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I. INTrRODUCTION
In 1995, the Supreme Court of Israel held that Basic Laws enjoy
normative supremacy over "regular" laws.' A substantial portion of
the lengthy judgment is devoted to providing theoretical substantia-
tion for the superior status of the Basic Laws, particularly in view of
the fact that both the Basic Laws and the regular laws are enacted by
the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) itself. This fascinating analysis is
outside the scope of our discussion. At the heart of the judgment is
the conviction that the Basic Lms should be regarded as the written
constitution of Israel. A law which contradicts the provisions of a Ba-
sic Law may be invalidated as unconstitutional.' The power of invali-
dation is within the competence of the courts and is the outcome of
the normative superiority of a Basic Law over a regular law.5 Natu-
rally, as permitted by some constitutions of other countries, a Basic
Law may afford a statute scope for infringing the provisions of the
former. Subject to this, an amendment to a Basic Law may be ac-
I CA. 6821/93, United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Viii., 49(4) P.D. 221, exlradal i,
31 IsR. L RE,. 764,770 (1997).
- It suffices for us to point out that eight of the nine justices hearing the case reached the
conclusion that the Knesset possessesjurisdiction both to adopt constitutional acts (Basic Laws)
and ordinary statutes (regular laws), where the latter are positioned on a lower normative rung
than the former. See primarily the remarks ofJustice Shamigar, ,19(4) P.D. at 283-8. 31 Is,. L
REV. at 770-72, andJustice Barak, 49(4) P.D. at 355-409, 31 ISa. L R-v. at 780-8. It appears
that the reasoning ofJustice Barak, to the effect that the Knesset has a dual competency as a
constituent authority (in adopting Basic Laws ) and as a legislative authority (in enacting
Iaus)-prevails, as some of the other judges acceded to it. 49(4) P.D. at 150-54 (Levin. J.).
49(4) P.D. at 470, 31 IsR. L REV, at 794 (Zamir, J.); 49(4) P.D. at 577 (Maa. J.). justice
Cheshin expressed a minority view in this connection, which does not recognize the power of
the Knesset to generate constitutional acts which supersede regular laws. 49(0) P.D. at 473-526.
31 ISR. L RE., at 796-800. For an analysis of the opinions ofJustices Shmaigar Barak. and
Cheshin, see Claude Klein, Basic Laws, Constituent Pourr and Judrial IR4rt- of Statults in lsrae
Bank Hamizrachi United v. Kfar Chitufi Migdal and Oth/s, 2 EuR. PUB. L 205 (1995).
s 31 IsR. L REv. at 783 (Barak,J.) ("Each of the Basic Laws constitutes a chapter in the can-
stitution of the State of Israel. Each chapter stands as the pinnacle of the nonnative pyra-
mid... Indeed, the State of Israel has a constitution-dthe Basic Laws.").
4 49(4) P.D. at 272-76, 296-99, 319-24, 351-52 (ShamgarJ.); id. at 406-09, 418-19, 447 (Ba-
rak,J.). It should be noted thatJustice Barak leaves "open" the question of whether it is possi-
ble to "infringe" (as distinct from "amend") the provisions of a Basic Law by means of a regular
law. Id. at 409. See also his comments, id. at 409-10, from which it is perhaps possible to con-
clude that the infringement is indeed possible. However, it seems that the normative superior-
ity of a Basic Law over a regular law-A'hich Justice Barak has asserted-must lead to the con-
clusion that a deviation from a Basic Law is not possible even by %-ay of"infringement.' &e also
infra note 17.
. 49(4) P.D. at 316-17, 352, 31 IsR. L Rv,. at 777 (ShanigarJ.), 49(4) P.D. at 418-27, 447,
31 ISR. L REV. at 785 (Barak, J.); 49(4) P.D. at 513-14,567, 568, 571, 31 15R. L REv. at 801-02
(Cheshin, J.). All the judges were in agreement ith regard to the existence of the Court's
power to invalidate a statute in consequence of the normative superiority of Basic Laws.
6 See generaly Amos Shapira & Baruch Bracha, The ConstitutionalStatus ofInditidualFrerdorns,
2 IsR.Y.B. HUhi. RTs. 211,225-28 (1972). Such scope for infringement often exists in a chapter
dealing -with human rights in a constitution and is known as a "limitation clatse." Id. at 226.
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complished by the adoption of another Basic Law which provides for
that amendment.'
The trigger for the judgment of the Supreme Court was the en-
actment of two Basic Laws in the sphere of human rights: Basic Law:
Freedom of Occupation s and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Free-
dom.9 These Basic Laws reflected a partial victory in the protracted
struggle to adopt a full Bill of Rights for Israel by way of a Basic Law. "'
This success, which the President of the Supreme Court termed a
"constitutional revolution,"" opened the way to numerous difficult
constitutional questions, inter alia, in relation to the constitutional
status of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, which does not
contain a provision regarding formal entrenchment.
This issue stood at the center of the hearing in the United Mizrachi
Bank case, in which the appellants attacked the Family Agricultural
Sector Adjustment (Amendment) Law, 1993, is on the grounds that it
infringed their property rights which were guaranteed by Section 3 of
the Basic Law.' As noted, the Supreme Court held that this Basic
Law, together with the other Basic Laws, enjoy normative superiority
over regular laws and, in that case, the 1993 Law. Accordingly, the
Court examined whether this law indeed infringed upon the property
rights guaranteed by Section 3. Upon determining that it did, the
Court considered the law in the light of the limitation clause" and
concluded that the law did in fact meet the tests provided therein.
The infringing statute was therefore found to be constitutional not-
withstanding that it impaired the property right.
49(4) P.D. at 319-21 (Shamgar,J.); id. at 406-07 (Barak,J).
8 1991-1992 S.H. 114, repealed ty Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1994, 1993-1994 S.H.
90. Reference hereinafter will be to the 1994 version.
9 1991-1992 S.H. 150.
10 For background regarding attempts to adopt a Bill of Rights, see 3 AHARON BARAK,
INTERPRETATION IN LAw 261-63 (1994) (Constitutional Interpretation) (Hebrew); AMNON
RUBINSTEIN & BARAK MEDINA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 910-25 (5th ed.
1996) (Hebrew); Baruch Bracha, The Protection of Human Rights in Israe 12 ISR. Y.B. HUhi. RTS.
110, 124-26 (1982); Judith Karp, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom-A Biography of Pnver
Struggles, I LAW & GOV'T ISR. 323, 333-44 (1992-1993) (Hebrew); Asher Maoz, Defending Civil
Liberties Without a Constitution-The Israeli Experience 16 MELB. U.L. REv. 815, 819-20 (1988).
n Aharon Barak, The Constitutional Revolution: Protected Human Rights, 1 LAw & GOV'T ISR. 9,
11 (1992-1993) (Hebrew).
1 Cf. Section 7 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which contains such a provision.
"This Basic Law shall not be varied except by a Basic Law passed by a majority of the members
of the Knesset." I.
is 1992-1993 S.H. 178.
14 C.A. 6821/93, United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Viii., 49(4) P.D. 221, extractled in
31 ISR. L. REV. 764, 770 (1997).
15 Section 8 of the Basic Law states:
The rights conferred by this Basic Law shall not be infringed save where provided by a
law which befits the values of the State of Israel, intended for a proper purpose, and to
an extent no greater than required, or under an aforesaid law by virtue of an explicit
authorization therein.
The same limitation clause appears in connection with infringement of freedom of occu-
pation in Section 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.
[Vol. 3:2
Apr. 2001] CONSTITUIONAL UPGRADIG OF HUMLAN RIGHTS
Since the United Mizrachi Bank case, a number of statutes enacted
by the Knesset have been attacked on the ground of unconstitutional-
ity.16 In one of the cases, the Supreme Court invalidated a statutory
provision (by way of suspension) on the grounds that it infringed the
right to freedom of occupation guaranteed by Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation and did not meet the requirements of the limitation
clause contained in the Basic Law. 7 In another case, the Court in-
validated a statutory provision (again by way of suspension) which in-
fringed the freedom of a person which is guaranteed by Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Freedom, where that infringement failed to meet
the requirements of the limitation clause contained in that Basic
Lav.8
16 See; eg., H.C. 6652/96, Ass'n for Civil Rights v. Minister of Interior, 52(3) P.D. 117; H.C.
5503/94, Segal v. Speaker of Knesset, 51(4) P.D. 529; H.C. 4676/94, Mitral Lid. v. Knesset.
50(5) P.D. 15; H.C. 4562/92, Zandberg v. Broadcasting Auth.. 50(2) P.D. 793.
'7 H.C. 1715/97, Chamber of Inv. Managers in Isr. v. Minister of Fin., 51(4) P.D. 367.
is KC. 6055, 7083/95, Zemach v. Minister of Defense (forthcoming). As pointed out in
supra note 12, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is entrenched against deviations front its
provisions subject to the scope which it itself leaves to the Knesset in relation to legislatv in-
fringement of freedom of occupation. In this context it should be said that before the judg-
ment in the matter of Chamber of Investment Managers in Israd, 51(4) P.D. 367-and even before
the case of CA. 6821/93, United Alizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Migdril Cooperatite 1i11ag,,. 49(4) P.D. 221,
the Court examined the constitutionality of statutes which it uas asserted contradicted an en-
trenched provision of a Basic Law. In certain cases, the Supreme Court has even invalidated
provisions of such statutes. RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 10, at 383-98. The uniqueness of
the judgment in the United Mizachi Bank case lies in it providing the most in-depth theoretical
endeavour undertaken to date in the case law, to resolve questions which revolve around the
most fundamental aspects of the constitutional system. In consequence of this endeavour, the
Court held, contrary to earlier case law, see id. at 398-99, that even Basic Laws which are not en-
trenched-and therefore all the Basic Laws-enjoy a constitutional status which is superior to
that of regular statutes. In addition, the Court decisively affirmed the existence ofjudicial st-
pervisory power, a power which had been exercised in the past without any real theoretical de-
liberations as to the fact of its existence, principally by reason of the fact that the respondents
had not raised the issue of its absence. Id. at 396-97.
It should also be pointed out that in relation to Basic Law. Human Dignity and Freedom.
there also were, prior to this judgment, obiter dida in the case law regarding its supra-legislative
status, and regarding the power of the Court to supenise this status. e ; e.g.. Miscellaneous
Applications-Criminal [M.A.Cr.] 6654/93, Binkin v. State, 48(l) P.D. 290, -293. There.Justice
Barak refers to the right to leave Israel provided in Section 6(a) of the Basic Law:
This right enjoys a constitutional status which is supralegislative. A regular law which is
enacted after the date of entry into force of the Basic Law, which infringes the basic right
and which does not meet the requirements of the "limitation clause" (Section 8 of the
Basic Law), is an unconstitutional law. The Court is entitled to confer remedies in re-
spect of it. One of those remedies is a declaration of invalidity, while concurrently set-
ting the date of invalidity (retroactive, active, prospective).
Id. However, it must be reiterated, that these statements were not accompanied by the same
incisive analysis found in United Mizrachi Bank Ld., which has repercussions for the status of all
the Basic Laws and for the judicial supervision derived therefrom. This analysis %as imple-
mented in the Zemachjudgment in which, as noted, a statutory provision %as invalidated be-
cause it infringed the provisions of Basic Law. Hunman Dignity and Freedom. Se also Chambnerof
Inv. Managers in Isr., 51(4) P.D. at 418. In H.C. 102/99, Misgav v. Knesset (forthcoming)
(ZamirJ.), the Supreme Court noted, at paragraph 7, that
[I]t has already been held that the Court is competent to invalidate a law which is con-
trary to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom or to Basic Law. Freedom of Occupa-
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The substantive importance of the new Basic Laws and the recog-
nition of their supra-legislative normative status, enjoyed by the other
Basic Laws as well, caused the subordination of the various legal
branches to the constitutional provisions contained in the Basic Laws.
In the words ofJustice Barak, this amounts to the "constitutionaliza-
tion of the Israeli legal system."' 9 This constitutionalization is primar-
ily expressed in the new normative status of protected human rights,
which are now positioned at the apex of the pyramid, and by their
impact on the various branches of the law.20 This impact has a pro-
found effect on the relations between the individual and the adminis-
trative authority which exercises powers capable of infringing his
freedoms. A significant change has now been introduced in these re-
lations.2 ' Generally, it should be remembered that a firm, reciprocal
tion. However, it has not yet been held that the Court is competent to invalidate a law
which is contrary to Basic Law: the Government.
In my opinion, once it was determined that Basic Laws enjoy normative superiority over
regular laws, and that the Court possesses jurisdiction to exercise judicial review in accordance
therewith, the same extends to all the cases in which it is asserted that a statute is contrary to a
Basic Law. See also H.C. 1384/98, Avni v. Prime Minister, 52(5) P.D. 206, 209, 214 (stating that
with regard to the provisions of Section 39(b) of Basic Law: the Government, 1991-1992 S.H.
214, "[t]his provision exists on a constitutional supra-legislative level" and that "[a] Basic Law is
not a 'regular' law. A Basic Law is a normative provision, at a constitutional supra-legislative
level."); United Mizrachi Bank Ltd., 49(4) P.D at 468 (Zamir,J.).
At the same time, one should not ignore the fact that in the light of the final result reached by
the justices in the United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. case, i.e., that the statute under attack was not
void-the analysis made there in relation to the question of the status of the Basic Laws and the
power ofjudicial review is also in the nature of obiter dictum. In this connection, for example,
see the remarks ofJustice Cheshin at the beginning of hisjudgment: "The differences of opin-
ion among us that were revealed in relation to the issue of the constituent authority of the
Knesset and the question of the 'sovereignty' of the Knesset, all constitute obiter dictum"; 49(,1)
P.D. at 471-72,31 ISR. L. REv. at 796.
This fact, according to Justice Cheshin, did not diminish the importance of dealing with
the aforesaid questions:
[I] t seems to me that since the date of the Supreme Court of Israel--since the date of its
establishment up to the present-no greater or more important question has been
raised before the Court than the question of the constituent power of the Knesset to en-
act a constitution for Israel, than the question whether a constitution has been given to
Israel, even if only a few bills at a time .... However, substantively, the question over-
shadows all other questions brought before us, even if obiter, indeed it is a giant among
giants .... We are dealing with a question which lies at the foundation of the legal sys-
tem in Israel, no less. And standing before such a sublime question we would find it dif-
ficult not to make some comments concerning it.
49(4) P.D. at 472. For criticism of the judgment on the grounds that it is in the nature of obiter
dictum, see Eli M. Salzberger, The Constituent Assembly in Israe 3 LAW & GOV'T ISR. 679, 680-86
(1995-1996) (Hebrew).
19 United Mizrachi Bank Ltd., 49(4) P.D. at 447, 31 ISR. L. REV. at 792; Aharon Barak, The Con-
stitutionalization of the Israeli Legal System as a Result of the Basic Laws and Its Effect on Procedural and
Substantive Criminal Law, 31 ISR. L. REv. 3 (1997).
20 See United Mizrachi Bank Ltd., 49(4) P.D. at 447, 31 ISR. L. REV. at 792 (Barak,J.).
"1 See MA.Cr. 537/95, Genimat v. State, 49(3) P.D. 355, 414-15 (Barak,J.):
Upon the enactment of the Basic Laws, a conceptual change took place. Human rights
are no longer derived from interpretation of legislation. Interpretation of legislation
and its very validity are required to respect the human rights in the Basic Laws, and the
balance inter seas well as between them and the public interest. This change also has an
impact on legal rhetoric. In the past we used the rhetoric of authority, power and gov-
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connection exists between the two branches of public law-the consti-
tutional and the administrative-as, to a large extent, administrative
law leads to the concretization of the constitutional principles in the
sphere of the relations between the individual and governmental
authority.-- In giving rise to this concretization, administrative law
draws a balance between two fundamental elements of the welfare
state, which on occasion pull in conflicting directions. The elements
are, on the one hand, the need to grant expansive powers to the gov-
ernmental authorities-particularly those operating under the um-
brella of the executive branch (i.e public administration bodies)-
and, on the other hand, the need to restrict those same powers in or-
der to prevent inappropriate infringements of human rights. M Obvi-
ously, a supra-legislative constitutional arrangement in the sphere of
human rights stamps its mark on the aforesaid balance, thus influenc-
ing the rules of administrative law.
The greater the influence of the constitutional arrangements on
administrative law, the more relevant it is to speak of "constitutional
administrative law."-4 On occasion, the constitution is also the direct
and immediate source of the administrative law rule under considera-
tion.2 Thus, in terms of the matter under discussion here, namely,
the Bill of Rights in a constitution, it may be instructive to point out
that various aspects of the administrative process in the United States
are based on the provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Constitution concerning "due process." These provisions
guarantee, constitutionally, fair process when it is intended to in-
fringe the rights referred to in the United States Constitution's Bill of
Rights. 6 The same holds true regarding Canada by virtue of Section
ernmental discretion, from which the various rights were derived by inans of interpreta-
tion. In the light of the Basic Laws, we must now employ the rhetoric of rights and free-
doms, in terms of which we must determine the validity and scope of the authority,
power and governmental discretion. It is not governmental power, properly balanced.
which shall determine the human rights, but it is the human rights. properly balanced.
which shall determine the governmental power.
See also Unie Mizrachi Bank Lt., 49(4) P.D. at 447-87,31 ISR. L REV. at 792-93 (Barak,J.).
- Cf. THoMtAs ERSKINE HOLAND, THE ELE.MENTS OFJURISPRUDENCE 374 (13th ed. 1924):
The various organs of the sovereign power are described by constitutional law as at rest:
but it is also necessary that they should be considered as in motion, and that the nmanner
of their activity should be prescribed in detail. The branch of law which does this is
called administrative law....
See generally Dov Levin, Administrative Laa--The Conidar to the Parlor of Constjtutional Lau, on the
Occasion of the Release of Professor Baruch Bracha's Book AdrninistratitieLaw (i"lure2, 22 TEL Aviv
U. I REv. 617 (1999) (Hebrew).
23 See 1 BARUCH BRACHA, ADMINISTRATIVE Lv 9-10 (1986) (Hebrew).
24 See ROBERT STUART LoRCH, DEMhOCRATIC PROCESS AND ADMINISTRATIVL Ls.v 61 (rev. ed.
1980).
On the constitution as a source of particular rules of administrative law in Europe, see
JURGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISrRATIVE L ,W 103-04, 116-17, 156-57. 162-63. 167-6.8, 174-
75, 82, 194-96 (1992). See generally H.B. JACOBiNI, AN INTRODuctno TO COMPAAThTV
ADMinSrRATrvE LAW 5-6 (1991).
See BERNARD SCHWART7, ADtNISrRAwTivE LAW 224-25 (3d ed. 1991).
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7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982, which forms part of
the Canadian Constitution and which provides that "[e]veryone has
the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to
be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fun-
damental justice." -' This also applies to the proposed Bills of Rights
in Israel."8
As will be seen below, the direct and explicit reference to rules of
administrative law is not given prominence in Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation or Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom.29 Neverthe-
less, analysis of the provisions of the Basic Laws reveals their extensive
influence on administrative law, and consequently, the "upgrading"
of some administrative rules to a constitutional level. This influence
will be discussed in this article, but without purporting, of course, to
examine the entirety of the rules of administrative law from the con-
stitutional angle. Moreover, the discussion on this influence will
primarily be conducted on the level of principle, without entering
into the details of the concrete rules and the full extent of their ap-
plication.
The massive constitutional contribution by the Knesset in 1992
was also reflected in the replacement of Basic Law: the Government
of 19 6 8 ,30 with Basic Law: the Government of 1992.s' The new Basic
Law introduced significant changes to the system of parliamentary
government in Israel. At its center the new Basic Law provided for
the direct election of the Prime Minister (PM), the strengthening of
the PM's governing status, and the creation of various new arrange-
ments in the relations between the executive branch (the govern-
ment) and the Knesset.s2 This Basic Law contains a variety of provi-
sions-some of which also appeared in its predecessor-dealing
directly with rules of administrative law and their application in the
governmental arena. These provisions deal with the delegation,5
7 DAVID PHILIPJONES & ANNE S. DE VILLARS, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAv 25-26, 51-
60, 222-24 (2d ed. 1994); Barbara A. McIsaac, Pro-edural Fairness, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 339,
348-56 (Law Society of Upper Canada, Special Lectures, 1992); see also N.Z. Bill of Rights Act,
1990, § 27; S. Afr. Const. §§32-33.
-2 See, e.g., Basic Law: Human and Civil Rights Bill, § 19, 1972/1973 Hatzaot Chok [Bills of
the State of Israel] 448; Basic Law: Basic Human Rights Bill, §§18-22, 1982/1983 Hatzaot Chok
111; see also the Basic Law Bill referred to infra note 234.
There are clear and direct references to the principle of proportionality, as part of the
limitation clauses, in both Basic Laws. See infra text accompanying notes 281-87.
22 L.S.I. 257 (1968).
31 The new Basic Law entered into force in 1996. See Section 63 of Basic Law: the Govern-
ment of 1992.
32 See generally Changing the System of Government in Israel-Proposed Basic Law: the
Government-Direct Elections of the Prime Minister (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and
the Public Committee for a Constitution for Israel, 1990); Bernard Susser, Towards a Constitution
for Israe4 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 939 (1993); BARAK, supra note 10, at 39 (referring to the new sys-
tem as "quasi parliamentary government" or "quasi presidential government"); RUBINSTEIN &
MEDINA, supra note 10, at 687-730.
3S Section 41.
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transfer" and arrogation of powers,yn the power to promulgate subor-
dinate legislation, parliamentary supervision of such legislation,5
and more. Similarly, the constitutional principles anchored in those
provisions exert an influence on other aspects of administrative lawss
These arrangements justify separate examination." As already
noted, in this article we shall deal with the influence that the Basic
Laws operating in the sphere of human rights exert on rules of ad-
ministrative law.
II. THE APPLICATION OF THE BASIC L VS TO
THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES
A. The Application (Respect) Clause
Bills of Rights are first and foremost directed tow-ards government
authorities, obliging them to respect the protected rights.i° This is
also the case in the Basic Laws under consideration here. Section 11
of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom provides that: All gov-
ernmental authorities are bound to respect the rights under this Ba-
sic Law.
A parallel provision may be found in Section 5 of Basic Law:
Freedom of Occupation. The application of the Basic Laws to the
governmental authorities-from the point of view of their duty to re-
spect the rights contained therein-is, therefore, immediate and di-
rect
4
Section 39(b).
3 Section 42.
6 Section 47.
3 Section 48.
5s For example, they influence that which concerns the question of the independence of a
competent authority's discretion, wvithin the hierarchical system, and in our case-that which
stands at the top of the pyramid-the government. Sre2 BARL'CH BRACHA. AD.IN-rATI 'L Lv
64-65,84-86 (1996) (Hebrew).
On March 2001 the Knesset passed Basic Lau- the Government. which will replace the
1992 Basic Law by returning--generally speaking-to the system of parliamentary government.
The 2001 Basic Law will enter into force in the coming elections to the Knesset (Section 47)
which are scheduled for 2003. Reference hereinafter to "Basic Law: the Government" is to the
1992 version unless the 2001 version is explicitly mentioned.
s9 This is also the case with respect to the impact of other Basic Laws which have gained a
constitutional dimension since the United Aliuatch Bank LidL Case, on administative law, and
the potential impact of proposed Basic Laus, such as Basic Law: Legislation Bill, 1992-93 Hat-
zaot Chok 91.
40 "Historically, bills of rights, of which that of the United States is the great exemplar. have
been directed at government." McKinney v. Univ. of Guelph, [ 1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, 262 (La For-
estJ.) (Supreme Court of Canada).
The position is different ith regard to the duty of respect to be shown by private bodies.
The Basic Laws do not contain any specific application provisions regarding the duty of respect.
and the way to make them subject to the duty of respect is more complicated. See BAtRA. supra
note 10, at 647-97; see also C.A. 239/92, Egged Coop. Ass'n for Transp. in sr. v. Mashiah, 48(2)
P.D. 66, 70-73.
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The term "governmental authorities" refers to the three branches
of government in the classic division: legislature, judiciary, and ex-
ecutive. The public administration authorities are undoubtedly in-
corporated within the aforesaid category. These authorities are
numerous and richly diverse, and include, inter alia, the government
with its various branches, local government authorities and public
corporations.4 ' A question may arise as to the position of corpora-
tions incorporated under private law, but which are under the con-
trol of governmental authorities, such as government companies or
municipal companies. 5 It seems that to the extent that these corpo-
rations exercise statutory powers and operate primarily within the
public sphere-there is no difficulty in regarding them as govern-
mental authorities, as-by virtue of the rule of "normative duality"-
they are subject not only to private law but also to public law,4" includ-
ing the Basic Laws under consideration here. Other corporations
which are similarly controlled, but which do not fulfill governmental
functions, apparently are not subject to normative duality and are ac-
cordingly outside the purview of public law. Nevertheless, Justice
4- See the comments of Justice Shamgar with regard to the provision under discussion, in
C.A. 6821/93, United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village, 49(4) P.D. 221, 307 ("The
.governmental authorities' are three-the legislative authority, the executive authority and the
judicial authority,"), and the comments ofJustice Barak, id. at 412. See also H.C. 1000/92, Bavli
v. Great Rabbinical Court, 48(2) P.D. 221, 248. A "respect" clause which refers directly to gov-
ernmental authorities is fairly well-accepted in bills of rights. See, e.g., Can. Const. (Constitution
Act, 1982) (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), §32(1); Grundgesetz [Constitution]
(Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany,1949), §1 (3); N.Z. Bill of Rights Act, §3; S. Afr.
Const., §8; U.K. Human Rights Act, 1998, §6.
43 See H.C. 987/94, Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd. v. Minister of Communication, 48(5)
P.D. 412,436.
For an extensive look at this rich diversity of authorities, see ITZHAK ZAMIR,
ADMINISTRATIVE POWEiR 271-508 (1996).
45 For a discussion of these bodies and their relationship to the public administration, see
AvRAHAi VEINROTH, GOVERNMENT COMPANIES (1995) (Hebrew), Daphne Barak-Erez, Civil
Rights in the Privatization State: A Comparative View, 28 ANGLO-AMI. L. REV. 503 (1999), and
ZAMIR, supra note 44, at 427-83.
46 Thus, in H.C. 731/86, Micro-Page v. Electric Company of Israel 41 (2) P.D. 449, Justice Barak
did not see fit to decide the issue of the normative system applicable to all the governmental
corporations. I. at 461. However, he held that the Electric Company is subject to nonnative
duality, and therefore to the rules of administrative law:
Indeed, whatever the fate of the governmental companies--and we have no need to de-
cide that in the present petition-the status of the Electric Company is different from
the status of an ordinary governmental company. What makes the Electric Company
unique is that it has accumulated a number of qualities which make it comparable, for
the purpose of the lav applicable to its activities, to the statutory corporations. These
qualities are primarily- the existence of governmental powers, the conferral of an exclu-
sive franchise by the state and the control over an essential means of production (elec-
tricity) ....
Id. at 462.
47 Indeed, against the background of the comments quoted in supra note 46, Justice Barak
further held, "In my view, the Electric Company is just like a public authority." 41(2) P.D. at
462.
48 In CA. 3414/93, On v. Diamond Exch. Plants (1965) Ltd., 49(3) P.D. 196, 204-05, Justice
Zamir refers to the rule set out in the Micro-Page Case with regard to the Electric Company, add-
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Barak has expressed his firm view that they are subordinate to the di-
rect application of the Basic Laws.
The public administration authorities enjoy a wide range of pow-
ers in the spheres of legislation, adjudication and execution."' All
these powers are subject to the duty of respect provided for in the Ba-
sic Laws, which draw no distinction, for this purpose, between the re-
spective powers. Moreover, even when the authority acts within the
sphere of private law, it is subject to the rules of public law-again, as
part of the principle of normative duality'-and in our case, it is di-
rectly subject to the application of the Basic Laws.5
B. The Significance of the Application of the Basic Laws
to the Administrative Authorities
1. Negative Protection of Rights-
The Principle of the Legality of the Admiinistration
The application (duty of respect) clauses, therefore, oblige the
govermnental authorities-in our case, the public administration
authorities-to respect the human rights protected in the Basic Laws
under consideration. This duty of respect has, first and foremost, a
negative significance: those authorities are prohibited from infringing
upon the rights beyond the limits of what ispermitted by the Basic
Laws (i.e. the limitation clauses found therein"s) .
ing:
However it is clear that not all the governmental companies are made of the sane fabric.
Many are the companies which, excluding public ownership, show almost no characteris-
tics of a public body. Thus, for example, the Dead Sea Plants Ltd. Accordingly. it has
been held that normative duality does not apply to that company: it is not subject to the
rules of administrative law.
Id. at 205. See also ZA MR, supra note 44, at 473-74.
49 BARAK, supra note 10, at 454 ("IT]he application of human rights to the private corpora-
tion is not contingent upon that private corporation carr)ing out state functions. The applica-
tion of human rights is derived from the control and supervision of the state, whatever the finc-
tions being carried out.").
SeeBRAcHA, supra note 23, at 53-75.
51 See, eg., H.C. 840/79, Center of Contractors & Builders in Isr. v. Israel, 34(3) P.D. 729,
745-50; On, 49(3) P.D. at 204; Further Hearing [F.H.] 22/82, BeitJules LtdL v. Raviv Moshe &
Partners, 43(1) P.D. 441,465; Micro-Page, 41(2) P.D. at 461; Daphne BarakErez. Civil LiabililY of
Public Bodies: NormativeDualiy, 1 L & GOV'T ISR. 275 (1992-1993) (Hebrew).
52 See BARAK, supra note 10, at 452-53. This is also the position in Canada with regard to the
application of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to actions of a govcrnmental authority in the
sphere of private law. SeeJONES & DE VIUARS, supra note 27, at 46-47.
In so far as reference is to freedom of occupation, it is also possible to infringe upon it by
making use of the "notwithstanding" clause contained in Section 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation, which provides:
(a) A provision of law which infringes [upon the] freedom of occupation shall be valid
notwithstanding that it does not accord with Section 4 [the limitation clause], if it is in-
corporated in a law enacted by a majority of Knesset members and it expressly declares
that it is valid nodithstanding the provisions of this Basic Law; a law as aforesaid %ill ex-
pire at the end of four years from its date of commencement, save where an earlier ter-
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Thus, for example, Section 3 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Freedom, which protects property rights, states that: "[n]o injury
may be caused to the property of a person." A law which purports to
infringe this right will be invalid, unless it meets the requirements of
the limitation clause set out in Section 8.5
Thus is the immediate impact on the principle of the legality of
the administration, which is the foremost principle of administrative
law.- This principle makes the power of the administrative authority
contingent upon the existence of a legally valid empowering provi-
sion. Without such empowerment, its activities will be unlawful and
therefore without legal effect. This is the position with respect to the
activities of the authority in general and, afortiori, with respect to its
infringing activities in the sphere of human rights.8 In the absence
of constitutional protection of these rights, it was sufficient in the past
for the executive authority to point to a Knesset law which acted as
the source of its powers. Today, the position of protected rights is
different. A statute can act as the source of the power of the author-
ity, on condition, however, that the statute itself is valid-i.e., that it
meets the requirements of the limitation clause, both from the point
of view of its infringing-right contents, and from the point of view of
mination date is provided therein.
(b) The provision regarding the expiration of validity, as aforesaid in subsection (a),
shall not apply to a law which was enacted less than one year from the date this Basic Law
enters into force.
This prohibition is the conventional protection of "classic" human rights, according to the
liberal model. See Shapira & Bracha, supra note 6, at 216. An example of such negative protec-
tion is found in the American Bill of Rights. As Justice Rehnquist noted in Deshaney v. Winni-
bago Social Services.
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the state to protect
the life, liberty and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors. The Clause
is phrased as a limitation on the state's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain mini-
mal levels of safety and security. It forbids the state itself to deprive individuals of life,
liberty or property without "due process of law," but its language cannot fairly be ex-
tended to impose an affirmative obligation on the state to ensure that those interests do
not come to harm through other means.
489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (Rehnquist, J.). See also Rwonda Copelon, The Indivisible Framerork of
International Human Rights: Bringing it Home, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
216, 219 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) ("Negative is a word that aptly describes the U.S. frame-
work of civil rights and civil liberties in a number of ways...."); David P. Currie, Positive and
Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 864-67 (1986). But see Currie, supra, at 872.See, e.g., CA. 6821/93, United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill., 49(4) P.D. 221;
supra text accompanying notes 13-14. For additional rights which enjoy negative protection in
the Basic Laws under discussion, see BARAK, supra note 10, at 361-62.
56 See BRACHA, supra note 23, at 35; ZAMIR, supra note 44, at 49.
57 See CA 630/97, Local Comm. for Planning & Constr. v. Song of N. Constr. Co., 52(3)
P.D. 399, 403-04 (Ariel,J.):
The central principle of administrative law is the principle of the legality of the admini-
stration. The authorities of the public administration are established by virtue of statute
and statute confers powers upon them and determines their mode of operation. It fol-
lows that no administrative authority, set up by virtue of statute, is entitled to do anything
save what it has been authorized to do by statute ....
See BRAcHA, supra note 23, at 39-40.
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the empowerment of the administrative authority to infringe that
right.5O As a result, the princi le of the legality of the administration
attains a constitutional status.
2. Positive Protection of Rights-The General Duty of the Administrative
Authority to Exercise Pouters
Alongside the principle of the legality of the administration,
which prohibits the authority to act in the absence of a legal authoriza-
tion-and in our case, to infringe a right-another important princi-
ple of administrative law obligates the authority to ac 6r These two
principles are complementary, together reflecting the fundamental
principle of the rule of law.0 Indeed, in the same way as the absence
of empowerment reveals the unwillingness of the legislature to en-
able the authority to act, conferral of a power manifests the will of the
legislature to compel exercise of the power on the part of the author-
ity.6
The duty to act is often intended to protect one of the human
rights, including those originating from the liberal model, which, as
noted, on the conceptual level, require "negative" protection. Thus,
for example, "it is the right of the citizen ... to enjoy his property
and to procure the services of the police against anyone interfering
59 As to the constitutionality of the statutory authorization in this regard, see the final por-
tion of the limitation clauses ("or under an aforesaid law by virtue of an explicit authorization
therein") and infra text accompanying notes 156-57,200.
In Canada too, the "legality of bureaucratic conduct is now decided not only in accordance uith
fidelity to legislation, but also by the normative concepts contained in the Clmrter." &eAndrew
J. Roman, The Possible Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Frrdoms on Adminisfrative Lau,
26 LES CAHlERs DE DRorr 339, 341 (1985). This is not the case, however, in Australia where
there is no constitutional Bill of Rights. See Kim Rubinstein, Touards 2001: An Assumvennt of the
Possible Impact of a Bill of Rights on Administrutive Law in Australia, I AL'STL J. An.ILN. L 13. 22
(1993-94).
60 In this way, constitutional support is given to the philosophical idea underlying Bills of
Rights, ie. that the individual is entitled to do whatever he pleases unless his freedom is limited
by a valid piece of legislation. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humtan Rights states in Art.
29(2): "In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limita-
tions as are determined by law .... " The Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution
clarifies the eight preceding it, noting that: "The enumeration in te Constitution of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
6, SeeBRACHA, supra note 38, at 23-41.
See KC. 428, 499, 431, 446, 448, 463/86, Barzilai v. Israel, -10(3) P.D. 505. 621-22, trr-
lated in 6 SELECTEDJUDGMENTS SUP. CT. ISIL 1, 103-04; RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 10, at
228-29, 243. Reference is to the rule of law in the "formal" sense. Id. at 228.
63 See, eg., H.C. 297/82, Berger v. Minister of Interior, 37(3) P.D. 29.45-47. surnrinzd ins 20
IsR. L REN 504 (1985). When reference is to a discretionary power, the significance of the duty
is that it is for the authority to consider the exercise of the power subject to the rules of admin-
istrative law which are concerned with the proper exercise of the discretion--rules which may
compel it to perform the act which is within the scope of its power. Se, e.g., Berger, 37(3) P.D.
29; H.C. 3094, 4319, 4478/93, Movement for Quality in Gov't v. Israel, '17(5) P.D. 401. 419-21,
translated in 10 SELCrEDJUDG.IENTS SUP. Cr. IsR. 258, 278-82; H.C. 2624, 2827,2830/97, Ronel
v. Israel, 51(3) P.D. 71, 76-77.
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[with it] ."6 Similarly, the police must guarantee the implementation
of freedom of artistic speech against any person attempting to ham-
per it by way of a disturbance. They must also protect the freedom
of demonstration and worship by providing protection to demonstra-
tors6 and worshippers67 from a hostile crowd attempting to under-
mine the right. On a broader level, "public authorities" must share
with the public information stored in their files and data bases, inter
alia, as part of freedom of information s and the right of the public to
know.69 The right to equality7° often means the imposition of an obli-
gation on the authority to grant A the same care that it grants B,
when there is no relevant difference between them.71
3. Positive Protection of Rights-The Constitutional Duty of the Administra-
tive Authority to Exercise Powers
This approach, which obligates the authority to act in order to
protect a right, is reflected in the Basic Laws insofar as they compel
the governmental authorities to respect the protected rights: the re-
spect may, in certain circumstances, impose a prohibition on the in-
fringement of a right, and in other circumstances impose a duty to act
in order to protect the right against infringement.7 In this way, the
purpose clauses in both Basic Laws are also implemented. Thus, Sec-
tion IA of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom states that "[t]he
purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and free-
dom ... ,7 "Protection" may well require the performance of an act
64 H.C. 222/68, Nationalist Groups Ass'n. v. Minister of Police, 24 (2) P.D. 141, 167 (Witkon,
H.C. 549/75, Noah Films Co. v. Cinematic Films Supervisory Bd., 30(1) P.D. 757, 76
(Witkon,J.) ("If there is a fear of rowdiness, it is for the police to preserve the public peace and
the maintenance of law and order. This is not a consideration which should influence a coun-
cil member to prohibit a film, which, in his initial view, should not have been prohibited.").
See H.C. 158/83, Levi v. Southern Dist. Police Comm'r, 38(2) P.D. 393, 404-05, translated
in 7 SELECrED JUDGMENTS SUP. CT. ISR. 109, 120-21; H.C. 2665/98, Nahum v. Israel Police.
52(2) P.D. 454, 460.
67 See H.C. 292/83, Temple Mount Faithful Ass'n. v. Commander of Jerusalem Dist. Police,
38(2) P.D. 449,454-57.
68 Freedom of Information Law, 1998, S.H. 226, §1 ("Every Israeli citizen or resident has the
right to obtain information from a public authority in accordance with the provisions of this
Law.-).
Even prior to the enactment of the Freedom of Information Law, the case law recognized
"the right to obtain information," while emphasizing "the duty of holders of public office to
provide information to members of the public." H.C. 1601-1604/90, Shalit v. Peres, 44(3) P.D.
353, 365 (Barak, J.); see also CA_ 6926/93, Israel Shipyards Ltd. v. Israel Elec. Co., 48(3) P.D.
749, 794-96; see also infra text accompanying notes 245-47.70 As to this right, see infra text accompanying notes 288-300.
71 See, e.g., H.C. 721/94, El-Al Isr. Airlines Ltd. v. Danilowitz, 48(5) P.D. 749; see also infra text
accompanying note 299.
7 SeeBARAK, supra note 10, at 313, 365.
73 A parallel provision is found in Section 2 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation ("The
object of this Basic Law is to protect freedom of occupation.").
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on the part of the appropriate authority." Indeed, as Justice Barak
explains in his book:
[E]very constitutional norm which requires the government to refrain
from an act, may in appropriate circumstances compel the government
to act. Ultimately, the distinction between an act and an omission is fine
and indistinct, and it is difficult to assume that on such a narrow basis it is
possible to construct a constitutional theory according to which the Basic
Law requires that an authority refrain from a governmental act but does
not compel governmental action. It seems, therefore, that the govern-
ment may breach its obligation not only by an act but also by an omis-
sion.
An outstanding example of both aspects of the duty of respect
may be found in the provisions of Sections 2 and 4 of Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Freedom:
2. No injury may be caused to the life, person or dignity of a human be-
ing as a human being.
4. Every person has the right to protection of his life, his person and his
dignity.
Against the background of Section 4, it would seem that Section 2
is concerned with negative protection; and against the background of
Section 2, it would seem that Section 4 is concerned ith positive
protection. Thus, Justice Cheshin, referring to the right to dignity,'
stated:
[A] longside this right arises the obligation of the state to assist a person
to obtain what is properly his. The right which subsists in the Basic Law
is addressed to us: by its nature it affords relief to the holder of the right
to dignity, and by its nature it imposes a duty on other persons. This is so
in general, and afortiori because the Basic Law expressly instructs us-in
Section 4-that every person is entiled to protection of his dignity.
74 SeeBARAK, supra note 10, at 312-13.
BAAK, supra note 10, at 313. Cf. H.C. 297/82, Berger v. Minister of Interior, 37(3) P.D.
29,34-36. See also MATHEW C.R. CRAvEN, THE INTERKNTIO\'AL CovENA\cr o. E.o.No.%tic, SoCIA.
AND CULTuRAL RIGHTs--A PERSPECrIVE ON ITS DE .ontFrTr 15 (1995) ('[It would be wrong
to suggest that civil and political rights themselves are entirely negative ... the protection of
civil and political rights at an inter-individual level necessitates the operation of a police force
and a penal system." (citation omitted)); Currie, supra note 54, at 867.
,6 C.A. 3077/90, Anonymous v. Anonymous, 49(2) P.D. 578,593.
Id. See Further Hearing-Civil [F.H.C.] 7325/95. Yedioth Achronot Ltd. v. Kraus, 52(3)
P.D. 1, 61 (CheshinJ.). See also the comments ofJustice Cheshin in H.C. 6126/9-, Sen esh v.
BroadcastingAuthoriy, 53(3) P.D. 817, in connection with Basic Law: Human Dignity and Free-
dom which states:
Section 2 establishes a prohibition according to which "no injury may be caused to the
life, person or dignity of a human being as a human being" .... Section 4 or the Law
provides us with a duty according to which: "every person has the right to protection of
his life, his person and his dignity."
Id. at 865.
For the duty imposed on governmental authorities to protect human dignity, see also CA.
5942/92, Anon)ymus v. Anon)mous, 48(3) P.D. 837,842, and paragraph 2 ofJustice Barak's opin-
ion in the 1999 decision in H.C. 5936/97, Iam v. Didm"or Geemal of the Miniist of Edutalion, Cul-
ture & Sport (forthcoming).
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In cases where there is a positive duty to act to protect the right
under consideration, breach of that duty will actually constitute in-
fringement of the right, and it seems that its legality will be exam-
ined-by way of analogy-through the perspective of the limitation
clause. Compliance with the positive duty to act entails activation of
the powers held by the authority to protect the right. Thus, "the dig-
nity of the petitioner as a person requires a guarantee of his minimal
existence as a human being,, 79 and it is for the welfare authorities to
exercise the powers to assist possessed by them in such a way as to
guarantee this right.80 This is also the case in relation to the authority
For the duties to act which are the product of the right to dignity, see, for example, H.0.
161/94, Atarri v. State (unreported); M.A.Cr. 3045/94, Issawi v. State (unreported). See also
infra text accompanying notes 79-81.
As to positive and negative protection for the life, liberty and security of a person under
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, see Marthajackman, The Protection
of Welfare Rights Under the Charter 20 OlTAWA L. REV. 257, 322-28 (1988).
78 See infra text accompanying note 106. Also, in the case law which preceded the Basic
Laws, or which did not rely on them, and which imposed a duty to act on tile authority in order
to prevent violation of a protected right, see supra text accompanying notes 64-71, the duty was
not, of course, absolute. In specific cases it was necessary to draw a balance between the duty to
act and other relevant considerations operating within the scope of the power, i.e. considera-
tions in the face of which the duty might have yielded. Thus, for example, we have seen that
the police are under a duty to protect the right to demonstrate in the face of a hostile crowd
wishing to neutralize it. See supra text accompanying note 66. However, it may be that in cer-
tain circumstances this duty will not materialize:
It is possible that the reasonable efforts made by the police to prevent interference with a
demonstration will succeed in eliminating the danger threatened by a hostile crowd, but
it may also happen that the danger remains .... In this predicament the second ques-
tion poses itself, namely: does the risk of harm to body and life justify repression of the
right of demonstration and procession? ... An infringement of the right of demonstra-
tion and procession has to be justified when its exercise entails a risk of bodily injury and
loss of life. A democratic society which is anxious to preserve human dignity, life and
bodily integrity, which is concerned with maintaining democratic government proce-
dures, must sometimes deny or curtail the freedom of expression and the freedom of
demonstration and procession, even if the practical implication of so doing is to grant a
hostile audience defacto veto power.
H.C. 158/83, Levi v. Southern Dist. Police Comm'r, 38(2) P.D. 393, translated in 7 SELEcrED
JUDGMENTS SUP. CT. ISR. 109, 123 (Barak, J.). See also H.C. 881/78, Muzlach v. Commander of
Damon Prison, 33(1) P.D. 139, where the Court referred to the right of the petitioners-youths
who had been arrested-to make good the right of compulsory education, the Court having
been petitioned to allow them to travel every day from the prison to school where they could
study. "Alongside the duty to guarantee studies is the right to learn, and the petitioners ask that
this right be fulfilled in respect of them," asJustice Landau pointed out. Id. at 140. At the same
time, "with regard to the legal aspect of the petition, there are rights which the law guarantees
to a person, but which in prison conditions it is impossible to implement for other reasons also
originating in the law." Id. Thus, in the instant case, the right to education was not totally re-
jected; rather, within the framework of the existing constraints, the respondent could only en-
able the petitioners to implement the right within the four walls of the prison. For the right to
education, see also infra note 80.
See Atarri (unreported) (Barak, J.); see also National Labor Court Hearing [N.L.C.H.] 04-
265/96, Hassid v. National Ins. Inst. (unreported).
80 See Atarri (unreported) (Barak,J.). In the instant case, the authorities fulfilled their duty.
In H.C. 1554, 7715/953, Association of Shocharei Gilat v. Minister of Education, Culture & Sport,
50(3) P.D. 2, the petitioners asserted the existence of a constitutional right to education an-
chored in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom within the framework of the right to dig-
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charged with maintenance of detention centers: "if indeed the image
of the detainee as a human being is violated, then he is entitled not
only that the state not infringe his dignity as a human being but that
it actually protect his dignityw
ru
It may be that the duty to act will require the authority to promul-
gate regulations that are within its competence,U and if it fails to do
so, the courts may order it to do so,s just as they may order it to for-
nity. In their view, this right imposed a duty on the Minister of Education to ensure the educa-
tion of infants aged 0-3 and to continue his financial support for a psychological/educationad
program aimed at this age group, in which two of the petitioners were participating. Justice Or
rejected the contention that the right to dignity constitutionally anchored the right to educa-
tion. Id. at 25-26. The petitioners further attempted to rely on the principle of 'freedom of
education," set out in the Declaration of te Establishment of the State of Israel, 19-18. 1 LS.I.
3, since Section 1 of the Basic Law provided that fundamental human rights had to be re-
spected in the spirit of the Declaration's principles. Justice Or did not decide wthether the ref-
erence to the Declaration of Independence conferred upon it the status of a constitutional
source of rights. However, he held that even on the assumption that it possessed such a status,
freedom of education did not impose on the Minister the duty alleged by the petitioners.
The right to "freedom of education," literally, is to guarantee freedom and choice in
education. Thus, for example, parents who wish to provide religious education to their
children, have the freedom and choice to furnish them with such education. Similarly.
parents who desire to provide their children with a different education, which is not re-
ligious, have the freedom to choose such education for them. But, the right to 'freedom
of education," perse, does not entail the obligation of te state to supply a particular type
of education.
50(3) P.D. at 27. Justices Tal and Dorner did not see any need to decide ie question of the
constitutional right to education, it at 34, and indeed a petition for a further hearing on the
issue was dismissed on the ground that:
[The decision in the judgment, the subject of the petition, uas not nade ... on the ba-
sis of the position expressed by Justice Or in relation to the existence or absence of a
constitutional right to education .. but as a result of die decision of the Court not to in-
tervene in the discretion of the Ministry of Education and Culture.
Further Hearing High Court ofJustice [F.H.HLCJ.] 5456/96, ltzhak v. Minister of Educ. (unre-
ported) (BarakJ). For criticism of the judgment in die Association ofShocharri Gilat Cas, see
Gershon Gontovnik, Constitutional Lau: Deelopirats in the Wl of the Constitutional lkRoulion.
22 TEL Aviv U. L REV. 129, 130-46 (1999) (Hebrew). See also Guy Mundlak, Soecial-&onomri
Rights in the New Constitutional Discousme From Social Rights to a Social Diunioa of Huzan Rights. 7
LABOR LWYEARBOOK 65, 125-29 (1999) (Hebrew).
81 See Issawi (unreported) (Barak, J.). The comments referred to tie contention by the ap-
pellant in relation to die very difficult conditions prevailing in his prior place of detention. S-
also H.C. 5319, 5706, 5707/97, Kogan v. Military Advocate Gcn., 51 (5) P.D. 67, 89: M.A.Cr.
3734/92, State v. Azazmi, 46(4) P.D. 72, 85.
With regard to a mandatory power, the significance is simple: where die conditions set
out in the authorizing law are satisfied, the authority is obliged to promulgate regulations. With
regard to a discretionary power, the significance of the obligation is tat tie authority must
consider the promulgation of regulations in accordance with the rules applicable to die exer-
cise of discretion, and that the latter may lead the authority to the conclusion tiat it is com-
pelled to issue regulations. See H.C. 295/65, Oppenheimer v. Minister of Interior & Healdt,
20(1) P.D. 309; Berger, 37(3) P.D. at 29; see also supra note 63.
See generally BRAcHA, supra note 23, at 177-87. In ie Atarri case (unreported) the peti-
tioner asked that the Minister of Health be compelled to promulgate regulations which would
govern the matter of trade in human organs. The Minister agreed dtat this matter needed to
be regulated by legislation, but, in his view this had to be done by prinmary legislation, mad in-
deed the government even tabled a bill in this connection in die KnesseL I. The Court re-
garded the response of the Minister as reasonable, however, tought it necessary to add: "oilf
course, if the legislation does not come to pass within a reasonable period. the respondent will
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mulate rules concerning the policy and criteria guiding the imple-
mentation of its powers so as to guarantee the right to equality or
any other protected right.
85
The duties to act found in the Basic Laws under consideration
here, may also give content to the residual power of the government
set out in Section 40 of Basic Law: the Government.& Thus, for ex-
ample, the government is empowered, by virtue of this section, to de-
cide property rights in connection -with the holy places to which the
Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council, 1924,' applies.s The gov-
ernment is obliged to exercise this power, the significance of which is
to protect the rights under consideration;89 again, if the governmentrefrains from doing so, this could lead to judicial intervention.9" Sec-
have to reconsider his position." Id.
Thus, in relation to the authority to allocate funds from the state budget to "special insti-
tutions," tihe Supreme Court of Israel made the allocation contingent upon adoption of "clear,
relevant and equal criteria." H.C. 780/83, Yeshivat Tomchei Tmimim Centr. v. State (unre-
ported) (Barak,J.; Bejski,J.; Levin,J.); BRACHA, supra note 38, at 226-27 n.23.
Such as the right to dignity from the point of view of consideration for the feelings of fam-
ily members of a deceased in connection with the epitaph on the tombstone of the deceased in
a military cemetery. See H.C. 556/83, Bassat v. Minister of Defense, 38(i) P.D. 177; F.H.H.C.
3299/93, Waxelbaum v. Minister of Defense, 49(2) P.D. 195. In the latter case it was held that:
the matter of the petitioners would be returned to the Minister of Defense in order that he re-
consider their request against the background of new regulations or rtles which would be
promulgated or issued, within a reasonable time, and which would draw a proper balance be-
tween the need to guarantee uniformity in the military cemeteries, and the need to allow the
family personal expression.
Id. at 204 (Levin,J.).
Section 40 states: "The government is authorized to perform in the name of the state,
subject to any law, any action which is not imposed by law on another authority." See generally,
BRAcHA, supra note 23, at 43-44, 52, 79-80; ZAMIR, supra note '14, at 334-44; RUINSTEIN &
MEDINA, supra note 10, at 781-85. The same provision appears in Section 32 of Basic Law: the
Government of 2001. See supra note 38.
87 3 Laws of Palestine 2625.
& See H.C. 188/77, Coptic Muthran v. Israel, 33(1) P.D. 225, 228, 234, 236, 241, 251; H.C.
109/70, Coptic Muthran v. Minister of Police, 25(1) P.D. 225, 234, 244, 252; H.C. 222/68, Na-
tionalist Groups Ass'n. v. Minister of Police, 24(2) P.D. 141,178, 211,220.
AsJustice Landau clarifies in his dissenting opinion in the Coptic Muthran case, 33(1) P.D.
at 238:
[R]eference here is to rights which deserve legal protection, and it is the case law ruling
that when a governmental body is given the power to act (such as in Section 29 of Basic
Law: the Government [of 1968; this Section was replaced by Section 40 of the Basic Law
of 1992]) it is obliged to exercise that power, if exercise of the power is necessary to af-
ford protection to an existing right.
Actually, there was no dispute between the judges in respect of this general principle. See infra
note 90.
In the Coptic Mathran case, 33(l) P.D. at 225, the High Court ofJustice was asked to order
the government to exercise its power under the said Section and to decide a dispute between
two churches regarding the sharing of certain sites adjacent to the Church of the Holy Septul-
chre in Jerusalem. The government had reached a decision the practical effect of which was
not to decide. See id. at 232. Justice Landau, in a dissenting opinion, regarded this as a refusal
to exercise its power, id at 236, and, accordingly, held that the government was obliged to con-
clude the hearing of the dispute and come to a decision with reasonable speed. Id. at 247. The
second minorityjudge,Justice Witkon, also thought that reference here was to the refusal of the
government to exercise its power to decide the dispute. Id. at 247. It must be said that even
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tion 40 is also the basis for the government's power-from the point
of view of internal law-in the occupied territories.9' In the same ay
that the allocation of financial benefits by the government ithin the
area of the State of Israel requires the formulation of "clear, relevamt
and equal criteria" in order to guarantee the right to equality,9" the
award by the government of grants in the territories, in reliance on
Section 40,93 also requires such criteria.9'
In the context of employing Section 40 of Basic Law- the Gov-
ernment for the purpose of implementing the duty to act, ithin the
area of the protection of human rights in general, and in relation to
the rights contained in the Basic Laws in particular, it is necessary to
sound a note of caution. Section 40 provides for residual power, i.e.
though the three majorityjudges---Asher, Bechor and Lein-wvere of the opinion that the peti-
tion had to be dismissed, they did not disagree ith Justice Landau regarding the principle that
the government may not refuse to decide the dispute. ThusJustice Levin explained that:
[H]ad the government given notice that it was imashing its hands completely of the han-
dling of the dispute between the litigants, or had it violated their right to be heard be-
fore it on the basis of equality, or had it been proved that it refused and refuses to hold
any hearing on the matter, then I would not have hesitated to hold that there is a basis
for our intervention enforcing upon it fulfillment of the duties imposed upon it ....
Id. at 243. However, thejudge did not see the government's decision in this wav
[B]earing in mind the nature of the powers of the executive authority, in the instant
case, one must see the decision not to consider the petitional rights of the litigants. for
the time being, until the conditions are right for the same, as a decision which tie gov-
ernment was competent to make and that we have no cause to intervene in it.
Id. at 243-44. Justice Bechor agreed with this view, id. at 245-16, as did Justice Asher, who
agreed with the two other majorityjudges. I. at 249. Cf. H.C. 257/89, 2.110/90. Hoffman v.
Official Responsible for Western Wall, 48(2) P.D. 265, 339-40, 355-56, 357-58. In this connec-
tion it should also be added that the courts tend to refrain from intervening in decisions of the
government concerning the holy places. H.C. 8666/99. Temple Mount Faithful v. Attorney
Gen., 54(1) P.D. 199. As the Court has noted.
This does not mean, of course, that if a difference of opinion or violation of the law in
matters concerning the Temple Mount are revealed, the executive authority-the gov-
ernment and the Prime Minister-ill react by doing nothing. On the contram it is be-
cause the courts refrain from dealing with mauers concerning the Temple Mount. that
there is a doubly strong duty on the executive authority to enter--deeply-into all the
differences of opinions and violations of the law, and do everything possible--as speedily
as possible-in order to preserve order, public peace and te appropriate balance be-
tween the various sectors of the public.
Id. at 210 (Cheshin,J.).
In the case at bar, the competent bodies did not refuse to deal uith the matter, and did
not disregard their functions and responsibilities, rather, they considered a variety of fac-
tors relating to the matter... the competent bodies, including the Prime Minister, hav-
ing deliberated and weighed the situation on the merits, without taking into account ex-
traneous factors or an improper purpose, there is no room, in the light of the case law
applicable in this connection, for the court to intervene and order them to take this or
that step.
kL at 207 (Zamir,J.).
91 SeeI-LC. 302,304/72, Khilo v. Government of lsr., 27(2) P.D. 169. 176.
See supra note 84.
SeelH.C. 287/91, Kargal Ltd. v. Investment Ctr. Admin., 46(2) 852.862.
9 Id. at 864 (Goldberg,J.) ("Reference is to large sums of public money, which are granted
on the basis of administrative decisions made on an annual footing, and there is no need to say
that respondent must have before it clear criteria, detailed guidelines and objective standards
for the allocation of the moneys.").
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power which should be exercised by the government in the absence
of another competent authority.95 The arena of activity is that of the
executive authority, and it is customary to regard it as the answer to
the need for general governmental powers in this area.9 6 Because the
extent of the power contained in Section 40 is unclear, there is a
great danger that reliance upon it may lead to unnecessary expansion
of the powers of the executive branch, as well as enable its invasion
into areas of competence of the other branches-the legislative and
thejudicial 7 Indeed, the Supreme Court has clarified that:
[T]here are activities which are not within the competence and power of
the government, as performing them without legal authorization is con-
trary to fundamental normative concepts which ensue from the nature of
our regime. This is the case in relation to basic rights which are part of
our positive law, whether they were incorporated in a Basic Law or not.
Thus, for example, the government would not have power to close a
newspaper on the basis of an administrative decision if there is no ex-
press provision regulating a matter such as this, and even if a Basic Law
has not yet been enacted which defines freedom of expression; such an
act would be contrary to our fundamental perceptions regarding human
freedoms that are inherent in our system, which may only be limited by
statutory law .... 98
Likewise, it cannot be regarded as the source for subordinate leg-
islative powers, where these were not provided for by statute.Y' Basic
normative perceptions of the Israeli constitutional system provide
that primary arrangements are within the competence of the primary
legislator' 0°-this is so in general and afortiori in the arena of human
95 See H.C. 5128/94, Federman v. Minister of Police, 48(5) P.D. 647, 652-53; H.C. 2918,
4235/93, Kiryat Gat Municipality v. State, 47(5) P.D. 832, 842.
96 See Federman, 48(5) P.D. at 651-54.
See Kiryat Gat Municipality, 47(5) P.D. at 841-42; RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 10, at
784-85.
98 Fedennan, 48(5) P.D. at 652 (Shamgar, J.). See also Kiiyat Gat Municipality, 47(5) P.D. at
846-48; H.C. 7691/95, 2878/96, Saguy v. Israel, 52(5) P.D. 577, 588; H.C. 5100/94, 4054,
6536/95, 5188/96, 7563, 7628/97, 1043/99, Public Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel at
para. 19 (forthcoming).
99 See Baruch Bracha, Blanket Rule-Making Power According to the Basic Law: Legislation Bil 4
TEL Aviv U. STUD. L. 219, 223-24 (1978-1979) [hereinafter Bracha, Blanket Rule-Making Power];
see generally C.A. 524, 525/88, Pri Ha'Emeq Agric. Coop. Ass'n. v. Sdeh Ya'akov workers Village
of Ha'Poel Ha'Mizrachi for Coop. Agric. Settlement, 45(4) P.D. 529, 553 (Barak, J.) ("In Israel
there is no general all-embracing power of the executive authority (the government) to enact
secondary legislation .... Accordingly, all secondary legislation must be anchored in special
authorization found in primary legislation."). Today, this principle has lost some of its force in
view of Section 47(a) of Basic Law: the Government, cited infra in text following note 177. For
a criticism of this provision, see Baruch Bracha, Delegated Legislation, I LAW & GOV'T ISR. 411,
416-17, 426 (1992-1993) (Hebrew) [hereinafter Bracha, Delegated Legislation]. See also infra text
accompanying notes 178-80.
100 H.C. 2740/96, Shanceyv. Supervisor of Diamonds, 51(4) P.D. 481,504 (Cheshin,J.):
The principle of the rule of law in its substantive sense, teaches us that 'primary ar-
rangements' must be placed within a law of the Knesset, and that regulations were not
designed, in principle, to do other than implement statutes. This is the Pillar of Fire,
this is the Pillar of Cloud, which show us the way, night and day-and we shall follow
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rights.10' In other words, according to these fundamental percep-
tions, there is no room for the government and its branches, on the
basis of Section 40, to give content, in the sense of a primary ar-
rangement, to the duties to act set out in the Basic Laws under dis-
cussion, for the purpose of protecting human rights. This complex
issue, which requires an intricate and sensitive network of balances-
on occasion involving the recognition of the violation of one right in
order to protect another-is within the competence of the legisla-
ture, and where necessary will confer powers on the administrative
authorities. These powers, as we have seen, may be subject to the du-
ties to act in the Basic Laws.
Section 40 of Basic Law: the Government will therefore furnish a
source of power in the area under consideration in those rare cases
which may appropriately be dealt with by the government as the ex-
ecutive authority of the state, and which do not have the effect of de-
termining primary arrangements.'9 Afortiori, the duties to act in the
Basic Laws should not be regarded as a direct source of power of an
administrative authority-in the absence of statutory provisions con-
ferring upon it the necessary power.13
them.
See in the same spirit Justice Barak in H.C. 3267/97, 715/98, Rubiswn v. Mfinistr of Defrnsw,
52(5) P.D. 481,502:
A basic rule of public law in Israel states that where a governmental act is anchored in a
regulation or an administrative directive, it is proper that the general policy and te
fundamental standards which underlie the act be anchored in primary legislation by vir-
tue of which the regulation was promulgated or the administrative directive issued. In
more "technical" language, the basic rule provides that "primary arrangements" which
set the general policy and the guiding principles-must be determined in a Knesset law.
whereas the regulations or administrative directives must determine 'secondary ar-
rangements" only....
See also H.C. 6971, 6972/98, Paritzki v. Israel, 53(1) P.D. 763, 777-78 (Barak. J.). id. at 790
(Cheshin,J.).
10 See Rubinstein, 52(5) P.D. at 513 (BarakJ.):
T]he violation of human rights, even if it advances the values of the state, even if it is for
a proper purpose, and even if it does not exceed the extent necessar)-must be deter-
mined in a law establishing the primary arrangements and it is not sufficient that the ex-
ecutive authority obtains formal authorization for a legislative act. Thus, the reqttire-
ment that the primary legislation determine the primary arrangements and that the
secondary legislation or administrative directives deal only with implementation ar-
rangements is anchored in the need to protect the freedom of the individual. It is true
that in a democratic regime, it is sometimes necessary-for the purpose of satisfying the
interests of the public--to violate the rights of the individual. Nonetheless, this viola-
tion, even ifjustified, must be determined in primary legislation, and not be put in the
hands of the executive authority itself....
10 These comments also conform to the "desired legal policy which seeks to limit in so far as
possible the scope of Section 29 [Section 40] as a source of original jurisdiction. Kiriat Gat
Munipali, 47(5) P.D. at 844 (GoldbergJ.). Sce also ZAfItR, supra note 44, at 342.
to, It must be said that even prior to the enactment of Section 2-9 of Basic Law. te Govern-
ment of 1968, which preceded Section 40 of the present Basic Law of 1992, tie Supreme Court
recognized the existence of powers held by the administrative authorities, even though it -as
not possible to anchor them in an express or implied statutory provision. Se BK .A,.. supra
note 23, at 42-43. In Coptic Muthran, Justice Landau pointed out that the power to decide con-
flicts concerning rights in the holy places is wvithin the province of the government w tether on
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It will be recalled that implementation of the duties to act in the
Basic Laws is expressed by the exercise of powers by the authority un-
der consideration, against the background of the fundamental tenets
of our constitutional system.'0° In the absence of primary legislation
regarding that implementation, whether directly in a law or by
authorizing an administrative authority also by law, and subject to
what has been said so far regarding the application of Section 40 of
Basic Law: the Government, the duty to act is shifted to the "gov-
ernmental authority" which possesses the power to act. This govern-
mental authority, namely, the legislature, is obliged to exercise its
power, i.e. the power of legislation. As the Basic Laws possess a supra-
legislative constitutional status, they are capable of compelling the leg-
islative organ to legislate. 5 Indeed, breach of the duty actually
the basis of the general governing powers of the government.., or on the basis of the express
provisions of Section 29 of Basic Law: the Government." H.C. 188/77, Coptic Muthran v. Is-
rael, 33(1) P.D. 225, 228. In other words, concurrently with the source provided by Section 29
(today, Section 40) of the Basic Law, the government and its branches enjoy general governing
powers by virtue of the previous sources. This view seems to me to be misplaced: Section 29,
once enacted, covered the issue of general (residual) governing powers and there is no room to
seek additional sources, the results of which are unknowable, and which are inconsistent with
the principle of the legality of the administration. Accordingly, as noted, today, reliance should
only be placed on Section 40 in this context. See BRACHA, supra note 23, at 52; Itzhak Zamir,
Administrative Power, 1 LAW, & GOV'T ISR. 81, 118 n.95 (1992-1993) (Hebrew). Indeed, in the
Federman case, Justice Shamgar considered the theory of general or inherent powers and its
sources and added:
In any event, whatever the issue of the roots of the inherent power, the Israeli legislature
did not see fit to leave this matter within the framework of an oral tradition, btt in-
cluded an express provision within Basic Law: the Government, namely, that which is
found in Section 29 of Basic Law: the Government....
48(5) P.D. at 653. In other words, Section 29, and now Section 40, is the basis of the theory ti n-
der discussion here.
This sensitive issue of general/implied/inherent/prerogative/residual powers also occu-
pies other legal systems, which in practice recognize such powers, despite the principle of the
legality of the administration, which in those systems also enjoys priority status. Under United
States law, there is uncertainty concerning the issue of "inherent executive powers"-uncer-
tainty which has not been resolved even after the well-known decision in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which dealt with this question. Another case on this
matter that also failed to resolve this sensitive question is Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654
(1981). See also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 670-77 (3d ed. 2000):
Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1407-11 (1989); Sym-
posium, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 29 UCLA L. REV. 977 (1982).
In England, despite the great importance attributed to the principle of the legality of the
administration, see A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONsTruTION
188, 202 (by E.C.S. Wade, 10th ed. 1959) and the citation in infra text accompanying notes 257-
58, the crown, that is the government, enjoys prerogative powers in a variety of fields. See
ANTHONY BRADLEY& KEITH EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 271-85 (12th ed.
1998). In Australia, see MARGARET ALLARS, INTRODUCTION TO AUSRALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 46-48 (1990), Canada, see DAVID J. MULLAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 170 (2d ed. 1979);
PETER WA. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 15-19, 776 (4th ed. 1997), and France, see
L. NEVILLE BROWN &JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 221-22 (5th ed. 1998), as
well, some non-statutory powers are recognized.
104 See supra text accompanying notes 95-100.
05 On occasion, a Basic Law sets out an express provision which compels the Knesset to legis-
late. See, e.g., Section 5A of Basic Law: The Knesset ("A list of candidates to the Knesset shall be
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amounts to infringement of the protected right. W hile the limitation
clause does not directly apply to this "infringement," it would seem
that it is possible to apply it by way of analogy and accordingly the in-
fringement caused by the lack of legislation must satisfy the relevant
elements of the limitation clause. Failure to meet these requirements
might well lead the courts to determine that the legislative authority
is under a duty to legislate'06
It should be pointed out that the courts have on occasion-in-
cluding in the period preceding the "constitutional revolution"-af-
firmed the existence of the duty to act imposed on the Knesset within
the context of their review of its decisions (not statutes).,'o Moreover,
in the case law concerning the constitutional right to vote in Knesset
elections, °e the courts have made clear-initially with great cau-
tion'o--the existence of the Knesset's duty to guarantee the imple-
mentation of this right by legislation,"O and in the light of the cate-
gorical comments made by the judges in this respect, it seems that,
had the legislature not acted as required of it, there would have been
no choice but, at a later stage, to grantjudicial relief against the legis-
submitted exclusively by a party, the manner of incorporation and registration of parties and
conditions for submitting the list of candidates shall be determined by law.'). In relation to the
matters with which we are concerned, there is no express provision of this t)pe. However, rthe
Knesset-the legislative authority-is one of the governmental authorities to which te applica-
tion clauses in the Basic Laws under discussion are directed. Sr supra text accompanying note
42.
10 The limitation clause deals iith a situation where the iolation of a protected right is by a
law, and here the violation takes place by virtue of the absence of law. However, as both are vio-
lations, see supra text accompanying notes 64-68, the rationale behind the limitation claiuse also
applies to a statutory omission. Accordingly, absence of legislation will bejustified if it befits te
values of the State of Israel, if it is for a proper purpose and if it meets tie requirement of pro-
portionality. Cf. I-.C. 2481/93, Dayan v. Commander of Jentsalem Dist., 48(2) P.D.-156, 489;
C.A. 506/88, Shefer v. State, 48(1) P.D. 87, 105, 169-70; RmtA, supra, note 10, at 33-84. An
administrative authority is also subject to the limitation clause. Se. irifra text accompanying
notes 201-04. By analogy, the limitation clause will also apply to omissions on the part of tie
administrative authority, when a duty to act has been imposed on it in relation to its powers. Ser
suVr text accompanying note 74.
Se4 eg., H.C. 5711/91, Poraz v. Speaker of Knesset, 46(1) P.D. 299; H.C. 742/8-1. Kahana
v. Speaker of Knesset, 39(4) P.D. 85; H.C. 73/85, Kach Faction v. Speaker of Knesset, 39(3) P.D.
141. As to judicial review of Knesset decisions, see David Kretzmer, Judicial Reti, wofKnswdDeci-
sions, 8 TEL AViv U. STUD. L 95 (1988).
103 Sections 4 and 5 of Basic Law. The Knesset, 12 LS.I. 85 provide:
4. The Knesset shall be elected by general, national, direct, equal, secret and propor-
tional elections, in accordance with the Knesset Elections Law; this section shall not be
varied save by a majority of the members of tie Knesset.
5. Every Israel national of or over the age of eighteen )ars shall have tie right to vote in
elections to the Knesset unless a court has deprived him of that right by virtue of any
Law....
109 SeeH.C. 269/69, New Communist List (Rakact) Faction v. Minister of Police, 23(2) P.D.
233; I-LC. 215/59, Geller v. Minister of Interior, 13 P.D. 1703.
110 See H.C. 337, 341, 359/84, Hokma v. Minister of Interior, 38(2) P.D. 826: Prisoners Peti-
tion Appeal [P.P.A] 4/82, State v. Tamir, 37(3) P.D. 201, 212; H.C. 378/81. Aisualen v.
Chairman of Cent. Elections Comm., 35(3) P.D. 673,674-75 (Elon.J.).
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lature in order to force it to perform its duty."' Now, having entered
the constitutional era, at least since the United Mizrachi Bank Ltd.
case,"2 it may be argued more forcefully that where the Knesset
breaches its duty to legislate, the duty to grant relief shifts to the gov-
ernmental authority competent to do so; namely, the judicial author-
ity."3 As Justice Cheshin put it, "the substantive right of a person to
dignity gives rise to a subsidiary right to obtain relief from the court,
whenever that dignity is violated."' 4
Needless to say, we are treading on extremely sensitive ground
touching the nature of the relations between the judiciary and the
legislature, and it is to be presumed that the courts will exercise the
necessary caution, anchored in constitutional considerations, which
U] See the adamant comments voiced by the five judges in the Hokma case, 38(2) P.D. 826,
with regard to the right to vote of prisoners and detainees, whose constitutional right could not
be implemented by reason of their being imprisoned. AsJustice S. Levin stated:
As the right of prisoners and detainees to vote in elections to the Knesset has been rec-
ognized, the legislature cannot decline responsibility and refrain from regulating the
method of implementation of the aforesaid right. Not only is a moral duty imposed on
the Knesset to do so, but also a statutory duty, and the legislature is not entitled, by omi t-
ting to act, to remove from the holders of the right that which has been granted to them
by an entrenched provision in a Basic Law; indeed, if the Knesset is of the opinion that
there is no justification for granting prisoners and detainees, or some of them, the right
to vote, it should state the same with a "special" majority. The phenomenon by which a
person is granted the right to vote, but the possibility of implementing it is negated, is
undesirable, and the sooner the Knesset acts to prevent it, the better.
Id. at 838. In the same spirit, see the comments ofJustices Shamgar, id. at 830, Ben Porat, id. at
835, Elon, id at 835, and Bejski, id. at 837. The Knesset met the duties imposed on it and en-
acted a law which regulated the implementation of the right to vote of prisoners and detainees:
Knesset Elections (Amendment No. 17) Law, 1986, 40 L.S.I. 249.
A similar argument concerning the violation of the right to vote-by reason of difficulties
in its implementation-and the principle of equality in voting, was raised by disabled petition-
ers in H.C. 1759/99, Storm v. Minister of Interior (unreported). The Court stated:
At the start of the hearing-and before we considered the constitutional question-we
asked the respondents to examine the possibility of amending the law in relation to the
subject-matter of the petition. Today, we have been informed that the amendment has
indeed been carried out, and that yesterday the Knesset passed the Elections to the Fif-
teenth Knesset and the Prime Minister (Amendment) Law, 1999. Counsel for the peti-
tioners indicated that the petition has been satisfactorily resolved.
Id. The statute was published in 1998-1999 S.H. 143.
"2 CA 6821/93, United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill., 49(4) P.D. 221.
The judicial authority, i.e. the courts, is one of the governmental authorities to which tre
application clauses in the Basic Laws are directed. See supra text accompanying note 42. For
the possible nexus between judicial review of Knesset resolutions and judicial review of Knesset
legislation, see the comments of Justice Elon in H.C. 620/85, Miari v. Speaker of Knesset, 41 (4)
P.D. 169, 264.
14 CA 3077/90, Anonymous v. Anonymous, 49(2) P.D. 578, 593; see also CA. 5942/92,
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 48(3) P.D. 837, 842; BARAK, supra note 10, at 704. Precedents for
judicial intervention in the implementation of the duty by the legislature, may be found on the
comparative level, for example, in the constitutional case law in Germany. See DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERIANY 310-14 (1994); DONALD P.
KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONALJURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 335-56
(2d ed. 1997); SABINA MICHALOWSm & LORNA WOODS, GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE
PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 136-46 (1999); Currie, supra note 54, at 869-71.
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in a particular case may lead the court to refuse to grant the relief es-
sential to enforce the duty."5
What is the significance of enforcing the duty from the point of
view of the contents of the arrangement under discussion here? In
the context of subordinate legislation, the Supreme Court has held
that the case law "requires the subordinate legislator to act, however,
it does not require it to act in one way as opposed to another.""" In
other words, even if the Court compels the authority to promulgate
regulations, it will not dictate their contents.' 7  This is a forliori the
position with regard to the duty to legislate on the part of the legisla-
ture: the Court will determine the existence of the duty to legislate,
while the contents of the legislation will be determined by the legisla-
11 The general rule within the area of administrative law in relation to the grant of relief.
states that:
[O]ne should draw a sharp distinction between the rule binding the administrative
authority and the relief granted by the court for breach of the nle. The nile is located
on one plane, and the relief on another. The court may consider, after the act. factors
which are different from the factors binding the authority prior to the act....
H.C. 2911, 3486/94, Backi v. Director Gen. of Ministry of Interior, 48(5) P.D. -91, 30-1 (Zamir.
J.); see also Application for Criminal Appeal [A.Cr.A.] 2060/97, Vilenchik v. Tel-Aviv Dist. Psy-
chiatrist, 52(1) P.D. 697, 719-20; H.C. 7053/96, Amcor Ltd. v. Minister of Interior, 53(l) P.D.
193, 202-04. This rule achieves a special status when a resolution of the Knesset concerning its
working procedures is being attacked. Despite te existence of a flaw, the court may well desist
from intervening. AsJustice Shamgar put it
[I]n practice, the court will not hurry to exercise its judicial review, in accordance with
its powers, in so far as relates to those portions of the working procedures of the Knesset
which are not in the form of a quasi-judicial resolution .... The proper balance between
the need to guarantee the existence of the law and te need to respect the uniqueness of
the Knesset in its resolutions concerning its internal affairs, is based on the activation of
a standard which examines the substance and the weight of the violation ensuing in a
concrete case.
IMC. 1179, 1180, 1181/90, Ratz Faction v. Deputy Speaker of Knesset, 44(2) P.D. 31, 35. This
.proper balance" precluded the intervention of the Court in the case at bar, despite the fact
that the respondent had not met the duty imposed on him by the Knesset regulations regarding
the date on which a vote of no-confidence in the government would be held. U. at 36.
It is evident that this caution will guide the judiciary in connection with its judicial reviews over
the Knesset as the legislature, in general. See, eg., I-LC. 8238/96,4513/97, Abu Arar v. Minister
of Interior, 52(4) P.D. 26, 42-43; United Mizrachi Bank Ltd., 49(4) P.D. at 331-32, 349-50; infha
note 118; infra text accompanying note 134, as well as in the sphere of the Knesse's duty to act.
i.e. its duty to legislate. If we use terminology relating to the Basic Laws, we can say that this
caution accords with the values of the State of Israel, it is exercised for a fitting purpose and to
the proper extent. In other words, in relation to the judicial authority as well, the relevant
components of the limitation clause are applied by way of analogy, -w supra text accompanying
notes 78, 106, so that, if they apply, the courts will be entitled to desist from fulfilling their du-
ties regarding the grant of relief in respect of a violation of a protected right. For a discussion
of the serious difficulties regarding the judicial determination concerning tle statutory duty, se
BARAK, supra note 10, at 314, 365. For the appropriate judicial remedy to implement the duty
to act, see Emanuel Gross, Constitutional Renzadies, 4 L.w & GOV\T Iml 433. 456-58 (1997-1993)
(Hebrew).
116 H.C. 134/76, Sharabi v. National Council of Bar Ass'n, 30(3) P.D. 493,498 (Landau,J.).
1 This is because the only decision attacked is the decision not to promulgate regulations in
breach of the duty to do so. Dictating the contents of the regulations wovuld entail stepping into
the shoes of the regulatory authority and transforming the court into the body promulgating
regulations-a function outside the framework ofjudicial supervision.
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ture."8
III. THE INFLUENCE OF THE BASIC LAWS ON
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS, PROCESS, AND DISCRETION
I have already pointed out that the significant developments in
the constitutional arena in connection with human rights have im-
mediate implications for administrative law, as the latter implements
the principles of the constitutional system while drawing a balance
between the needs of the community (the public interest) and the
good of the individual (human rights)." 9 This balance is expressed in
every aspect of the activities of the administrative authority, starting
with a determination of the extent of the authority's powers, via the
administrative process, and ending with the decision of the authority,
which is usually the outcome of discretion conferred on the authority
by statute. All these factors are influenced by the constitutional de-
velopments under discussion here. 20 Administrative authorities are
now supposed to wend their way through the new constitutional or-
der both from the point of view of the normative status of the pro-
tected rights and from the point of view of their great weight within
the complex of interests touching upon the exercise of a particular'2'
power. .We shall now examine the impact of the Basic Laws on ad-ministrative powers, processes and discretion.
118 Cf 1715/97, Chamber of Inv. Managers in Isr. v. Minister of Fin., 51 (4) P.D. 367, 387 (Ba-
rak,J.):
Indeed, a declaration of the invalidity of a law, or part of it, is a serious matter. Ajudge
will not do so lightly. A declaration of invalidity of subordinate legislation as being con-
trary to the provisions of a law, is not the same as a declaration of invalidity of primary
legislation as being contrary to a Basic Law. By invalidating subordinate legislation, the
judge gives expression to the will of the legislature. By invalidating primary legislation,
the judge frustrates the will of the legislature.
19 See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
- Against this background we can understand the immediate, direct and broad application
of the Basic Laws to the governmental authorities in general, see supra text accompanying notes
41-43, and, for our purpose, to the public administration authorities in particular, see supra text
accompanying notes 50-52.
121 In this context, one should mention the comments of Justice Elon when he referred to
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom: "In view of the constitutional status and importance
of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, the provisions of this Law are not only in the na-
ture of basic values of the legal system in Israel, but also comprise the basic infrastructure of the
legal system in Israel...." CA. 506/88, Shefer v. State, 48(1) P.D. 87, 105. These comments
were cited with approval by Justice Barak, applying them to the two Basic Laws concerning hu-
man rights, in MA.Cr. 537/95, Genimat v. State, 49(3) P.D. 355,410.
[Vol. 3:2
Apr. 2001] CONSTITUTIONAL UPGRADING OF HUILN RIGHTS
A. Administrative Power
1. Administrative Power to Violate Human Rights
Prior to the Era of the Basic Laws
According to the principle of the legality of the administration,
the source of power of an administrative authority is statutory.'- Even
prior to the enactment of the two Basic Laws, the Supreme Court
held in a long line of cases that the empowering law would be inter-
preted in such a way so that the violation of human rights caused by
the power granted to the authority would be minimal.'| There was a
presumption that the legislature, operating within a democratic state,
aspired to protect these rights (a presumption which continues to
prevail). As noted by Justice Etzioni when annulling the refusal of
the Registrar of Companies to register a company under a name se-
lected by its founders:
[W]hen reference is to a power which entails a real violation of a basic
right of a citizen in a free society, we shall not hesitate to decide in favour
of the interpretation which limits the violation of the civil rights, as there
is a presumption that the legislature respects these rights and if it sees fit
to infringe one of them-it will do so by means of ex .ress words which
leave no shadow of a doubt in respect of that intention.
On occasion, the Supreme Court has reached even further in im-
plementing this interpretive approach, in order to prevent or limit
the violation of a righLu Justice Cohn expressed this as follows:'
If sometimes the court is brave enough to interpret the words of the leg-
islature in a manner contrary to its assumed intent-if its language jusi-
fies or demands such an interpretation-this will only be at a time and
place when that interpretation is needed to increase remedies and to
strengthen justice and protect human rights so that they will not be cur-
tailed. This is not the position when that interpretation is required to
broaden the powers of the authority and to diminish an individual's
12- See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
12 See Bracha, supra note 10, at 114-24; Maoz, supra note 10, at 82-0-30; Amos Shapira. The
Status of Fundamental Individual Rights in the Absence of a Writen Constitution, 9 IsR. L REV. 497,
498-508 (1974); Shimon Shetreet, Refiletions on the Pratection of RighLs of the Inditiduat 12 s. L
REv. 32, 34-38 (1977); Joseph M. Wolf, National Sarurity v. The Rights of the Acused: The Lsradi
Expoeience, 20 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 115, 119-22 (1989-1990).
124 H.C. 124/70, Shemesh v. Registrar of Co.. 25(1) P.D. 505,513. See, e.g., CA. 52-1, 525/88,
Pri Ha'Emeq Agric. Coop. Ass'n. v. Sdeh Ya'akov Workers village of Ha'Poel Ha'Mizrachi for
Coop. Agric. Settlement, 45(4) P.D. 529,561 (Bar-akJ.); I-LC. 252/77, Babajani v. Tel Aiv Mu-
nicipality, 32(1) P.D. 404,415-16 (Cohn,J.):
[Ihf the legislature ishes to deny a person's freedom of independent occupation. or to
empower a subordinate legislator to do so, it must state this in explicit and unanbiguous
language. If the legislator used language which is open to a reasonable interpretation
according to which a person's basic right to choose his own occupation %ill not be cur-
tailed or denied, then the court will presume that the legislator did not intend to restrict
this right and to curtain fundamental freedoms.
125 SeeBracha, supra note 10, at 120-21.
226 H.C. 355,370,373,391/79, Katalan v. Prison Serv., 34(3) P.D. 29-, 301.
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freedoms: in such a case the court will barricade itself behind the legisl a-
ture's intent and turn it into a buttress for the protection of the individ-
ual.1
7
Concurrent with the protection of human rights, the courts have
created balancing systems in relation to conflicts between protected
rights and other public interest values, which must be protected in a
democratic state and which on occasion are expressed in a statute
conferring power on the administrative authority.' This system of
balances is what guides the activities of the authority, and what un-
derpins the judicial review of these activities.' 29
This multi-faceted complex of protected rights and the various
ancillary balancing formulass ° has provided the Israeli legal system
with a "form ofjudicial Bill of Rights, resembling Bills written in con-
stitutions of other states, however, in contrast to some (not all) of
them, our Bill of Rights is subject to the sovereign will of the I.nesset
as the legislature.' s  The intent to infringe human rights-directly
by statute or by delegating powers to an administrative authority,
must be expressed by the Knesset in a clear and unequivocal man-
132ner.
M Id. Cf CA. 1915, 2084, 3208/91, Jacobi v. Jacobi, 49(3) P.D. 529, 626-27 (Strasberg-
Cohen,J.)
,,s See, e.g., H.C. 158/83, Levi v. Southern Dist. Police Comm'r, 38(2) P.D. 393, translated in 7
SELECTEDJUDGMENTS SUP. CT. ISR. at 115.
M See id. at 127-29. As to the balancing conducted by the security authorities between secu-
rity needs and fundamental freedoms, see Baruch Bracha,Judicial Review of Security owers in Is-
raek A New Poliy of the Courts, 28 STAN.J. INT'L L. 39, 55-62 (1991-1992).
13 See, e.g., Election Appeal [E.A.] 2, 3/84, Neiman v. Chairman of Cent. Election Comm. for
Eleventh Knesset, 39(2) P.D. 225, 311, translated in 8 SELECrEDJUDGIENTS SUP. Gr. ISR. 83, 161
(Barak, J.) ("Indeed, when adopting the standard of probability one should not follow a gen-
eral, universal criterion, since it depends on the force of the different values that come into
conflict within a given legal context.").151 H.C. 112/77, Fogel v. Broadcasting Auth., 31(3) P.D. 657, 664 (Landau,J.). See also H.C.
152/71, Kremerv.Jerusalem Municipality, 25(1) P.D. 767, 782.
132
- See, e.g., H.C. 200/57, Bernstein v. Bet Shemesh Dist. Council, 12 P.D. 264, 268; H.C.
124/58, Bigon v. Lod Municipality, 13 P.D. 339, 343, 346. Generally, the demand regarding the
expression of this will by the legislature is even stricter. In other words, in order that the violat-
ing statutory provision-and in our case the provision in the empowering statute-be recog-
nized by the courts as such, it must be explicit. Thus, in H.C. 337/81, Miterani v. Minister of
Transp., 37(3) P.D. 337, extracted in PUBUIC LAW IN ISRAEL 125 (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat
eds., 1996),Justice Shamngar considered the question of whether an implicit authorization in a
statute is sufficient to allow violation of individual freedoms. The question arose in the con-
crete context of violation of freedom of occupation by subordinate legislation-in the absence
of explicit statutory authorization. Justice Shamgar noted:
Examination of the subordinate legislation, according to the limits marked out for it by
the primary legislation, is, of course, especially strict when the limitation of a basic right
is involved: the subordinate legislator needs ... in all cases explicit authorization by the
primary legislator; accordingly, we return to the issue of the interpretation of the written
word ... a basic right cannot be denied or limited save by explicit legislation on the part
of the primary legislator, and, provided there is no Basic Law directing otherwise, by a
subordinate legislator authorized to do the same by the primary legislator .... In my
view, authorization for this purpose means "express authorization," and for my part refer-
ence here is exclusively to a situation where the primary legislator clearly and expressly
states that it empowers the subordinate legislator to promulgate regulations establishing
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2. Administrative Power to Wiolate Human Rights
in the Era of the Basic Laws-General
As we have seen, the status of the principle of the legality of the
administration underwent transformation in the context of rights
protected by the Basic Laws. It now enjoys constitutional status. The
legislature is under a duty to respect these rights and does not have
the power to violate them except within the confines of the limitation
clause. A law which is found to be unconstitutional may be invali-
dated's'
However, the Court will not arrive at such a far-reaching conclu-
sion regarding the invalidity of a law except where every avenue has
been exhausted and there is no possibility of interpreting the law in
such a way as to make it conform with the provisions of the Basic
Laws. In other words, the Court will do everything possible in order
to find, by way of interpretation, "conformity" between the statute-
including the sections conferring power on the administrative autho'-
ity-and the Basic Laws. tn
In this way, the Court implements, in Israeli law, the principle of con-
formity to the constitution's' which is accepted in various systems where
judicial supervision is exercised over the constitutionality of the law. '56
prohibitions or restrictions on occupation in a particular profession.
37(3) P.D. at 358. Indeed, according to the legal situation which preceded the new Basic Lws,
the right to freedom of occupation did not have an effect on the validity of a law, and the legis-
lature could have limited or impaired freedom of occupation, provided this was done in an ex-
press, dear and unequivocal manner. H.C. 726, 878/94, Clal Ins. Co. v. Minister of Fin.. 48(5)
P.D. 441,459 (Levin,J.). See also 1715/97, Chamber of Inv. Managers in lsr. v. Minister of Fin..
51(4) P.D. 367, 383; H.C. 5936/97, Lam v. Director General of the Ministry of Education. Cul-
ture & Sport (forthcoming) (paragraph 10 of Justice Domer's opinion and at paragraph I of
Justice Barak's opinion). This principle is valid in respect of all human rights, see 2 ;rHARo.
BARAK, INTERPRErATION iNLAW558-61 (1993) (Hebrew) (discussing stautor" interpretation).
s See supra text accompanying notes 53-60.
5 See Cla, 48(5) P.D. at 474 (Levin,J.):
A question arises... what standards should guide us, when we seek to interpret the
components of the limitation clause and examine the considerations of the legislature,
in terms of reviewing legislation in the light of the principles and the values and the
rights conferred by a Basic Law. It seems to me that the rule which should guide us in
such a case is, on one hand, that the interpretation must be limiting, tat the basic rights
declared in the constitution (currently, in the Basic Laws) must be given their full sub-
stantive and fundamental significance, and that in any event, the possibilities of violating
these rights should not be expanded.
Yet, it is appropriate to accord proper respect to the legislature and to impute to it a pre-
sumption that its considerations and reasons, when enacting provisions violating basic rights.
were relevant and sincere. See also C.A. 2405/91, 2912/93, State v. Estate of Rabbi Pinhas David
Horowitz, 51(5) P.D. 23, 64-65; I-.C. 5503/94, Segal v. Speaker of Knesset. 51 (4) P.D. 529, 548-
50; Chamber of Inv. Managers in Isr., 51(4) P.D. at 387-88, 418; H.C. 7111, 8195/95. Local Gov't
Ctr. v. Knesset, 50(3) P.D. 485, 496; H.C. 3434/96, Hofnung v. Speaker of Knesset. 50(3) P.D.
57, 67-70; H.C. 4562/92, Zandberg v. Broadcasting Auth., 50(2) P.D. 793, 815; supra text ac-
companying notes 115-18.
15- See Zandberg 50(2) P.D. at 810; M.A.Cr. 537/95, Gnimatv. State, 49(3) P.D. 355,412.
In the United States for example, see Ashander v. Tennessee Valley Auth.. 297 U.S. 288.
347 (1936) (Brandeis,J., concurring):
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The presumption regarding the aspiration of the legislature to re-
spect the protected rights is not weakened, but strengthened: legisla-
tion is interpreted against the background of the fundamental values
of the system.'5 ' These values are reflected in the protected rights
which serve as the basis of the systemss and now attract a supra-
legislative constitutional status of which the legislature is aware. As a
result of this, interpretation of statutes will be carried out while "at-
tributing greater weight to the rights" under discussion. In other
words, "in the balance between the interests embodied in these rights
and other interests, which are not embodied in constitutional rights,
the status of the former rights are strengthened.' 40 This shift in the
fulcrum of balance-that is, an interpretation favouring protected
rights and limiting the infringing powers of the administrative
authority-is strengthened even more by the fact that the alternative
may be the invalidation of the law, which, as already noted, is a result
the court strives to avoid.
The new value and normative status of the protected rights also
affects the old law which preceded the Basic Laws. The validity of this
law has been preserved, even if it infringes the protected rights and
The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by
the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be dis-
posed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on
either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the court will decide only the latter.
See also Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919). Regarding Germany, see Rob Bakker,
Verfassungskonforme Auslegung, inJUDICIAL CONTROL-COPARATIVE ESSAYS ONJUDICIAL REVIEW
9 (Rob Bakker et al. eds., 1995):
Verfassungskonforme Auslegung is an essentially German concept .... According to this
principle a statutory provision is not considered unconstitutional if there is a possibility
of interpreting the provision in a way which is in conformity with the Basic Law, provided
the statutory provision remains meaningful when interpreted in such a way.
See also CURRIE, supra note 114, at 28 ("[T]he German [Constitutional] Court often goes out of
its way to construe a questionable statute so as to assure its conformity with the constitution
('Verfassungskonforme Auslegung').").
This interpretive principle is also used where the Bill of Rights does not possess a supra-
legislative constitutional status. See, e.g., N.Z. Bill of Rights Act, § 6 ("Wherever an enactment
can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of
Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning."); U.K. Human Rights Act, §
3(1) ("So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be
read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights."). Regarding
Section 3 of the Human Rights Act, see, for example, K.D. Ewing, The Human Rights Act and Par-
liamentary Demoeray, 62 MOD. L. REV. 79, 86-88 (1999); KEIR STARNEZ, EUROPEAN HUMAN
RIGHTS-THE HUMAN RIGHTs AcT 1998 AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
14-16 (1999).
137 See, e.g., H.C. 680/88, Schnitzer v. Shani, 42(4) P.D. 617, 626-30, translated in 9 SELEcrED
JUDGMENTS SUP. Cr. ISR. 77, 87-93; H.C. 953/87, 1/88, Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, 42(2)
P.D. 309, 328-31.
:38 See supra note 121.9 H.C. 5394/92, Hophert v.Yad Vashem Mem'l Auth., 48(3) P.D. 353,363 (OrJ.).
140 Id. For a far-reaching example of a law being made "compatible" by way of interpretation,
with the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, in order to prevent doubts as to
its validity, see Zandberg, 50(2) P.D. at 810-15.
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does not conform with the provisions of the limitation clause."'
However, interpretation of it will be conducted in the spirit of the Ba-
sic Laws. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation contains an explicit
provision in this regard." Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom
does not contain such a provision. However, even in its absence, it
should be remembered that the two Basic Laws have made their mark
on the basic values in accordance with which these "old" laws are in-
terpreted. That is, even in connection with an old law there may be a
"shift" of the point of interpretive balance leading to a change in its
meaning, in the direction of further strengthening protected rights
and limiting the infringing power of the authority which has been
conferred on it by the empowering statute. " Accordingly, when con-
sidering a particular power, by virtue of which it is possible to infringe
a protected right, it is necessary to examine the old case law in the
context of that power. The result of that examination may be the re-
striction of power and the limitation of the infringement made by vir-
tue of it, so that it conforms to the provisions of the limitation
clause. 1' In this way, the gap, in relation to the protected rights, be-
tween the old and new law is diminished, and the "duality of the
status" of the respective rights is reduced."' This duality of status cre-
141 See Section 10 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom and Section 10 of the Ba-
sic Law: Freedom of Occupation. The "validity clause" of the latter Basic Law is provisional.
and it preserves violating enactments until March 14, 2002, unless repealed earlier.
Section 10 of the Basic Law stipulates that provisions of any "old enactment 'shall be
construed in the spirit of the Basic Law."
143 SeeM.A.Cr. 537/95, Genimatv. State, 49(3) P.D. 355, 375-76. 379, 410-21 (Domer.J., Ba-
rakJ.). This approach did not find favor ithJustice Cheshin who, in a minority judgment.
argued that it was not compatible with the provisions of Section 10 of Basic Law. Human Dig-
nity and Freedom, which preserves existing law:
In my opinion, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom did not intend, in principle, to
make changes to the law preceding it, and indeed the same law we had then is %ith us
now. Why did I say "in principle"?-because it is possible that on the margins some
change may take place--even if only minor-and we must not commit ourselves in ad-
vance. That is the way of the law, developing itself, step after step, little by little, and this
path which has been paved, I too will follow.
Id- at 389; see also id. at 389-401. In a further hearing in relation to this case, the position ofJus-
tices Dorner and Barak imas accepted in relation to the issue under discussion here: F.H. Cr.
2316/95, Genimat v. State, 49(4) P.D. 589, 609-10, 614 (Mzza, J.); i. at 63031 (Goldberg.J.):
id. at 632-34 (Strasberg-Cohen,J.). See also i. at 644, 648 (DomerJ.); id. at 652-55 (Baak. J.).
Justice Cheshin retained his minority opinion. I& at 639-43.
144 SeeF.I-H.C. 4466/94, Nusseiba v. Minister of Fin., 49(4) P.D. 68,85: H.C. -15-1 1/9-I. Miller
v. Minister of Defense, 49(4) P.D. 94, 139. Naturally, this renewed examination of the old case
law need not necessarily lead to a "shift" in the interpretive point of balance ith which we are
concerned. It is possible that in the past-prior to the enactment of the Basic Laws--the case
law steered the possible interpretation in the direction of "favoring" the protected rights. nak-
ing it compatible with the provisions of the Basic Laws, and this interpretation %ill remain valid
now as well. In the same way, it is possible that the old law does not leave room for interpreta-
tion in the spirit of the Basic Laws and in such a case its meaning will remain as it %as. See Gen-
imat 49 (3) P.D. at 414-15.
For the application of the limitation clause to an administrative authorit, see infra text
accompan)ing notes 199-204.
See Baruch Bracha, Ahaon Barak Constituional Intrpretatior, 3 Lkw & GovT IsR. 339, 349-
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ates an anomaly in the Israeli constitutional system in that there are
rights which are protected in a constitutional manner, while concur-
rently there are enactments which are not subject to that protection
and which violate those rights. This anomaly must be eliminated,
and the approach of the Supreme Court contributes to this result."'
Such a contribution will be encouraged by the effect Basic Laws have
on the interpretation of "old" and "new" enactments which violate
rights that are not protected by those Basic Laws. It would seem that
this is the path now being pursued by the courts.'47 Indeed, it would
seem that even in the constitutional age, the primary application of
the Basic Laws will be in the area of interpretation and not in the
area of invalidating statutes.148
53 (1995-1996) (Hebrew).
146 Cf Baruch Bracha, A Selection of Notes on Current Issues 1970-1979, 16 ISR. L. REV. 260, 261-
62 (1981) (reviewing ITZHAK H. KLINGHOFFER, A SELECrION OF NOTES ON CURRENT ISSuLES
1970-1979).
147 SeeH.C. 5016, 5025, 5090, 5434/96, Horev v. Minister of Transp., 51 (4) P.D. 1, 43 (Barak,
Indeed, since the Knesset adopted the Basic Laws relating to human rights, we have been
using the standards set out therein for the purpose of interpreting tie governmental
powers which were conferred by legislation (primary or subordinate), whether in rela-
tion to legislation which was enacted prior to these Basic Laws, or legislation enacted
thereafter; whether in relation to the violation of rights "covered" in the two Basic Laws
concerning human rights, or in relation to the violation of human rights which are not.covered" by these Basic Laws. This connection between the constitutional limitation
clause and the complex of laws within the field of public law-including human rights
which are not "covered" by the Basic Laws-is natural.
The important questions in this context are, of course: to what extent the court imple-
ments the rule which it has established, especially in relation to the influence of the Basic Laws
on the laws preceding them; to what extent the judicial decisions have been modified; and to
what extent the violating impact of old laws has been limited by the Basic Laws. It would seem
that at present it is still too early to point to drastic changes regarding the application of the old
law. See, e.g., Eyal M. Gross, The Politics of Rights in Israeli Constitutional Law, 3 ISR. STUD. 80, 101-
06 (1998); David Kretzmer, Fifty Years of Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Human Rights, 5 LAW &
GOV'T ISR. 297, 334-37 (1999) (Hebrew). In any event, the infrastructure for these changes ex-
ists and their materialization depends on the extent of the court's resolve to make real use of it
in order to achieve uniformity with the values (the rights) contained in the Basic Laws. Exami-
nation of the implementation of the rule in the direction of a real change in the meaning ac-
corded to "old" concrete provisions in the context of concrete rights justifies an article of its
own and is beyond the scope of the discussion in this article.
148 SeeH.C. 7357/95, 1479/96, Baraki Peta Humphries (Isr.) Ltd. v. State, 50(2) P.D. 769, 786
(Barak,J.):
The Basic Laws have led to the constitutionalization of Israeli law. This phenomenon in-
fluences both the validity of legislation and its meaning. For myself, I believe that the in-
fluence on the interpretation of legislation will be more extensive than the influence on
the validity of the legislation, as every statute requires interpretation, and only few stat-
utes will be examined as to their validity.
See also supra text accompanying notes 134-40.
[Vol. 3:2
Apr. 2001] CONSTITUTIONAL UPGRADING OF HUI LAN RIGHTS
3. Administrative Power to Violate Human Rights-
The Limitation Clause
This discussion returns us to the principle of the legality of the
administration in the constitutional sense. The permissible violation
of a protected right is "by a law"-namely, by primary legislation-
which meets the requirements specified in the limitation clause,"^ "or
under an aforesaid lav by virtue of an explicit authorization
therein.""4 For our purposes, the latter provision is of particular im-
portance, as the administrative authorities act by virtue of authoriza-
tion "under a law," and the term "under a law" enables violation of a
right by regulations made under a law. "'
Similarly, the legislature may authorize the administrative author-
ity to violate rights by way of an administrative act ' 2 which is not a
regulation 5 " In other words, it is an act which does not possess a leg-
islative character.'5 ' Naturally, the empowering law, together with its
authorizing provisions, must meet the requirements of the limitation
clause. 55 In this context it should be emphasized that reference is to
"explicit authorization." In this way the Basic Laws reiterate the law
developed prior to their enactment by the courts" and even sharpen
it in the direction of protection of rights. 7
1 Analysis of the requirements which refer to the values of the State of Israel and to the
proper purpose, is outside the scope of this article save for the occasional reference herein. Se-
infra text accompanying notes 225-29, 238-40, 248-50. 26C-67, 275, 282-300.
Section 8 of the Basic Law- Human Dignity and Freedom and Section 4 of the Basic Law:
Freedom of Occupation. See supra note 14.
1 SeeInterpretation Law, §9, 35 LS.I. 370 ("The expression 'under,' or a similar expression
in relation to any enactment shall be construed as relating also to regulations made by virtue of
such enactment."); see also H.C. 6055, 7083/95, Zemach v. Minister of Defense (forthcoming)
(at paragraph 20 ofjustice Zamir's opinion); Cr.A. 725/97, Kalkuda v. Authority for Agric. Su-
pervision, 52(2) P.D. 721, 762; ILC. 2740/96, Shancey v. Supervisor of Diamonds. 51(4) P.D.
481, 491; H1C. 6500/93, Cohen v. Minister for Religious Affairs, 48(2) P.D. 837. 841-42; H.C.
5771, 5807/93, Zitrin v. Minister ofJustice, 48(1) P.D. 661,6668.
M See H.C. 5936/97, Lam v. Director General of the Ministry of Education, Culture & Sport
(forthcoming) at paragraph 10 of the opinion ofJustice Domer; CA. 6821/93. United Mizrachi
Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vll., 49(4) P.D. 221, 337; H.C. 726, 878/94, Clal Ins. Co. v. Minister
of Fin., 48(5) P.D. 441,472; see also BARAK, supra note 10, at 615; BRACHA, supra note 38. at 108-
11. Cf. Oren Gazal, Restriction of Basic Rights "By Law" or 'As Prhszi1cd by Law," 4 L-%%w & GOV'T
ISR. 381,396-01 (1997-1998) (Hebrew).
M Unless the empowering statute and the relevant case law give rise to a duty to promulgate
reelations. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
See the definition of "regulation" in Section 3 of the Interpretation Law: "Regulation"
means a direction issued by virtue of Law and having legislative effect.
M See ZAvI, supra note 44, at 135-36. See also injla text accompanying notes 186-88.
1s See supra text accompanying note 132.
15 This is accomplished in the express requirement that the authorization be 'explicit." Cf.
supra note 132. Of course, the requirement that the authorization be "explicit" now possesses a
constitutional status-that is, an authorizing statute cannot deviate from it-and not only the
status of an "interpretive presumption" as in thie past. See H.C. 5936/97, Lain v. Director Gen-
eral of the Ministry of Education, Culture & Sport (forthcoming) at paragraph 10 of Justice
Dorer's opinion.
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The demand for "explicit authorization" should be interpreted
against the background of the basic values of the system at the center
of which, for our purpose, is the strengthening of the protected
rights' ss and deployment of the primary arrangements, especially
those which have implications for human rights, in the hands of the
primary legislator.9  Thus, the empowering law must state, in its own
provisions, the contents of the violating arrangement as well as the
criteria for its implementation and leave the administrative authority
to handle the implementation of that arrangement-whether by way
of subordinate legislation or in other ways-in accordance with those
criteria.'6°
The Supreme Court has recently made vigorous use of this consti-
tutional approach in the Rubinstein case, "' invalidating an arrange-
ment made by the Minister of Defence exempting a large number of
Yeshiva [religious academy] students from the duty to perform mili-
tary service. The Minister relied on Section 36 of the Defence Service
Law (Consolidated Version) 1986, which empowers him to exempt a
person from military service:
The Minister of Defence may, by order, if he sees fit to do so for reasons
connected with the size of the regular forces or reserve forces of the Is-
rael Defence Forces or for reasons connected with the requirements of
education, security, settlement or the national economy or for family or
other reasons
(1) exempt a person of military age from the duty of regular service or
reduce the period of his service ....162
Earlier attempts to challenge this arrangement in the High Court
ofJustice had failed.ln Since the last of those attempts,' the number
,58 See supra text accompanying notes 137-39.
159 See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
60 See BARAK, supra note 10, at 489-507; ZAMIR, supra note 44, at 116-17, 180-81; RUBINfrEIN
& MEDINA, supra note 10, at 982. For a different opinion, see Gazal, supra note 152, at 401-03,
414-21. It should be noted thatJustice Barak reached the conclusion that the duty to set out in
the violating law those criteria which will guide the administrative authority, need not necessar-
ily be on the basis of the requirement of explicit authorization, but rather on the basis of the
requirement that the violation be "by a law ... or under an aforesaid law." BARAK, sura note
10, at 489-507. Considering the purpose of the provision (namely, to ensure "the principle of
the rule of law from the formal point of view and from the narrow, substantive point of view,"
id. at 489, and following a comparative analysis,Justice Barak set out additional requirements in
relation to the violating law-for our purpose, the authorizing law-including that:
the law be general, public, known and published, and that it be clear, certain and unde r-
standable so that members of the public will be capable of conducting their affairs in ac-
cordance with it. Within this framework it may be possible to include additional ele-
ments such as a retroactive and retrospective prohibition.
Id. at 490. See also Miscellaneous Applications-Criminal [M.A.Cr.] 6654/93, Binkin v. State,
48(1) P.D. 290, 293; infra text accompanying note 242.
161 H.C. 3267/97, 715/98, Rubinstein v. Minister of Defense, 52(5) P.D. 481.
16. 40 L.S.I. 112.
,0 For a review of these attempts, see Rubinstein, 52(5) P.D. at 532-38.
,64 H.C. 910/86, Ressler v. Minister of Defense, 42(2) P.D. 441, translated in 10 SELECTED
JUDGMENTS SUP. Cr. ISR. 1.
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of persons receiving an exemption has increased significantly. Simi-
larly, a shift took place in the status of the "basic rule,""' which states
that primary arrangements are determined by the primary legisla-
tor-and not by its delegates among the administrative authorities,
especially when reference is to a violation of human rights. This shift
is the outcome of the enactment of Basic Laws concerning human
rights which tend to "strengthen the basic rule. This strengthening is
expressed by the fact that the interpretive presumption, to the effect
that there is an assumption that the purpose of the law wvas not to
grant to the executive authority power to establish primary arrange-
ments, obtains added force."'6" In Rubinstein, reference was made to a
law which preceded the Basic Laws which therefore,
are incapable of impairing the validity of the old empowerment. Never-
theless, in the absence of an express provision to controvertn-an inter-
pretive effort must be made-where possible-to give this empowerment
a restrictive interpretation, so that it will be implemented, in so far as
possible, in the spirit of the basic rule regarding primary arrangements.
In this spirit, there are cases where the executive authority must refrain
from fundamental decisions on basic social issues, which are the subject
of intense public dispute, and leave the decision to the legislative author-
ity 167
Rubinstein raised extremely difficult questions concerning the
clash between rights (such as the right to equality of those serving in
the army versus the freedom of religion of the Yeshiva students), as
well as ideological social and security questions."a All of these require
a determination by the legislature.' Application of the basic rule to
the power of the Minister of Defence under of Section 36 of the De-
fence Service Law (Consolidated Version) leads to the conclusion
that the Minister does not have the power to grant a general exemp-
tion to Yeshivastudents.'- The eleven judges who heard the case held
that the arrangement was void (by way of suspension) and passed the
matter to the Knesset for it to deal with.'
7'
The Basic Laws concerning human rights therefore bolstered the
interpretive approach of the courts which is intended to guarantee
that the primary arrangements-and for our purpose, those within
the field of human rights-will be determined by the legislature.
With regard to "new" authorizing statutes, this approach may lead to
the invalidation of a statutory provision which purports to grant un-
165 The term "basic rule of public law in Israel" is used by Justice Barak to describe tie consti-
tutional interpretive presumption under consideration here. See the remarks ofJustice Barak
in spra note 100.
166 SeeRubinstdn, 52(5) P.D. at 523 (BarakJ.). Cf. H.C. 5016,5025,5090.5434/96, Horev v.
Minister of Transp., 51(4) P.D. 1, 75-76.
167 52(5) P.D. at 523 (Barak,J.).
163 I& at 524-29.
169 d. at529.
-0 1& at 530.
NI Id. at530-31.
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guided power and discretion by virtue of which it is possible to violate
a protected right. For example, if a statute enacted by the Knesset in
consequence of the judgment repeats the provisions of the current
Section 3 6 ,i- it does not meet the requirement of explicit authoriza-
tion (and in the concrete context considered by the judgment, the
statute may be invalidated if the Court reaches the conclusion that
the statute purports to grant primary power to violate a protected
right) 173
At the same time, care should be taken not to reach hasty and far-
reaching conclusions that a statutory provision is void by reason of
the grant of primary power to the administrative authority. In the Is-
raeli system there is no provision possessing constitutional status that
concentrates legislative power in the hands of the primary legislator,
and which constitutionally limits its power to delegate its powers.' 71
Unfortunately, the "basic rule" concerning the non-transfer of pri-
mary powers to the public administration, fails to genuinely reflect
the legislative reality. The reality is that the legislature engages in an
intensive conferral of primary powers on the administration, powers
which may be exercised either by means of subordinate legislation'
7
1
or by means of other administrative acts. 7% This is also the case in
sensitive areas such as human rights.Y7 7 Even, Basic Law: the Gov-
ernment clarifies that it is within the power of the legislature to grant
broad rule-making powers to a Minister. Section 47 of the Basic Law
provides as follows:
(a) The Prime Minister or the Minister charged with the implementation
of a Law is empowered to make regulations for its implementation.
(b) A Law may empower the Prime Minister or Minister to make regula-
tions on a matter specified in the authorization.
Subsection (a) deals with the power to issue regulations of a sec-
ondary character.'78 Subsection (b) deals with regulations which are
not necessarily implementation regulations-that is, possessing a sec-
ondary character-and therefore it would seem that regulations of a
172 Cf BARAK, supra note 10, at 502-03; H.C. 2740/96, Shancey v. Supervisor of Diamonds,
51 (4) P.D. 481,520-21 (Barak,J.). See also supra note 160.
173 A possible protected right is a right to equality. See infra text accompanying notes 288-300.
Justice Barak did not state his position with regard to the constitutionality of a possible future
statutory arrangement passed by the Knesset. See H.C. 3267/97, 715/98, Rubinstein v. Minister
of Defense, 52 (5) P.D. 481, 528-29; see also id. at 541 (Cheshin,J.).
In 2001 the Knesset passed legislation granting semi-ministerial powers to the Minister of
Defense regarding the exemption of Yeshiva students from military service. Petitions attempt-
ing to challenge the validity of this legislation are now pending in the Supreme Court.
74 See BRACHA, supra note 23, at 83; see also H.C. 6971, 6972/98, Paritzki v. Israel, 53(1) P.D.
763, 790-91.
175 See BRAcHA, supra note 23, at 84-86; RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 10, at 806-07.
:76 See ZANIR, supra note 44, at 134, 232-38.
17 SeeBracha, Blanket Rule-MakingPower, supra note 99, at 247; ZAMIR, supra note 44, at 134.178 As to the secondary character of "implementation regulations," see H. Klinghoffer, The
Rule of Law and Subordinate Legislation, 1 (12-13) HED HAMiISH'AT 222, 223 (1957) (Hebrew).
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primary nature would also enter this framework."" This provision
imprints a "constitutional seal" on the existing reality. This reality,
whereby broad rule-making powers is granted, exists in other legal
systems, including those which constitutionally assign the power of
legislation to the legislature.'8'
The "basic rule," insofar as it reflects constitutional values of the
utmost importance to a democratic regime,'8 ' is supposed to "moder-
ate" the phenomenon whereby far-reaching powers are conferred on
the public administration. We have seen that it is of special impor-
tance, and attains greater force, when power is granted to violate
human rights. Today, it has secured a constitutional status by means
of the appropriate interpretation of the limitation clause, and accord-
ingly, at least in the area of protected rights, the basic rule also ap-
plies to the provisions of Section 47(b) of Basic Law: the Govern-
ment. That is to say: empowering statutes which fall within the
confines of the Section will also be subject to the aforementioned
rule and will certainly be interpreted in the light of that rule. This
should not ignore the reality "on the ground" and the constraints
19 See Bracha, Delegated Legislation, supra note 99, at 427; RunINSTEIN & MU)IN.A supra note
10, at 807. The same provision as in Section 47 appears in Section 37 of Basic Law the Gov-
ernment of 2001.
ISWith regard to England, see PAUL P. CRAIG. ADMINISTRATIE Lw 366 (4th ed. 1999):
[T]he use of skeleton legislation ... is cause for special concern. The passage of such
legislation is now common, with power being given to the executive not merely to fill te
technical details, but also to decide broad issues of policy, thereby leading to a conse-
quential shift in the balance of power between Parliament and the executive.
See also CARLETON K. ALLEN, LAW AND ORDERS 93-94, 154-57, 17072 (3d ed. 1965). Regarding
the United States, see LORCH, supra note 24, at 18; TRIBE, supra note 103, at 978 ({The Court
has broadly construed this power to delegate with tie result that the Court hias not invalidated a
single delegation of congressional power on nondelegation doctrine grounds since 1936.).
Regarding Australia, see ROGER DOUGLAS & MELINA JONAS. AD.IINisTRATi'E L-%%-
CotMEiNTARY AND MATERIALS 272-82 (3d ed. 1999); S.D. HOTOi,. PiNcatuLs OF AUST-LLAN
ADMINIsmTIvE LAW 115-16 (6th ed. 1985). Regarding Canada, see JONES & DE VILLAR! supra
note 27, at 85, 87-88; HOGG, supra note 103, at 349-52. On tie other hand, the Gernan
Constitutional Court is more strict in complying with the limitations provided by Section 80(l)
of the Basic Law regarding the delegation of legislative power. Sir CURRIE, supra note 114. at
125-34.
In this context it is interesting to mention te Constitution of te Fifth Republic of
France, which confers limited legislative powers upon the legislative branch in areas defined in
the Constitution, whereas the upper ranks of tie executive branch are granted primary and
residual legislative powers. Cf. Article 34 of tie Constitution, which addresses die legislative
powers of the Parliament in relation to the matters set out tierein, to Article 37. which deals
with the residual legislative powers of the government. In tie light of this constitutional dii-
sion of legislative powers in France, one cannot speak of regulations, which are promulgated in
the residual sphere assigned to the government, as 'subordinate legislation." &S BROWN &
BELL, supra note 103, at 11.
181 See the broad discussion of these values in, H.C. 27,10/96, Shanmr v. Superisor of Dia-
monds, 51(4) P.D. 481, in the opinions ofJustice Cheshin, 51(4) P.D. at 50-1-19, and Justice Ba-
rak, id. at 520-21, and injustice Barak's opinion in, LC. 3267/97, 715/98. Rubinstein I. Minister
of Defense, 52(5) P.D. 481,502-15. See also H.C. 5936/97, Lam v. Director General of the Ministry
of Education, Culture & Sport (forthcoming) at paragraph 9 ofJustice Dorner's opinion; Public
Committee Against Torture in Israel (forthcoming) paragraph 37 of Justice Barak's opinion:
BRACHA, supra note 23, at 93-95.
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which cause the legislature to grant broad powers to the administra-
tive authorities.
2
The significance of this is that the difficult issue'8 3 of the delimita-
tion of the boundaries between primary and secondary arrangements
in this connection,8' will receive a flexible solution which will take
into account all the relevant factors:
The level of abstractness of the primary arrangement changes from case
to case. The greater the violation of the freedom of the individual, the
less one should be satisfied with too high a level of abstractness, and an
arrangement in primary legislation is needed which establishes, even on
a general level, the substance of the violation or the scope of the viola-
tion of the freedom. When the object of the arrangement is a complex
issue, which requires great expertise, it will occasionally be possible to be
satisfied with a high level of abstractness .... 185
Indeed, it seems that the primary use of the rule relating to pri-
mary and secondary arrangements will be on the constitutional-
interpretive level. Thus, instead of invalidating the statutory empow-
ering provision, it will be interpreted in such a way as to meet the re-
quirements of the rule.186 For example, an all-embracing empowering
provision-literal implementation of which could lead to the conclu-
182 SeeRubinstein, 52(5) P.D. at 515-17.
,83 See id.
184 See Klinghoffer, supra note 178, at 224, where he discusses the distinction occupying us in
the context of subordinate legislation:
The power to make implementation regulations only enables subordinate legislation
with regard to subordinate arrangements, which "implement" primary arrangements de-
termined by law. The conceptual borderline separating primary and subordinate ar-
rangements cannot be given a general definition, by way of abstract thinking. It depends
on the nature and specific substance of the subject-matter which is to be arranged, and
therefore, the decision whether a certain set-up is of a primary or secondary nature, can-
not be made otherwise than by an inductive way in accordance with reason and logic.
See also Bracha, Blanket Rule-Making Power, supra note 99, at 241-46. Without attempting to estab-
lish a precise border line between the two types of arrangements, Justice Barak clarifies in Ru-
binstein, 52(5) P.D. at 515:
[A] primary arrangement exists where from the law itself-according to its construction
by way of the usual methods of interpretation-it is possible to delineate the area within
the borders of which the executive branch operates, and the direction, the principles or
the purpose which are supposed to guide the executive branch in its actions. To the ex-
tent that regulation of a particular area necessitates fundamental decisions, which are
capable of establishing structures that are significant for the life of a person or society, it
would be proper for the decisions to be taken through the primary legislation itself. In-
deed, a primary arrangement exists, where a law itself establishes principles or standards
at a high level, which must be implemented at a lower level.
1 See id. (Barak, J.); see also id. at 515-17; BARAK supra note 10, at 503-04; RUBINSTEIN &
MEDINA, supra note 10, at 982.
A high level of abstractness exists, for example, in the United States in the context of the
requirement, which has been established in the case law, that the delegation of legislative pow-
ers by Congress be accompanied by standards, that is, by criteria according to which the subor-
dinate legislator is supposed to exercise its powers. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 26, at 1-59.
"Since 1935, the court has upheld statutes containing only vague standards and statements of
policy and delegating very broad discretion." Id. at 51.
186 . . . . .See Rubinstein, 52(5) P.D. at 517, 521-24; see also supra text accompanying notes 154-39.
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sion that it is unconstitutional'8--might not be annulled by the Court
but rather be made "compatible" with the rationale of the basic rule
so as to enable the operation of a specific, limited and secondary-type
power under it.s In this context, other factors may also possess sig-
nificance, such as subordinating the arrangement established by the
administrative authority to parliamentary supervision or to other
measures which reflect the various constitutional values underlying
the basic rule.w In any event, in considering statutory empowerment
provisions by virtue of which it is possible to violate protected rights,
the court today must give added weight to its own pronouncements
on this sensitive topic and do what it can to prevent the dangers
which it itself has pointed out:'90 "Subordinate legislation concerning
a fundamental and highly important matter, made under an empow-
ering statute, may bring on us a purely formal democratic regime. A
genuine parliamentary democratic regime requires that legislation be
enacted by the legislature. " '9'
Is an authority which has lawfully been granted the power to vio-
late a protected right entitled to delegate that power? The delegated
power is a power "under a law," as required by the limitation clause,
since it originates in a statute.' - However, it seems that it is not "un-
der a law by virtue of an explicit authorization therein." In other
words, if the legislature ishes to enable an authority to delegate a
power which has been granted, it must explicitly empower that
authority to do so. This interpretation conforms with the purpose of
the Basic Laws in connection with the protection of the rights con-
tained therein and in connection with the aspiration to confine, inso-
197 See supra text accompanying note 155.
8 Thus, with regard to the exemption given to te Yeshiva students in Rubnstrin. 52(5) P.D.
481, we have seen that one of the reasons for the different result reached by the Court-com-
pared to its earlierjudgments----as the significant growth in the number of persons enjoying
the benefit of the exemption. Supra text accompanying note 16-1. Set Rubinstein. 52(5) P.D. at
499-501, 529-30. Does it therefore follow that in the absence of sud growt, the Court would
not have invalidated the arrangement in relation to the exemption? See the opinion ofJustice
Cheshin, idL at 538, where he emphasizes that by virtue of the powers granted to him, the Minis-
ter of Defense is entitled to issue individual exemptions, and that a general exemption is not
within his ministerial competence but within that of the Knes L
19 See Rubinstein, 52(5) P.D. at 503-04; H.C. 2740/96; Shancey v. Supervisor of Diamonds,
51(4) P.D. 481, 509; H.C. 790/78; Rozen v. Minister of Trade. Indus. & Tourism, 33(3) P.D.
281, 293; see also ALLEN, supra note 180. at 359; RuBINSTEIN & MEDIN , supra note 10, at 808:
Aharon Barak, Subordinate Legislation, 16 ScRi'TA IEROSOLYIrANA 219. 223-26 (1966); Ken.
neth Gulp Davis, A New Approach to Ddegtion, 36 U. CaL. L REv. 713 (1968-1969); Baruch
Bracha, Toward Parliamentary Supervision of Ddegalca Legislation (Basic Law: Legislation Bill, Chapter
C), 7 TELAVIVU. L REV. 390,395-99 (1979-1980).
190 H.C. 266/68, Petach Tikvah Municipality v. Minister of Agric., 22(2) P.D. 82.1.831 (1968)
(Itkon, J., Sussman,J.).
In a similar spirit, see the comments of Justice Jackson in Youngstown Shedt & Tube Gv. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) ("With all its defects, dela)s and inconveniences, men have
discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that te Executive be un-
der the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.).
19" SeeBRACHA, supra note 38, at 111; supra text accompanying notes 149-55.
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far as possible, the capacity to violate rights to the legislature itself, or,
at least, to the authority which it expressly contemplated and empow-
ered. This interpretation also conforms with the law regarding dele-
gation, the starting point of which is that "delegatus non potest dele-
gare.''93 This rule is in the nature of a presumption, which may be
expressly, and, on occasion, even implicitly, rebutted.94 The pre-
sumption has great force when one is considering the delegation of a
power to violate human rights. The force stems from the necessity to
prevent that power from being "disseminated" and placed at the dis-
posal of a body not contemplated by the legislature with the atten-
dant increased danger that rights will be violated.'9 5 Applying this
"strict" presumption to the provisions of the limitation clause, appar-
ently makes it necessary to identify an explicit statutory provision con-
ferring power to delegate the violating power.'96 In a situation where
it is possible to delegate this power, and on the assumption that the
criteria for its implementation have not been set out or not specified
in a sufficient manner in the empowering law (for example, when
reference is to a law which preceded the Basic Laws and which clearly
confers upon an authority the power to determine primary arrange-
ments), the authority will be obliged to determine those arrange-
ments itself and it will not be entitled to delegate the power to de-
termine them to another body.1
97
Beyond the issue of the determination of primary arrangements, a
number of questions arise concerning the requirement of "explicit
authorization" in the limitation clause. These questions will not be
195 A delegate cannot delegate. In other words, the delegate of the legislature-namely, the
authority which has been granted the power-is not entitled to delegate that power to another.
See BRACHA, supra note 38, at 152-56; DE SMITH Er AL., PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 224
(Harry Woolf, JeffreyJowell, & Andrew Le Seur eds., 1999).
94 See BRAcHA, supra note 38, at 156-58.
195 See id. at 168. The presumption is supposed to be even more powerful if reference is to
the delegation of a power having a legislative nature. See id. at 160-66; DE SMITH ET AL., supra
note 193, at 227-28.
196 This need also exists in relation to competent authorities in respect of which there is a
general power of delegation. Thus, Section 41 of Basic Law: the Government empowers the
government to delegate powers to ministers, Section 41 (a), and ministers are empowered to
delegate the powers granted to them-either directly under a law, Section 41 (b), or delegated
to them by the government (in which case the government must authorize the continuation of
the delegation-Section 41 (c))-to a public servant. According to Section 41(e), the provi-
sions of Section 41 shall apply "if no other intention may be inferred from the law which con-
fers the power or imposes the duty." Since the law which confers the power on the government
or on a minister is subject to the provisions of the Basic Laws relating to human rights (or, in
relation to old legislation, the empowering law must be interpreted in the spirit of the Basic
Laws), it seems that "another intention" is being inferred from that law in terms of delegation
of powers, at least in so far as concerns a delegation of powers from a minister to a public ser-
vant.
197 This is the situation which was considered in H.C. 2740/96, Shancey v. Supervisor of Dia-
monds, 51(4) P.D. 481. With regard to the discussion in the text, see primarily the opinions of
Justice Cheshin, id. at 504-19, andJustice Barak, id. at 519-21.
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discussed in this article.'9s In any event, just as the empowering (vio-
lating) statute is subject to the limitation clause, so too, and a fortiori,
is an administrative decision exercising the violating power subject to
that clause.'99 The limitation clause also applies to the exercise of
power conferred by laws which preceded the Basic Laws, both by rea-
son of the "application (respect) clause,"-w and by reason of the duty
to interpret existing law in the spirit of the Basic Laws.!' Addition-
ally, this interpretation will consider the fact that, from the point of
view of the power of an administrative authority, the limitation clause
does not present any novel requirements, as these requirements ap-
plied to the authority by virtue of the rules of administrative law even
prior to the enactment of the Basic Laws. m In the light of the "valid-
19s SeeB.RAaK, supra note 132, at 554-55, 560-61; B.RAK, supra note 10, at 500-01; Gazal. supra
note 152, at 403-08. These questions await judicial decision. Cf. Shantm, 51(4) P.D. at 491
(Strasberg-Cohen,J.). See also H.C. 5936/97, Lam v. Director General of the Ministry of Educa-
don, Culture & Sport (forthcoming) at paragraph 10 of Justice Dorner's opinion. For an ex-
ample, in this context, of regulations which were promulgated "by virtue of an explicit authori-
zation" in a law, see ILC. 450/97, Tnufa Afarzponr & Alainn-er ,ir LiL t. Minuter of Labar
& Welfare, 52(2) P.D. 433, 442. For an example of a regulation which does not meet this re-
quirement and is therefore invalid, see H.C. 205/94, Nof i. Minisirr of Defns. 50(5) P.D. 449.
462.
1 See Lam (forthcoming) paragraph 8 of Justice Dorner's opinion; 1715/97, Chamber of
Inv. Managers in Isr. v. Minister of Fin., 51(4) P.D. 367,396; H.C. 1255/94 Bezeq, Isr. Commu-
nications Co. v. Minister of Communications, 49(3) P.D. 661, 679, 687; H.C. 987/9-1 Euronet
Golden Lines (1992) Ltd. v. Minister of Communications, 48(5) P.D. 412, 436.
Section 11 of Basic Law Human Dignity and Freedom, ste supra text accompan)ing note
40; Section 5 of Basic La"'. Freedom of Occupation; see also CA. 6291/95, Ben Yakar Cat Eng'g
& Constr. Co. v. Special Comm. for Planning & Constr., 51(2) P.D. 825, 843; H.C. 4-M54/94,
Millerv. Minister of Defense, 49(4) P.D. 94, 138; F.H.H.C. 4466/94, Nusseiba v. Minister of Fin..
49(4) P.D. 68, 87; Miscellaneous Applications--Civil [M.A.C.] 4459, 4475/9-1, Salmonov v.
Sharbani, 49(3) P.D. 479, 483. For the application clauses, see supra text accompanying notes
40-118.
0 SeeEuronet, 48(5) P.D. at 436. For the interpretation of the old law in the spirit of the Ba-
sic Laws, see generally supra text accompanying notes 141-48. The duty to interpret the old law
in the spirit of the Basic Laws is also applicable to regulations. This conclusion is obtained in
respect of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation from Section 10, quoted in supra note 143, uhich
relates to the interpretation of the term "enactmenL" The term 'cnactment also includes a
regulation. SeeSection 3 of the Interpretation Law. With regard to Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Freedom, see C.A 5209/91, State v. Ramid &Bnjamin Ltd., 49(-0) P.D. 830,836. Moreover,
an "old" regulation which violates a protected right and which does not conform to te limita-
tion clause may be held to be invalid, as the "old* empowering statute-including its empower-
ing provisions--will be interpreted, in so far as possible, in the light of the Basic Laws. That is.
it will be interpreted in such a way that it will not empower the promulgation of that regulation.
SeeH.C. 5304/92, Perach 1992 Assistance to Persons Injured by Laws & Regulations for Another
Israel, an Ass'n v. Minister ofjustice, 47(4) P.D. 715, 760-63.
See H.C. 5016,5025,5090,5434/96, Horev v. Minister of Transp., 51(4) P.D. 1, 43 (Barak.
J.) ("Thus, the transition from the preceding law to the limitation clause is 'clean' and 'fast.'
without any difficuhy. "); Miller, 49(4) P.D. at 138; Salmona 49(3) P.D. at 483; see aLso H.C.
1703/92, C.A.L Cargo Air Lines v. Prime Minister, 52(4) P.D. 193,.23-1-35 (Barak, J.) 'lndeed.
we accept that the limitation clause applies in every area of administrative law, and it com-
prises-within the framework of the appropriate interpretation of every piece of legislation-a
standard for both protecting human rights and violating them...).
The Court occasionally applies the limitation clause to a decision made under an old law.
as an obvious solution, which requires no reasoning. See for example te comments of Justice
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ity of laws clause, 203 however, in those cases of old laws which cannot
be made compatible with the Basic Laws, and where the application
of the limitation clause to an administrative power conferred by them
will lead to the undermining of the laws, the administrative authority
will be able to act without being subject to those requirements.21
This would also hold true where such application is incompatible
with a statutory provision conferring a power which does not conform
with the provisions of the limitation clause.
B. Administrative Process
1. Shaping the Administrative Process-Efficiency and Fairness
The administrative process is intended to enable the administra-
tive authority to exercise its power efficiently in accomplishing the
purpose for which it was granted the power. However, efficiency is
not the only consideration which shapes the administrative process.
Operating alongside is the consideration of fairness, which expresses
the duty of an authority in a democratic regime to respect the basic
rights of the individual 05 These two considerations clash in a variety
Dorner regarding the validity of an order of administrative detention:
The Court must examine whether evidence on the basis of which the order is issued is
sufficiently persuasive so as to provide a basis for the violation of a person's freedom, and
whether the violation befits the values of the state, if it is for a proper purpose and
whether it does not exceed what is required; all as ensuing from Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Freedom.
Administrative Detention Appeal [A.DA.] 4/96, Ginzbourg v. Minister of Defense, 50(3) P.D.
221, 223. Cf. H.C. 4806/94, D.S.A. Env't Ltd. v. Minister of Fin., 52(2) P.D. 193, 205 (Zamir, J.)
(rejecting petitioner's claims that orders issued by the Minister of Finance violated her rights
which were protected by Basic Law- Human Dignity and Freedom and adding that, "as it has
been found that these orders do not violate rights under the Basic Law ... there is actually no
need to examine whether they meet the conditions of the limitation clause").
-03 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, Section 10; Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom,
Section 10.
90 SeeH.C. 6026/94, Nazal v. Commander of I.D.F. in Judea & Samaria, 48(5) P.D. 338, 350;
BARAK, supra note 10, at 563-64; Ewing, supra note 136, at 87-89; see also Section 6(1)-(2) of the
United Kingdom Human Rights Act:
(1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Con-
vention right.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to an act if-
(a) as the result of one or more provisions of primary legislation, the authority could
not have acted differently, or
(b) in the case of one or more provisions of, or made under, primary legislation which
cannot be read or given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights,
the authority was acting so as to give effect to or enforce those provisions.
05 See GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DIscRETIoN-LAwv AND POLICY IN FEDERAl.
REGULATORY AGENCIES 34 (1987); JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRuSIS AND LEGITIMACY-THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AIERICAN GOVERNMENT 129-30 (1978). See also the comments
ofJustice Barak in H.C. 685/78, Mahmoud v. Minister of Educ. & Culture, 33(1) P.D. 767, 777
("[T]he principles of fairness which bind the administration are some of the primary tools...
for the preservation of civil rights."), and Justice Dorner's comments at paragraph 9 of H.C.
5936/97, Lam v. Director General of the Ministry of Education, Culture & Sport (forthcoming)
("[E]fficiency is not necessarily an advantage where under consideration is a violation of hu-
[Vol. 3:2
Apr. 2001] CONS"ITUTIONAL UPGRADING OFJHUAL4N PCGHTS
of contexts, and in such cases, the administrative process is the out-
come of the balance drawn between them.,% This point of balance-
namely, the process under consideration here-is tightly intertwined
with the basic constitutional tenets of the legal system, and is of im-
mense importance in terms of the protection of basic rights:
It is not without significance that most of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the difference
betveen rule by law and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to
strict procedural safeguards is our main assurance that there will be equal
justice under 
law."
7
Indeed, it is an open secret that procedural arrangements, in a
broad sense, have captured a central role in the defence of human
rights: "The history of liberty has largely been the history of the ob-
servance of procedural safeguards. ' O'
2. The Influence of the Basic Laws
Against this background, one may understand the influence
which the Basic Laws concerning human rights exert over the admin-
istrative process. Since the weight attached to the protected rights
has mounted, the consideration of fairness has also-as a matter of
principle-been strengthened in shaping the administrative process
relating to the exercise of power by virtue of which these rights may
be violated.-" In terms of our issue too-as with regard to the scope
of the administrative power2'10 -the Basic Laws exert their influence
on the shaping of the process touching the old laws which violate
protected rights.
21
Increased concern for the protection of human rights in the ad-
man ights.").
-06 See 1 KENErH CuLP DAvis, ADtMNIsTRAmT.E Lkw TRF_,%TsE 57 (2d ed. 1978) ("Te two
main interests in fairness and effectiveness must be accommodated to each other so as to
maximize the protection of both interests .... ).
- Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas, J.). See also H.C.
297/82, Berger v. Minister of Interior, 37(3) P.D. 29, 49-50 (referring to the issue in the wider
context of the protection of the substantive rule of law).
McNab v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943) (Frankfurterj.); se alsoMalinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401,414 (1945) (FrankfurterJ.); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 456,477 (1921)
(Brandeis, J.); Lord Chancellor Viscount Kilmuir, The Stale, tht Citlnz md the Law 73 Lw Q.
REV. 172, 178 (1957); LC. 3914/92, Lev v. Regional Rabbinical Court of Tel Aviv-Jaffa. 48(2)
P.D. 491,502-03 (BarakJ.).
-0 In Lev, 48(2) P.D. 491, afterJustice Barak discussed "the entirety ofrte general considera-
tions in the framework of which one must exercise a procedural power (legislative or inher-
ent)," id. at 503, he referred to a situation where those same considerations clash, and where a
balance must accordingly be drawn between them: "Within the framework of this balance great
weight must be given to considerations relating to human rights. This is particularly manifest
now, following the legislation of Basic Law-. Human Dignity and Freedom." hL
210 See supra text accompanying notes 141-48.
_11 See Lev, 48(2) P.D. at 503. Possibly, this influence %vill also be expressed in relation to new
and old law which violates rights that are not protected by te Basic Laws. Se supra text accom-
panying note 147.
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ministrative process will, for example, require a more solid than
"usual" evidentiary foundation before a decision will be reached which
violates a protected right. It is clear that establishing the facts is of
cardinal importance to the exercise of a particular power.1 The
general test applying to the quantum of evidence needed for the
purpose of arriving at an administrative decision, is the test of the
reasonable person (or more precisely, the test of the reasonable ad-
ministrative authority) .2 With regard to the implementation of the
test it may be said that "the perception of the reasonable person is in-
fluenced, in the natural course, by the relative importance of the val-
ues, which the factual elements intended to regulate. 2 1 4  Indeed,
"It]he reasonableness of the decision is a function of the values in-
volved in the decision,"21 5 and when reference is made to the basic
rights of the individual, the test of reasonableness becomes even
more strict-namely, "the evidence required to persuade a statutory
authority of a justification for denying a fundamental right must be
clear, unequivocal and convincing." 216 As the importance of the right
and the significance of the injury increase, the courts require more
persuasive evidence to justify the authority's decision.2 ' This re-
212 See the well-known remarks of ChiefJustice Hughes of the United States Supreme Court,
in his 1931 appearance before the Federal Bar Association, as quoted by Judge Frank in United
States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942 (2nd Cir. 1942): "An unscrupulous administrator might be
tempted to say let me find the facts for the people of my country, and I care little who lays down
the general principles."
See also Berger, 37(3) P.D. at 36 (Barak,J.) (citing the above remarks); N.L.R.B. v. Curtin Mathe-
son Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 819 (1990) (ScaliaJ.) (same).
21 SeeH.C. 442/71, Lanski v. Minister of Interior, 26(2) P.D. 337, 357 (AgranatJ.):
The question of the weight and credibility of the evidence is a matter for the administra-
tive authority to determine. Rules should not be laid down in advance as to how it
should act in that respect, apart from the rule that the evidence should be such that-
taking into account the subject, the contents of the evidence and the person who gave
it-any reasonable person would regard it as being of probative value and would rely on
it in one way or another.
See also Berger, 37(3) P.D. at 37. The Israeli test in this regard actually resembles the American
"substantial evidence" rule. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 26, at 640. English law "also has some
affinity with the substantial evidence rule of American law." WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER
FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 279 (8th ed. 2000); see also DE SMITH ET AL., supra note 193, at
143-44.
214 H.C. 620/85, Miari v. Speaker of Knesset, 41 (4) P.D. 169, 273 (Barak,J.).
215 H.C. 680/88, Schnitzer v. Shani, 42(4) P.D. 617, translated in 9 SELEGrEDJUDGMENTS Sup.
CT. ISR. 77, 103 (Barak,J.).
216 Election Appeal [E.A.] 2, 3/84, Neiman v. Chairman of Cent. Election Comm. for Elev-
enth Knesset, 39(2) P.D. 225, translated in 8 SELECrEDJUDGNMENTS SUP. CT. ISR. 83, 100 (Sham-
gar, J.) (relying on the United States Supreme Court case of Woodby v. Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966)). See also H.C. 1227/98, Malevski v. Minister of Interior,
52(4) P.D. 690, 713-15. For the application of this test to emergency powers in Israel, by the
exercise of which fundamental freedoms may be infringed, see Bracha, supra note 129, at 63-66.
217 See Neiman, 8 SELECTEDJUDGMENTS Sup. CT. ISR. at 100 (Shamgar, J.) ("The more impor-
tant the right, the greater the required weight and force of the evidence that is to serve as a ba-
sis for a decision in a diminution right."). See also H.C. 802/89, Nassman v. Commander of
I.D.F. in Gaza Strip, 44(2) P.D. 601, 606; H.C. 4146/95, Estate of the Late Lily Danker v. Direc-
tor of Antiquities Auth., 52(4) P.D. 774,800-01.
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quirement will be particularly strict, therefore, in connection ith a
violation of rights protected by the Basic Laws.''
Granting additional weight to the consideration of fairness in
shaping the administrative process, must also spur the courts to re-
examine their position regarding the right of persons-who may be in-
jured by certain regulations-to be heard during the rmle-7naking process. It
seems that thus far, the case law has not recognized this right.'2, The
main reason is efficiency.20 In my opinion, there was no room for
this position even prior to the Basic Laws, and it would be proper to
apply the right to be heard to legislative acts, just as the) are applied
to judicial and administrative acts.2 -' Recently, judicial statements
_18 SeeH.C. 2394/95, Mochnik v. Minister of Interior, 49(3) P.D. 274, 281. In this context, it
must be pointed out that the courts have not always applied the more severe evidentiary test
regarding violations of basic rights. Thus, for example, refusal to grant a business license falls
within the framework of a violation of freedom of occupation. Nevertheless, in the past. the
courts have not applied the more severe test, in contrast to the case where a license is cancelled.
where this test is applied. See BRACHA, supra note 38, at 301-02. It would seem that now, after
freedom of occupation has attained a new status-following its entrenchment in Basic Law.
Freedom of Occupation-the more severe test will apply even to an -original" application for a
business license. This will be the case in relation to "new" legislation (follming the Basic Law)
and in relation to old legislation. Cf H.C. 987/94, Euronet Golden lines (1992) Ltd. v. Minis-
ter of Communications, 48(5) P.D. 412,425 (ZamirJ.) (holding that 'a particularly grave viola-
tion of a basic right must be based on particularly credible and persuasive factors... no sub-
stantial violation may be made to freedom of occupation... save where this is supported by a
real factual basis"). See also H.C. 635, 7216/95, Hadarim Taxis, Sherut Rehovot. Kiryat Ekron.
Mazkeret Batya Ltd. v. Minister of Transp., 51 (5) P.D. 723, 748-49.
_19 See H.C. 3, 9/58, Berman v. Minister of Interior. 12 P.D. 1493. 1509. translatal in 3
SELEcrEDJUDGMENs Sup. CT. IsP. 29, 48; Cr.A. 3490/90, Galilee Wine Presses v. State, 48(1)
P.D 11, 16; Baruch Bracha, The Right to be Heard in Rule Making Prwtrfings in England and in I-
rae Judidal Policy Reonsidered, 10 FORDHAM IN-T'L LJ. 613. 615-20 (1987). Broadly speaking,
this is also the law in England; see Bates v. Lord Hailsham, [19721 1 %W.LR. 1373 (Cl.); DE
SMirH ErAL., supra note 193, at 292-93; CR.iG, supra note 180. at 408. Regarding Australia. see
HOTOp, supra note 180, at 120-22, 211-12; EDWARD I SYKES, DA\'IDJ. L HA.%it, & RICtLRD R.S.
TRACEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ADNINISrRATVE LAW 178 (3d ed. 1989). Regarding Canada,
see JONES & DE VILLARS, supra note 27, at 90-92, 208-10; SARA BLAre. ADMINISTRATIVE LAw IN
CANADA 120-26 (1997). The legal literature in Canada is engaged in a debate whether the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms requires that the public participate in certain regulatory proc-
esses. SeeJONES & DEVILLARS, supra note 27, at 92 n.55. In the United States, there is a general
arrangement in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946, allowing interested parties the right to
be heard in rule-making proceedings. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994). See
also RICHARD J. PIERCE JR. Er AL, ADMtNISTRATIvE LIAW AND PROCE.SS 320-26 (3d ed. 1999):
SCmvARTZ, supra note 26, at 193-99. Similar arrangements exist, generally speaking. at the state
level as well. See ScmAR7z, supra note 26, at 205-07. For a comparison in this regard between
American and Israeli law, see Colin S. Diver, Israli Adminifmtitte Lamfrin an Arrnrica P-rsp-
tive, 4 LAW & GoV'T IS,. at I, XII-XIV (1997-1998). In Australia too, important statutory devel-
opments have taken place in this area at the state level in order to bring about greater partici-
pation on the part of the public in the rule-making process. Sie DOUGLAS &JoNEs. supra note
180, at 288-90. A proposal for reform in this direction also exists on the level of te Common-
wealth. Id. at 316-17.
_ SeeBracha, supra note 219, at 636-37 ('It appears that considerations of eflicency occupy a
major place in the judicial policy of non-recognition of the right to a hearing with respect to
lelslative acts.").
See id. at 626. Of course, the application of the right to a hearing on rule-nmking pro-
ceedings should be adjusted so as not to reject the consideration of efficiency. See td. at 638-45.
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have been made which recognize the need for a shift in this direc-
tion.2 Strengthening the status of protected rights requires the im-
plementation of this shift, at least in relation to the protected rights.
We have seen that there are constitutional systems which have in-
corporated certain aspects of the administrative process into the pro-
visions of their constitutions in order to provide constitutional pro-
tection to the fairness component underlying those processes.! Is
there also a basis for such incorporation in our Basic Laws on human
rights? It seems to me that, if reference is made to rights protected
by the Basic Laws, the answer should be in the affirmative. Procedural
fairness is part of the general duty of fairness-and it is also con-
nected, of course, to the consideration of the protection of human
rights-which applies to the governmental authorities in their rela-
tions with the individual. 4 This duty is one of the basic values of the
legal system, "2 and it derives from the duty of trust owed by the gov-
ernmental authority in a democratic regime to each member of the
public.26 In the matter at hand, legislation which violates a protected
right must meet the requirements of the limitation clause and, inter
alia, must befit "the values of the State of Israel." Accordingly, a vio-
lating statute must satisfy the requirement of fairness, and the confer-
ral of power on an administrative authority to violate a protected
right is also subject to the duty to act fairly, which includes guarantee-
ing a fair process. Against this background it is possible to under-
stand the remarks of the Supreme Court that "Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Freedom protects the right of every person to due proc-
ess prior to violation of his rights."28 Further, it may be said that the
right to due process-that is, fair process-is also guaranteed within
the framework of the requirement of proportionality, which is estab-
lished by the limitation clause and which requires that the violation
of the protected right be "to an extent no greater than required."'
-2 See H.C. 164/97, Contram Ltd. v. Ministry of Fin., 52(1) P.D. 289, 342; Application for
Civil Appeal [A.CA.] 3577/93, Israel Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Moriano, 48(4) P.D. 70, 86-87; H.C.
3536/92, Swirey v. Herzliya Municipality, 47(1) P.D. 125, 144; H.C. 975/89, Nimrodi Land Dev.
Ltd. v. Speaker of Knesset, 45(3) P.D. 154, 157-58; see also AHARON BARAK,JUDICiAL DISCRETION
487 (1987) (Hebrew); ZAIIR, supra note 44, at 802-03.
"- See supra text accompanying notes 24-28.
224 SeeBARAK, supra note 222, at 478-91; BARAK, supra note 132, at 456-57,548-49.
2 See, e.g., Further Hearing-Civil [F.H.C.] 7325/95, Yedioth Achronot Ltd. v. Kraus, 52(3)
P.D. 1, 72-73. See also BARAK, supra note 222, at 478, 484; BARAK, supra note 132, at 456, 548.
26 See, e.g., H.C. 840/79, Center of Contractors & Builders in Isr. v. Israel, 34(3) P.D. 729,
745-46. For the duty of the governmental authority to act fairly towards the individual, and for
the question whether there is a parallel duty on the individual towards the authority, see, gen-
eray, Contram, 52(1) P.D. 289.
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, Section 4; Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom,
Section 8.
3 ACA. 5587/97, Attorney-Gen. v. Achar (Minor), 51 (4) P.D. 830, 861 (Or, J.). See also
Aharon Barak, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right, 41 HAPRAKLIT 271, 281 (1993-1994) (He-
brew).
X" H.C. 4914/94, Turner v. State Comptroller, 49(3) P.D. 771, 790; Attomey-Gen. v. Achar
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From the foregoing, it follows that the Basic Laws impose limita-
tions on the legislative power of the Knesset within the area of the
administrative process. Thus, for example, it will not be within the
competence of a law to permit the violation of a protected right while
concurrently creating an exemption from the duty to satisfy the rdes of
natural justice-the right to be heard and the rule against bias and
conflict of interests-save in highly exceptional circumstances where
the exemption conforms with the values of the state. 2  It is possible
that the courts will even anchor these rules as protected rights. In-
deed, one may find hints in the case law to the effect that the right to
be heard is shielded by the umbrella of the right to dignity' or the
right to freedom. " If this approach is accepted, the aforementioned
rules will achieve "independent" constitutional protection even in
cases where the violation is of a right which is not protected by the
Basic Laws.233 In other words, the rules of natural justice--or at least
the right to be heard-will join the list of protected rights.?'
51(4) P.D. at 861. For the requirement of proportionality, see infra text accompanying notes
281-87.
Thus, the right to be heard may be suspended if its exercise would frustrate the objects of
the legislation invoh'ed-which is acceptable under the limitation clause in the Basic Laus-or
if urgent action is needed to avoid serious consequences. Srt H.C. 598/77. De'eri v. Parole
Comm'r, 32(3) P.D. 161; see also ZAMl, supra note 44. at 802-09; surgenriralh. H.C. 531/79. Likud
Faction in Petach Tikvah Municipality v. Petach Tikvah Municipality, 3-1(2) P.D. 566. 576 (Ba-
rakJ.), extracted in PUBUC LAW IN ISRAEL 169 (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysbiat eds., 1996) ('[Tlhe
principles of necessity or 'the exigencies of the hour' nmy on occasion postpone the application
of rules of natural justice and conflict of interests ...."); CrA 768/80, Shapira v. State. 36(1)
P.D. 337,366 (Barak,J.) ("At the same time, the application of the doctrine of necessity must be
limited to what is vital only, and not be turned into an opening for usurping the rules of natural
justice."). Cf. DE SMIT E" AL, supra note 193, at 365-72, 439-41.
231 See Sections 2 and 4 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom; H.C. 1446/96, Mosve-
ment for Quality in Gov't in Isr. v. Israel, 50(3) P.D. 705, 707; see also Barak, supra note 228. Cf.
David Feldman, Human Dignity as a Legal Value-Part 1, 1999 Pun. L 682. 696. With regard to
the interpretation of the right to dignity in the Basic Law, as incorporating dte prohibition
against bias see Haim A. Cohn, The Values of a Juish and Democratic State-Studis in Basic Lau,
Human Dignity and Freedom, in HAPRAEIrT-JUBLEE BOOK 9, 32 (1993).
= See Section 5 of Basic Law. Human Dignity and Freedom; MAohnik 49(3) at 281; H.C.
5304/92, Perach 1992 Assistance to Persons Injured by Laws & Regulations for Another Israel,
an Ass'n v. Minister ofJustice, 47(4) P.D. 715, 759; F.H.Cr. 4390/91, State v. Haj Yichiye. 47(3)
P.D. 661,694.
The test for the application of die rules of natural justice is the test of the violation of a
right. See H.C. 3, 9/58, Berman v. Minister of Interior, 12 P.D. 1493, translaltd in 3 SEt.ECrED
JUDGMENTS SUP. Cr. Is. 29,46.
M This approach may be regarded as far-reaching, as it elevates die process to a higher con-
stitutional status than the substantive right which is violated (on the assumption that this tight is
not a protected right). The Basic Law- Trial Rights Bill, 1993-1994 Hatzaot Hok 335, takes the
same approach. Section 8(b) of the Bill provides that "[a] legal power concerning the rights of
a person shall not be exercised save in a fair process, ithout bias and ithout irrelevant con-
siderations." See also the Basic Law Bills referred to in supra note -8. Another question, of
course, is whether the list of rights set out in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom. is a
closed list or whether it also inciudes rights which are not set out in that list. See infra note 297.
Recognition of the rules of naturaljustice as protected rights will prevent the subordinate legis-
lator from empowering an administrative authority to violate them uithout express statutory
authorization. See supra text accompan)ing notes 151-60. According to the prevailing law, it
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An additional process which should be mentioned in this context
is the duty to publish regulations. 5 This duty is set out in Section 17
of the Interpretation Ordinance (New Version): "[a]ll regulations
having legislative effect shall be published in Reshumot [the Official
Gazette] and, unless it be otherwise provided, shall come into opera-
tion on the date of such publication."3 6
The Supreme Court has stated:
Of course, a new piece of legislation which is enacted after the entry into
force of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Freedom, may create an exemption from the duty of publica-
tion only if it satisfies the requirements of the "limitation clause" (Section
1 [currently: Section 4] of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Sec-
tion 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom).23
What is the basis for this determination? If the reference is to a
law which expressly empowers the subordinate legislator to violate
one of the protected rights and concurrently exempts the regulations
from the duty of publication, then, according to the construction
given to the constitutional anchorage of fair process, we would have
to say that here too the violating statute-whether directly or through
its empowering provisions-must satisfy the requirements of the limi-
tation clause. The latter refers to the values of the State of Israel
which guarantee the principle of publicity as one of the aspects of the
seems that such a violation is possible even in the absence of express authorization as aforesaid.
This arises from the position taken by the majority justices (Cheshin and Berenson) in Legal
Council Appeal [L.CA] 9/55, Anonymous v. Chairman of Legal Council, 10 P.D. 1720, 1723,
1733. Countering this view, Justice Silberg emphasized, in a minority opinion, "that every regu-
lation which violates the principles of natural justice lacks legal validity, as we must assume that
the legislature, in transferring to some body the power to promulgate regulations, did not
authorize the latter to issue regulations which violate natural justice." Id. at 1735. See also tile
position expressed by Justice Cohn in H.C. 74/74, Ezra v. Minister of Transportation, 28(2) P.D.
729, 731, where, in a lone opinion and obiter dictum (the other judges did not express an opin-
ion on the matter, id. at 732, he agreed with the view taken byJustice Silberg. The position of
the majorityjudges in Anonymous v. Chairman of Legal Council seems wrong, as it is incompatible
with the status of the rules as basic rights and fundamental principles. See, e.g., H.C. 7279/98,
Sarid v. Israel at para. 18 (forthcoming); Shapira, 36(1) P.D. at 364-65; H.C. 654/78, Gingold v.
National Labor Court, 35(2) P.D. 649, 654; supra note 132. See also BARAK, supra note 132, at
510-13. Express authorization in this connection is also required in England. See DE SMITH ET
AL., supra note 193, at 361-62.
Even if one does not accept the position that the Basic Laws now directly protect the rules
of natural justice, strengthening of the status of the consideration of fairness within the deci-
sion-making process must lead to the conclusion that there is a need for express authorization,
both in relation to the new law and in relation to the old law. Cf. H.C. 5304/92, Perach 1992
Assistance to Persons Injured by Laws & Regulations for Another Israel, an Ass'n v. Minister of
Justice, 47(4) P.D. 715, 759-65.
See genera Hy BRACHA, supra note 23, at 249-69; ZAMIR, supra note 44, at 925-37,945-51.
1 L.S.I. (New Version) 5.
2 H.C. 4950/90, Parnass v. Minister of Defense, 47(3) P.D. 36, 42 (Barak, J.). See also CA.
4275, 6230/94, Securities Stock Exch. in Tel Aviv Ltd. v. A.T. Mgmt. of Torah Library Archive
Ltd., 50(5) P.D. 485,525.
2M See supra text accompanying notes 223-28, 230 (explaining fair process).
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rule of law.2s Accordingly, the empowering statute cannot exempt
the regulations from the obligation of publication, save in those rare
cases where the values of the State of Israel permit it.L° This result
may also be reached by way of interpretation to the effect that a viola-
tion of a protected right by a concealed law or regulation will not sat-
isfy the requirement of the limitation clause that such violation be "by
a law... or under an aforesaid law."
24'
It should be noted that the comments quoted from Parnass, mak-
ing a statute which exempts regulations from the duty of publication
subordinate to the provisions of the Basic Laws, are not limited, from
the point of view of their language, solely to regulations violating the
protected rights.2 4 2 Are these comments intended to have more far-
reaching effect than that argued for so far, namely, that in every case
the duty to publish regulations is protected by the Basic Lawls? Again,
if one accepts the view that the list of rights protected by Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Freedom is not a closed list," it may be possible
to also include within it freedom of speech as part of human dig-
nity.244 Further, as is well-known:
the right of the public to know is one of the central and important de-
rivatives of freedom of speech... and just as preservation of freedom of
speech is a primary guarantee of the democratic process and a guarantee
of other fundamental rights... so too respect for the right of the public
to know is a condition for the implementation of freedom of speech.
2 45
=9 SeeParmass, 47(3) P.D. at 42 (BarakJ.):
[I]n a democratic state faithful to the rule of law, all legislation must be published. Pub-
lication of legislation is an essential principle of the rule of law. One camnot demand
that a person obey the law if the law is hidden .... [H]idden legisation undermines the
foundations of the rule of law and the essence of democracy.
SeealsoA.Cr.A. 1127/93, State v. Klein, 48(3) P.D. 485,515 (CheshinJ.):
The principle of the publication of legislation is found at the very foundations of the
rule of law. This is the case in respect of the rule of law in its formal and primary sense.
if you will: the rule of law in the sense of the principle of legality. However, it would
seem that this principle of publication of legislation also permeates the realm of the rule
of law in its substantive sense--w'hicl has to do with contents and %alues-namely, the
rule of law immersed in the basic values of society and the individual.
See, e.g., Pamars, 47(3) P.D. at 42-43 (giving an example based on the grounds of national
security).
_41 This interpretation is proposed by Barak. See supra note 160; B.IIAM. supra note 10, at 491
("Concealed legislation is incompatible with a limitation 'by law' of a human right.").
24 See supra text accompanying note 237.
243 See infra note 297.
-4 Se; eg., C.A. 105/92, Re'em Eng'g Contractors Ltd. v. Municipality of Upper Nazareth.
47(5) P.D. 189, 201 (BarakJ.) ("Today, it is possible to derive freedom of expression from the
protection given to human dignity and freedom in Basic Law. Human Dignity and Freedom.').
See also the opinion ofJustice Cheshin in I-C. 6126/94. Se ish v. BmadrasingAutherir., 53(3)
P.D. 817, 864-65, where he refers to legal literature dealing with this question which has not yet
been decided in the case law of the Supreme Court. Thejustice saw no need to express his po-
sition in this regard.
245 See H.C. 5771, 5807/93, Zitrin v. Minister ofJustice, 48(1) P.D. 661. 673 (Mazza. J.). S e
also Further Hearing-Civil [F.H.C.] 7325/95,Yedioth Achronot Ltd. v. Kraus, 52(3) P.D. 1.78-
85. This right is now also guaranteed in the Freedom of Information Law. S e aLso supm text
accompanying notes 68-69.
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The right to know embraces, of course, knowledge of the law, in-
cluding subordinate legislation. Therefore, according to this line of
thought, the duty to bring the regulations to the knowledge of the
public-that is, the duty of publication-is in every case anchored in
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom.246 It seems that this route,
if adopted, will also allow a determination to be made as to the con-
stitutional duty to bring internal administrative guidelines, which are
not in the nature of regulations, to the knowledge of the relevant
public.
47
Returning to the regulations which violate one of the protected
rights by virtue of an express empowering provision, it seems that it
will not be possible to confer upon such regulations any retroactive ef-
fect, except to the extent that this conforms with the values of the
State of Israel. 248 The limitation applies to the power of the prima27
legislature, and a fortiori, to the power of its secondary delegate.
246 The Basic Laws have the effect of strengthening the duty to publish regulations under tile
"old" law as well. See CA. 4275, 6230/94, Securities Stock Exch. in Tel Aviv Ltd. v. A.T. Mgmt.
of Torah Library Archive Ltd., 50(5) P.D. 485, 525. It should be pointed out that even before
the Basic Laws, the courts were strict with the subordinate legislators regarding the fulfillment
of the duty of publication. In cases where the legislature exempted the subordinate legislator
from the duty to publish in Reshumot, the courts held that there still existed a duty of publica-
tion in some other manner. See H.C. 4950/90, Parnass v. Minister of Defense, 47(3) P.D. 36, 42;
CA. 421/6,1 State v. Haz, 15 P.D. 2193, 2204-05.
247 SeeBRAcHA, supra note 38, at 268 n.231. This duty is now also guaranteed in Section 6 of
the Freedom of Information Law.
248 The case law contains statements from which it appears that giving retroactive effect to
legislation violates the values of the State of Israel. See, e.g., H.C. 2933/94, Airports Auth. v. Na-
tional Labor Court, 50(3) P.D. 837, 854 (Mazza, J.) ("[R]etroactive legislation is contrary to
fundamental principles of the legal system, violates vested rights and legitimate expectations,
undermines social stability and causes injustice .. .."). However, this is not an all-embracing
principle which applies in each and every case. Thus, for example, "retroactive civil legislation,
per se, is not contrary to the values of the State of Israel. It all depends on the content of the
legislation." H.C. 4562/92, Zandberg v. Broadcasting Auth., 50(2) P.D. 793, 817-18 (Barak, J.);
see also H.C. 4806/94, D.S.A. Env't Ltd. v. Minister of Fin., 52(2) P.D. 193, 209; see generally,
BARAK, supra note 132, at 609-45; RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 10, at 248-55. In any event
there is a presumption that "the purpose of a law is not to bring about retroactive or retrospec-
tive application. It is presumed that all laws look to the future and not to the past..." P.P.A.
1613/91, Arbiv v. State, 46(2) P.D. 765, 776 (Barak,J.). This presumption may be expressly or
impliedly rebutted by the legislature. Id. at 775; Airports Auth., 50(3) P.D. at 853, 859-60;
BRAcHA, supra note 23, at 270-71; ZAMIR, supra note 44, at 964-65; RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra
note 10, at 251-52. See also infra note 254.
249 Section 17 of the Interpretation Ordinance (New Version), cited in supra text accompany-
ing note 236, provides that the date of publication in Reshumot is the date on which the regula-
tions become effective, "unless it be otherwise provided." In the past, the courts held that there
was a presumption that the secondary legislator possessed the power to confer retroactive effect
upon the regulations, except if the same was expressly or impliedly prohibited by the empower-
ing statute. See, for example,Justice Mazza's opinion in Airports Authority, 50(3) P.D. at 853-54,
which still espouses this view. However, such a view is incompatible with the presumption ap-
plying to the primary legislator regarding the denial of retroactive effect to a law the empower-
ing provisions of which form part of it. Indeed, it seems that recently, the courts have deviated
from their previous rulings and have "drawn a parallel" between the primary legislator and the
secondary legislator, so that the latter's power to promulgate retroactive regulations is contin-
gent upon an express or implied authorization in the empowering statute. See id. at 858-67
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Against this background it is possible to understand the comments of
the Supreme Court on this matter
A legal norm, in a statute or in a regulation, is generally prospective--
one that looks to the future-however, the primary legislator (within the
limits of the Basic Laws) and a secondary legislator (within the limits of a
primary law and the Basic Lams) can even provide for retroactive applica-
non.
C. Administrative Discretion
1. Administrative Discretion-Its Nature and Scope
The most sensitive aspect of any given power is that which relates
to the exercise of discretion. This is the very heart of the power.1'
(Zamir, J.); H.C. 5-90/97, Ezranal Orthodox Youth Movement in Erez Israel v. Minister of Re-
ligious Affairs, 51(5) P.D. 410; D.S.A., 52(2) P.D. at 209; H.C. 7691/95, 2878/96. Saguy v. Israel,
52(5) P.D. 577, 597-99; H.C. 1149/95, Erko Elec. Indus. Ltd. v. Mayor of Rison Le'Zion. 54(5)
P.D. 547,564,570-72. In any event, the power of the rule-maker is conditional upon ie retro-
active application not violating the values of the State of Israel. Stesupm note 248.
CrA. 4912,5434,5513/91, Talmi v. Suite, 48(1) P.D. 581, 620. Retroactive legislation-
primary and secondary--that violates protected rights may also be imalidated for being non-
proportional. See Zandherg, 50(2) P.D. at 810, 819. Ser also Itzhak Zamir, Isradi Adrrnautralive
Law Compared to German AdministratiiveLAm 2 LA W& Gov'T IsR. 109, 121 n.26 (199-1) (Hebrew).
So far I have referred to legislation-primary or secondary-that violates retroactively protected
rights, however, it is possible that the court wvill regard the retroactive legislation per s,-for ex-
ample, if it imposes a criminal prohibition or makes sanctions more severe-as a violation of
human dignity and freedom and therefore will invalidate the legislation. Se Bk3ARA. supra note
10, at 432; RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 10, at 249.
The sensitivity of the Israeli legislature to te prohibition on retroactive legislation. which
creates an offence or imposes overly heavy sanctions, may be seen in the provisions of Sections
3-6 of the Penal Law, 1977, 1976-1977 S.H. 226 (amended 1994). Thus, Section 3 of the Law.
captioned "No Retroactive Punishment," provides:
(a) An enactment which creates an offence shall not apply to an act committed prior to
the date of its lawful publication or the date of its entry into force, which ewr is later.
(b) An enactment which prescribes a sanction for an offence which is harsher than that
prescribed at the time of commission of the offence, will not apply to an act committed
prior to its lawful publication or prior to its coming into effect, whichever is later, how-
ever, adjustment of the rate of a fine shall not be deemed to be a harsher sanction.
The term "enactment" incorporates law and regulation: Interpretation Ordinance (New Ver-
sion), Section 1; Interpretation Law, Section 3. See aLso supra note 201. For te question of the
retroactive application of a penal law, see H.C. 1618/97, Satchi v. Municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa.
52(2) P.D. 542.
In the area of emergency regulations too-even though Basic Law: te Government con-
fers upon the rule-makers far-reaching powers, by means of which it is possible to deviate from
the provisions ofa law of the Knesset, including a Basic Law, which are not entrenched. Section
50(c) of the Basic Law (Section 39(c) of the 2001 version). "Emergency Regulations cannot
prevent applications to the courts, prescribe penalties retroactively or permit violation of hu-
man dignity" Section 50(d) (Section 39(d) of the 2001 version). This sensitivity on te part of
the Knesset will undoubtedly have an impact on te question whether retroactive subordinate
legislation, which, by virtue of an express authorization, violates one of the protected rights.
indeed infringes the basic values of the state. See also supra notes 248-50.
1 Thus, in referring to the power to promulgate regulations. justice Shangar clarifies that
"the focal point in the process of promulgation ies in the decision-making and deliberative
process of the authority, which as empowered to promulgate tie regulation." H.C. 653/79.
Azriel v. Dir. of Licensing Div., 35(2) P.D. 85,97.
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Through the discretion, the legislature expects the authority to stamp
its mark on the arrangement under consideration in order to achieve
the statutory purpose, while adapting the power to the different fac-
tors of each and every case. 2  Indeed, conferring discretion on the
authority entails granting it the power to select the solution which
seems most appropriate out of all possible alternative solutions. 5
This power is conferred on the authority; the discretion falls within its
province, and therefore, as a starting point, other bodies, including
the courts, are not to intervene in its application.2  Bearing in mind
that numerous statutes confer extremely broad discretion-without
establishing criteria for its implementation 255 -it is possible to under-
stand the great danger this poses to the rule of law and to the basic
rights of the individual. Indeed, Professor Dicey saw the grant of dis-
cretion to an administrative authority as a violation of the principle of
the rule of law. 6 Thus, he clarifies the first conception (of three) of
the rule of law:
We mean, in the first place, that no man is punishable or can be lawfully
made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law estab-
lished in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the
land. In this sense the rule of law is contrasted with every system of gov-
ernment based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary,
or discretionary, powers of constraint.
And he adds later: "wherever there is discretion there is room for
arbitrariness, and.., discretionary authority on the part of the gov-
ernment must mean insecurity for legal freedom on the part of its
subjects."'m
25 See F.H. 16/61, Registrar of Co. v. Kardosh, 16 P.D. 1209, 1215, translated in 4 SELECTED
JUDGMENrs SUP. CT. ISR. 32, 35 (Sussman, J.) ("A discretion is given to an administrative or-
gan ... in order that, in fulfilling its many-sided functions, which circumstances may vary and
change periodically and which cannot be precisely determined in advance, it may have freedom
of action."); see also H.C. 3094, 4319, 4478/93, Movement for Quality in Gov't v. Israel, 47(5)
P.D. 404, translated in 10 SELECTEDJUDGMENTS SuP. CT. ISR. 258, 278;JONES & DEVILLARS, supra
note 27, at 168; GARNER, ADMINISTRATiVE LAw 195-96 (Brian Jones & Katherine Thompson
eds., 8th ed. 1996).
?s See Registrar of Co., 16 P.D. at 1215, translated in 4 SELECTEDJUDGMENTS SUP. Cr. IsR. at 35
(Sussman,J.) ("[D]iscretion means freedom of choice from among different possible solutions,
or an option granted to the administrative authority... ."); Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensa-
tion and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 926 (1960)
("Discretion is an authority conferred by law to act in certain conditions or situations in accor-
dance with an official's or an official agency's own considered judgment and conscience.").
Registrar of Co., 16 P.D. at 1215, translated in 4 SELECTED JUDGMENTS SUP. CT. ISR. at 35
(Sussman,J.) ("[B]ecause that authority is empowered to choose and select the solution appro-
priate to its mind, the court will not interfere for the reason alone that it would itself have
picked upon a different solution.").
See supra text accompanying notes 175-80.
DICEY, supra note 103, at 188.
27 Id.
258 Id. This is Dicey's approach to the legality of the administration. See also supra note 103.
In a similar spirit see the comments of the Israeli Supreme Court in an old case:
According to the principle of the "rule of law," there is a duty on the legislature to estab-
lish in a law and specify there the situations in which licenses must be granted or refused,
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In the reality of the administrative state-that is, the modem wel-
fare state-it is difficult to accept these far-reaching comments, and
they certainly cannot be implemented. At the same time, in order to
prevent improper use of administrative discretion, one must aspire to
achieve the situation whereby the legislature will circumscribe the
discretion by means of determining the goals and criteria for its im-
plementation.n The reason for this is that "[a]bsolute discretion,
like corruption, marks the beginning of the end of liberty." 26
Similarly, it is necessary to confine the discretion by means of the
rules of administrative law concerning its exercise. Indeed, "there is
no need to emphasize that 'discretion' does not mean 'caprice.'""'
Accordingly, it also follows that every discretionary power granted-
however wide or absolute-is subject to judicial review which imple-
ments the rules to which the administrative discretion is subject!-'
2. The Rights Protected in the Basic Laws-A Relevant Consideration
The Basic Laws have a significant impact on administrative discre-
tion insofar as it concerns a power which may be used to violate pro-
tected rights. "- First and foremost, the Basic Laws limit the power of
the legislature to grant expansive discretion in this regard, without
establishing accompanying criteria for its implementation. : ' Beyond
in such a manner that the executive authority will only be left the function of executing
the provisions of the law. Accordingly, the legislative iork must be performed in such a
way that the citizen will be able to find in the body of the law the amswer to the question
what is prohibited and what is permitted, and will not depend in this matter on tie dis-
cretion of the executing government.
H.C. 113/52, Sachs v. Minister of Trade & Indus., 6 P.D. 696,702 (Ulshan,J.).
259 See supra text accompanying notes 98-99, 158-60.
-W6 New York v. United States, 342 US. 882.884 (1951) (Douglas,J.); and in a similar spirit.
Justice Barak stated that "the finest hour of the law is when it imposes restrictions on the discre-
tion of any governmental authority. This is true of every governmental authority.' H.C.
953/87, 1/88, Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Avi,.Jaffa, 42(2) P.D. 309.325.
-61 H.C. 542/76, 103/77, Consortium Int'l Ltd. v. Director Gen. of Ministry of Communica-
tions, 31(3) P.D. 477,483 (AsherJ.).
2 See F.H. 16/61, Registrar of Co. v. Kardosh, 16 P.D. 1209, tramnslated in 4 SE ECTED
JUDGMENTS SUP. Cr. IsR. 32,35-39; H.C. 680/88, Schnitzer v. Shani, 42(4) P.D. 617, trasilated m
9 SELECEDJUDGMENTS SUP. Cr. IsR. 77, 104-09.
With regard to the need for the administrative authority to supplement what has been
omitted by the legislature-in so far as it concerns the prevention of excessive discretion and
suitable review of its activities-by means of confining and structuring its discretion, inter alia by
issuing rules and general statements of policy, see KENNETH CUL' DAVIS DL O.Rmrosu
JuSrIcE-A PREIMtIARY INQUIRY 52-141 (1969). Set genrra/ CRAMG, supra note 180. at 521-23:
DENISJAMES GALIGAN, DiscR ioNARY PoWERs (1986); THE USES OF DLscrtETION (Keith Haw-
kins ed. 1992); Robert Baldwin &John Houghton, CirrularArgurents: The Status and Legitirwia
ofAdministrative Rues 1986 PUB. L 239; Denis James Galligan, The Nature and Function of Poids
with Discretionary Power, 1976 PUB. L 332;JeffreyJowell. The Legal Cantrol of Administralive Discre-
tion, 1973 PUB. L 178; Abraham D. Sofaer, Judicial Control of Inforyal DiscrTionary Adjudication
and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L RE%. 1293 (1972).
20 See, ag., F.H. Cr. 2316/95, Genimat v. State, 49(4) P.D. 589,653; M.A.Cr. 537/95, Genimat
v. State, 49(3) P.D. 355, 417-18.
-61 See supra text accompanying notes 158-60.
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this, in exercising its power the authority must take into account all
the considerations relevant to that power.6  Among these considera-
266tions are the basic values of the legal system, and, in the matter at
hand, the protected rights.2 67 In other words, despite the existence of
the violating power, the authority must consider exercising it in such
a manner so as not to violate the right or, alternatively, to cause
minimal damage.6  Where the authority has "transgressed" by ignor
ing this consideration, its decision will be invalidated.26 9
3. Reasonableness
As reference is made to a power by virtue of which it is possible to
violate a protected right, considerations relating to the protection of
the right confront relevant considerations concerning its violation.
As noted, the authority must take all of these into account. This clash
of considerations requires the authority to strike a balance between
them by giving appropriate weight to each factor.27 ' Again, the weight
given to the consideration of protecting the right is strengthened in
light of the constitutional status of the basic rights involved .27  This is
the case in relation to "new" legislation and "old" legislation. 27 An
H.C. 5445/93, Municipality of Ramle v. Minister of Interior, 50(1) P.D. 397, 410 (Zamir,
J.) ("[A]s is well known, the rule holds that every administrative authority must base its decision,
first, exclusively on relevant considerations, and second, on all the relevant considerations."); see
also H.C. 7365/95, Bolus Bros. Marble & Granite Mfg. Co. v. Investment Ctr., 50(2) P.D. 89, 97.SeeH.C. 953/87, 1/88, Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, 42(2) P.D. 309, 322; CA. 105/92,
Re'em Eng'g Contractors Ltd. v. Municipality of Upper Nazareth, 47(5) P.D. 189, 201; H.C.
5688/92, Waxelbaum v. Minister of Defense, 47(2) P.D. 812, 824 (Barak,J.) ("The relevant con-
siderations are derived from the purpose of the legislation. They include the particular goals
which the legislation is designed to achieve and the fundamental principles of the system, which
provide a 'normative umbrella' and general purpose for the entire legislation. ... ")..67 See F.H.H.C. 3299/93, Waxelbaum v. Minister of Defense, 49(2) P.D. 195, 201; H.C.
987/94, Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd. v. Minister of Communications, 48(5) P.D. 412, 433;
Waxelbaum, 47(2) P.D. at 827.
- SeelH.C. 5263/94, Hirshensohn v. Minister of Fin., 49(5) P.D. 837, 847; Euronet, 48(5) P.D.
at 433.
.69 See generally Bolus Bros., 50(2) P.D. at97 (Zamir,J.) ("Disregard by the authority of relevant
considerations may lead to the invalidation of the authority's decision."); Municipality of Rame,
50(1) P.D. at 410. The quoted formulation of the general rule leaves an opening for not invali-
dating an administrative decision even if the authority disregarded a relevant consideration.
This takes into account the vast complex of considerations which may be relevant in respect of a
particular power and which the authority may not always be capable of weighing. At the same
time, the authority must certainly address the central and fundamental considerations, in the
absence of which the decision will be invalidated. See DE SMITH Er AL., supra note 193, at 210-11;
ZAMIR, supra note 44, at 743-44;. In this context, one must include considerations concerning
the prevention of infringements of human rights, see Euronet, 48(5) P.D. at 433, and certainly
those preventing the infringement of protected rights.
270 See, e.g., Poraz, 42(2) P.D. at 335-38.
2 See Hirshensohn, 49(5) P.D. at 847; F.H. Cr. 2316/95, Genimat v. State, 49(4) P.D. 589, 653;
MA.Cr. 537/95, Genimat v. State, 49(3) P.D. 355, 417-19.
-. See supra text accompanying notes 141-48. It may be expected that the Basic Laws will also
have a strengthening influence in respect of the weight of basic rights which are not protected
therein, in the balance between these rights and other conflicting considerations. See supra text
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improper balance between the conflicting considerations %ill lead to
the invalidation of the decision on the ground of unreasonableness.' "
Concurrently with the added weight given to human rights in
connection with the duty of the administrative authority to exercise
its discretion reasonably, it seems that the latter duty may also attain a
constitutional status which will restrict the power of the legislature to
violate it by ordinary legislation. Prior to the adoption of the Basic
Laws being discussed here, the case law held that even if the Court
regarded the decision of an authority in a particular case as unrea-
accompanying note 147. Indeed, even before the enactment of the Basic Laws. significant
weight was given to basic rights in drawing the proper balance betveen them and other consid-
erations relevant to the exercise of the discretion of the competent administrative atthorivy.
See, e.g., H.C. 680/88, Schnitzer v. Shani, 42(4) P.D. 617, translatald in 9 SELLc.rEDJUDG.ML"rS
Sup. Cr. IsR. 77, 101. See also Bracha, supra note 129, at 83-85. On the other hand, e-en in the
era of the Basic Laws, one cannot assume, of course, that the increased significance accorded to
human rights in the exercise of the administrative discretion will inevitably lead to a balanced
result which prevents their infringement. Se, eg., H.C. 2740/96, Shance" v. Supervisor of Dia-
monds, 51 (4) P.D. 481,495-96.
_M See generaly H.C. 935, 940, 943/89, Ganor v. Auorney Gen., 44(2) P.D. .185, 513-14. ex-
traced in PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 334 (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysbiat eds., 1996); H.C. 389/80.
Golden Pages Ltd. v. Executive Bd. of Broad. Auth., 35(1) P.D. 421,444-47. The test of reaso n-
ableness enables the court to determine the proper weight to be given to each of te relevant
considerations and determine the "zone of reasonableness," in which are located all die solu-
tions from which "a reasonable administrative authority" is entitled to choose the one it sees fit.
without the court intervening in its decision; Golden Pages, 35(1) P.D at 440-42 (BarakJ.). In-
deed-
This administrative authority is not a screen and cover for die views of the court, as the
question is not what the court would have done in the concrete circumstances, but
whether a reasonable administrative authority would have acted in die way in which die
public servant actually acted.
Id. at 440-41. However
At the same time, it cannot be denied that the final decision is in die hands of die court.
as the court and none other, determines what the reasonable achninistrative authority
might decide. This is what gives rise to the heavy responsibility imposed on die court.
which must distinguish betveen the solution which it regards as desirable and die solu-
tion which a reasonable authority might accept. On occasion, the two overlap, as die so-
lution which appears desirable to the court is also the only solution which a reasonable
authority might accept. However, frequently, the two are not identical, as the solution
which appears desirable to the court is only one of die solutions which a reasonable
authority might accept. In such a case, the court must restrain itself, and it must enable
the administrative authority to choose the option which it regards as proper....
Id. at 441.
The fineness of the line between the "evaluation" of die 'reasonable administrative
authority" and the "evaluation" of the judge before whom die administrative decision is being
challenged, may be seen in additional cases. S4 e.g., H.C. 14/86, Laor v. Film & Theatre Su-
pervisory Bd., 41 (1) P.D. 421,438-39; MC. 806/88, Universal City Studios Inc. v. Film & Theatre
Supervisory Board, 43(2) P.D. 22, 36, translated in 10 SELEC ED JUDGMENTS SUP. CT. Is. 9,
246-47; Ganor, 44(2) P.D. at 513; Schnitzer, translated in 9 SELECrEDJUDGMENTS Sup. Cr. IsR. at
101-02, 115; see also State Service Appeal [S.S.A.] 4123/95, Or v. State, 49(5) P.D. 184, 192. The
Basic Laws-and the protected human rights therein-will therefore have great weight when die
courts are required to determine the scope of the zone of reasonableness.
Regarding the reasonableness test see generally, Ariel L Bendor, Are thtre Limits tojusti-
dability?-TheJurisprudential and Constitutional Contrtin-. in Light of the lsrad and Arajiran Exeri-
ence, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 311, 357-76 (1997); Bracha. supra note 129, at 81-88; ltzhak
Zamir, Unreasonableness, Balance of Interests and Propodionality, 11 TEL Aviv U. STUD. L 131
(1992).
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sonable, so long as the authority attracted statutory support-that is,
the authority adopted the policy of the primary legislature-the deci-
sion would be left in place and the Court would not intervene."'
Where reference is made to rights protected by the Basic Laws, it
seems that it may be argued that the legal position has now changed.
AsJustice Barak has commented:
[A]fter the enactment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, the
requirement of reasonableness is derived from the provision of the [Sec-
tion 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom] that "the rights con-
ferred by this Basic Law shall not be infringed save where provided by a
law which befits the values of the State of Israel, intended for a proper
purpose, and to an extent no greater than required." The requirement
of reasonableness may be found within the ambit of the phrase "proper
purpose" or within the ambit of the phrase "to an extent no greater than
required. 
"275
These remarks also apply, of course, to the power of an adminis-
trative authority "under an aforesaid law,"'' 6 by virtue of which it is
possible to violate protected rights.l It is also possible to base the
demand for reasonableness upon the duty provided for in the limita-
tion clause by virtue of which the violating law-or the administrative
decision made under it-will befit "the values of the State of Israel."
According to Justice Barak, reasonableness is "one of the basic
values of our legal system."28 The conclusion derived from this analy-
sis is that an unreasonable decision by an administrative authority
may be invalidated even if it is anchored in the empowering statute
and the decision adopts and implements the statute's policy. In
-74 See H.C. 120/73, Tobis v. Israel, 27(1) P.D. 757, 759; CA. 780/70, Municipality of Tel
Aviv-Jaffa v. Sapir, 25(2) P.D. 486, 491, 497; H.C. 580/77, General Ass'n of Merchants in lsr. v.
Municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaff-, 32(2) P.D. 780, 782 (Cohn,J.):
[Elven an unreasonable law is a binding law, and the powers based thereon may lead to
the promulgation of a regulation which is similarly binding, even though the same un-
reasonableness adheres to it too-not because the regulation is made reasonable, but
because its unreasonableness is remedied in advance in the law under which it was
promulgated.
See also H.C. 310/80, Dror of the S. Dev. Co. v. Municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, 35(1) P.D. 253, 262
(BechorJ.):
In the examination of the validity of the provisions of the secondary legislator, the test of
unreasonableness provides a tool for examining the will and intention of the sovereign
legislator, which granted the power to the secondary legislator, and if the secondary leg-
islator followed the primary legislator (the Knesset), the ground underlying the claim of
unreasonableness of the secondary legislation is removed ....
H.C. 487/81, M.S.B. Ltd. v. Mayor of Tel Aviv, 36(2) P.D. 278, 279-80. See also Eyal Zamir, Un-
reasonableness-A Ground for Judicial Intervention in Administrative Law, 12 MISHPATIM 291, 313-18
(1982) (Hebrew).
75 BARAK, supra note 132, at 543. The contents of the quoted passage are equally true of
freedom of occupation protected in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.
26 Section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, and Section 4 of Basic Law: Free-
dom of Occupation. For this provision in the limitation clause, see supra text accompanying
notes 149-204.
M See BARAK, supra note 132, at 545.
-7 Id. at 456.
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other words, the requirement of reasonableness attains a constitu-
tional dimension and will be used to examine the balances in the
empowering statute which violates a protected right and which must
meet the provisions of the limitation clause.'  Against this back-
ground one may understand the comments of Justice Cheshin in
connection with the collection of a radio fee for the Broadcasting
Authority:
All would agree, it seems to me, that empowering the Broadcasting
Authority to collect radio fees from those who have no radio set installed
in their car, is, at the least, an unusual requirement.... Indeed, subject
to the provisions of a constitution, to fundamental principles of natural
law and to basic principles of democracy, the legislature is entitled to
provide for any norm which it sees fit, even if, in our eyes, the norm
seems to be unreasonable and inappropriate. However, at the least, we
require from the legislature that it take courage and state its position ex-
pressly... if its ensuing statement will appear or sound somewhat falter-
ing-fundamental principles of the s)tem: ,Justice, logic and reason-
ableness will themselves supply what 
is lacking.
4. Proportionality
The upgrading of the requirement of reasonableness to a consti-
tutional level by making it part of the limitation clause also seems ap-
propriate if one bears in mind that the requirement of proportional-
ity, which is proximate to reasonableness, was expressly adopted by
the limitation clause, and makes the validity of the provision violating
the protected right contingent upon it being "to an extent no greater
than required."
The test of proportionality, as one of the criteria which must be
applied by the authority in exercising its discretion, was known to Is-
raeli administrative law even prior to being adopted by the Basic Laws
concerning human rights.2I The test is primarily used in the area of
human rights,m when these are violated by a decision of an adminis-
trative authority which is intended to achieve a legitimate purpose for
Cf. BARAK, supra note 10, at 227-28. Se also H.C. 726, 878/94. Clal Ins. Co. v. Minister of
Fin., 48(5) P.D. 441, 473-74 (Levin, J.); CA. 6821/93, United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal
Cop. VIIl., 49 (4) P.D. 221,462-63; Levin, supra note 22, at 617-20.
H.C. 5503/94, Segal v. Speaker of Knesset, 51(4) P.D. 529,554.
See gnmi y Bracha, supra note 129, at 85-91; Zeev Segal, Disproposriali^Y in Adminstrative
Law, 39 HAPRAKLrr 507 (1990) (Hebrew); Zamir, supra note 274, at 135-36.
2 However, use has also been made of de test in other fields such as when examining dte
question whether it is justified to promulgate emergency regulations instead of making use of
the ordinary legislative power of the Knesset. Sr-H.C. 2994/90, Poraz v. Israel, 44(3) P.D. 317.
The principle of proportionality in this context has now been adopted constitutionally, in Sec-
tion 50(e) of Basic Lav the Government "No emergency regulations shall be promulgated
and no arrangements, measures and powers shall be implemented thereunder, save to the ex-
tent that the emergency situation requires." The same provision appears in Section 39(e) of
the 2001 version of the Basic Law. See also H.C. 6971, 6972/98, Paritzki v. Israel, 53(1) P.D. 763.
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which the power has been granted. "'8 Inspired by comparative law,
the courts in Israel have given it meaning' through three subsidiaV
tests focusing on the relations between the means and the purpose.
These subsidiary tests are also applicable to constitutional propor-
tionality, which as noted, has been incorporated into the Basic Laws
as part of the limitation clause. 2m Accordingly, today it is a constitu-
23 See, e.g., H.C. 987/94, Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd. v. Minister of Communications,
48(5) P.D. 412, 435-38; H.C. 1255/94, Bezeq, Isr. Communications Co. v. Minister of Commu-
nications, 49(3) P.D. 661, 687-88; H.C. 3477/95, Ben-Atiya v. Minister of Educ., Culture &
Sport, 49(5) P.D. 1, 9-16. In the latter caseJustice Barak also considered the nexus between the
ground of proportionality and the ground of reasonableness. See id. at 14-15. For this latter
point, see also H.C. 8016/96, Stamka v. Minister of Interior, 52(2) P.D. 728, 776.
2&- See, e.g., 1715/97, Chamber of Inv. Managers in lsr. v. Minister of Fin., 51(4) P.D. 367,
384-89, 420-21; H.C. 5016, 5025, 5090, 5434/96, Horev v. Minister of Transp., 51(4) P.D. 1, 53-
54; Ben-Atiya, 49(5) P.D. at 9-15; United Mizrachi Bank Ltd, 49(4) P.D. at 436-37.
Ben-Atiya, 49(5) P.D. at 12-13 (Barak,J.):
In the majority of legal systems, in which the principle of proportionality is accepted, it
has been held that it comprises three elements, or subsidiary tests. The first element of
the proportionality test states that there must be compatibility between the purpose and
the means. The means which the administration applies must be shaped to achieve tile
purpose which the administration wishes to achieve. The means must lead in a rational
manner to the realization of the purpose. This is the test of the suitable means or tile ra-
tional means ....
The second element which makes up the proportionality, holds that the means which the
administration selects must injure the individual to the least possible extent. The adimin-
istrative tailor must sew the administrative suit in such a manner that it is tailored to tile
purpose guiding him, while choosing the means least injurious to the person. This is tile
test of the means of least injury ....
The third element of the proportionality test states that the means which the administra-
tion chooses is not proper, if the injury to the individual is disproportionate to the bene-
fit which it achieves in implementing the purpose. This is the test of the proportional
means (or the proportionality in the "narrow sense").
The origin of the principle of proportionality is found in German administrative law, where,
over the years, it has been perfected into sophisticated ground for judicial supervision over ad-
ministrative decisions. See NICHoLAs EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN
EUROPEAN LAW-A COMPARATIVE STUDY 2 (1996); SCHWARZE, supra note 25, at 685, 692;
MAHENDRA P.S. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN COMMON LAW PERsPEcrIvE 88 (1985).
Indeed, in the Ben-Atiya case, in setting out the three subsidiary tests for proportionality, Justice
Barak quoted the summary in Zamir, supra note 250, at 131, which refers to the subsidiary tests
in German law.
W6 As Justice Zamir stated in United Mizrachi Bank Ltd.:
[T]he rule in this matter is the same, in both constitutional law and administrative law.
Moreover, the rule which bases the proportionality on the three elements.., is... tle
proper rule. It equips the court with a sophisticated and efficient tool, which is based on
the experience in other countries and in international courts, in respect of the review of
the legality of the various types of statutes, regulations and administrative decisions.
49(4) P.D. at 470 (ZamirJ.). See also id. at 436 (Barak,J.); Ben-Atiya, 49(5) P.D. at 10-11; Horev,
51(4) P.D. at 53; Chamber of Inv. Managers in Isr., 51(4) P.D. at 421-22.
The German Constitutional Court adjudicated in the same way, in locating the principle of
proportionality, which had already been recognized in administrative law, on the constitutional
level. The case law concerns legislation which injures freedoms protected in the German Basic
Law, although the latter does not expressly refer to the said principle of proportionality. See
EMILIOU, supra note 285, at 53-59; KOMMERS, supra note 114, at 46; SCHvARZE, supra note 25, at
686-90; SINGH, supra note 285, at 88-89. The constitutional adoption led to further strengthen-
ing of the principle in administrative law. See Georg Nolte, General Principles of German and Euro.
pean Administrative Law-A Comparison in Historical Perspecive 57 MOD. L. REV. 191,202 (1994).
For the need for a constitutional dimension to be given to the principle of proportionality in
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tional requirement that a law violating a protected right and the ex-
ercise of administrative powers under it, meet the test of proportion-
ality.2
1
5. Equalty
An additional ground for examining administrative discretion-
which, as we shall see, has also achieved constitutional upgrading-
concerns the prohibition against discrimination. An administrative
authority must act on the basis of equality.!" The principle of equal-
ity is one of the basic values of the Israeli legal system?7' It is one of
the most prominent values: "this unwritten principle is the soul of
our entire constitutional regime."2" Accordingly, there is a presump-
tion that the legislature did not empower the administrative authority
order to reduce the infringement of protected constitutional rights. on occasions hen the leg-
islator possesses the power to infringe rights, see generally David Beaty , The Canadian iarter of
Rights: Lessons and Laments 60 MOD. L REv. 481, 484 (1997); David Beaty. Law and Politics, 44
AN.J. COMP. L. 131, 140 (1996).
The test of proportionality leaves the governmental authority discretion in respect of its
implementation:
In implementing the principle of proportionality-and primarily in examnining tie
means which causes the least infringement-one must recognize the zone of inanoctu-
verability of the governmental authority. Often, there are a number of %ways in which
one may meet the duty of proportionality. Sometimes tie situation is border line. In
these and other cases one must recognize the existence of zone of manocuverability of
the governmental authority. This zone is similar to tie zone of reasonableness of tie
executive authority .... This recognition of tie scope of governmental discretion is
based on the institutional advantage of tie governmental authority in examining possi-
ble alternatives, and its national responsibility-a responsibility imposed on it within tie
framework of the principle of the separation of powers--to implement tie proper pur-
pose ....
Ben-At ia, 49(5) P.D. at 13-14 (BarakJ.). H.C. 450/97, Tnufa Manpower & Maintenance Service
Ltd- v. Minister of Labor & Welfire, 52(2) P.D. 433.452 (DornerJ.) ("At the same time, reason
dictates that the 'zone of proportionality' which is conferred on te executive authority may be
narrower than that conferred on the legislative authority.").
On the constitutional zone of maneuverability (margin of appreciation or reasonable
room to manoeuvre) given to the discretion of the legislature in connection with the ground of
proportionality, see Tnufa Manpower & Maintenance Sew,, 52(2) P.D. at 452-53: Chamd.r of hn,.
Managers in Isr., 51(4) P.D. at 386-89, 419-23; United Mirarhi Banh Ltd., 49(4) P.D. at 437-41.
574-75. Seegenerally supra text accompanying notes 115-18.
2M Reference is to equality among equals, or, more precisely, among those where tie differ-
ence between them is not relevant for the purpose of the particular power. .. 4 e.g. F.H. 10/69,
Boronovskyv. Chief Rabbis of Isr., 25(1) P.D. 7,35. This is the Aristotelian perspective, which is
primarily expressed in Israeli case law in connection with the significance of tie concept of
equality. Of course, there are other perspectives, and recently the latter have been reflected
more and more in the case law. This is not the place to discuss this topic. Ser gerieral/y Itzhak
Zamir & Moshe Sobel, Equai Before the Law, 5 LW & GOV'T Isp. 165, 170-7.1 (1999). Cf. H.C.
1703/92, C.AL Cargo Air Lines v. Prime Minister, 52(4) P.D. 193, 235-37; Runt BEN-ISA.,
EQUALrIY OF OPPORTUNrTIES AND PROHIBrrION OF DIsCiINATIoN IN EommLOimENT 19-32
(1998); see infra note 298.
MLC. 637/89, Constitution for the State of Israel v. Minister of Finance, 46(l) P.D. 191.
204 (BarakJ.) ("[Tihe principle of equality is basic to our system, and one of the corner stones
of our constitutional system.").
0 .C. 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Fin., 23(1) P.D. 693, 698, translatod in 8 SEL cTED
JUDGMENTS SUP. Cr. ISR. 13, 18 (Landau,J.).
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to act in violation of the principle of equality.29' Over the years the
value under discussion has been transformed from being a mere
ground for examining administrative discretion to becoming a basic
right-namely, the right to equality.2 Nevertheless, in the absence
of constitutional anchorage of the right, the Knesset may violate a
right as well as empower an administrative authority to do the same.a-
As reference is to a basic right, it is subject to the rule developed in
the case law concerning the need for clear, unequivocal (and appar-
ently also express) authorization in relation to the aforesaid in-
fringement.2
And what is the effect of the Basic Laws? The right to equality is
not referred to therein as a protected right.2 Similarly, there are
numerous statements in the case law from which it appears that it is
guaranteed as part of the right to dignity26 If this view is accepted,
the right to equality will be transformed into a protected right, and
violation thereof will be permitted only in accordance with the tests
of the limitation clause. However, despite these statements, no judi-
cial determination has yet been made on this matter.27 Even if the
-91 See, BEN-ISRAEL, supra note 288, at 244-47, 251-52; RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 10, at
273-74; ZAItR, supra note 44, at 103-04; BARAK, supra note 132, at 457-59, 567.
2 See, e.g., Constitutionfor the State ofIsrae 46(l) P.D. at 202; C.A.L., 52(4) P.D. at 230 (Barak,
J.) ("Equality is a right from which the individual draws his vitality."); see also Zamir & Sobel,
supra note 288, at 205-08.
- H.C. 889/86, Cohn v. Minister of Labor & Welfare, 41 (2) P.D. 540, 546 (Ben-Porath, J.)
("[I]n the absence of a constitution the Knesset has the jurisdiction and the power to enact a
law which is discriminatory, and having done so, there is no choice but to act in accordance
with it."). See also Cr.A. 621/88, Feiler v. State, 47(3) P.D. 112, 121-22; H.C. 120/73, Tobis v.
Israel, 27(1) P.D. 757, 759. Cf H.C. 5263/94, Hirshensohn v. Minister of Fin., 49(5) P.D. 837.
-94 See supra text accompanying notes 122-32; see also H.C. 4541/94, Miller v. Minister of De-
fense, 49(4) P.D. 94, 139 (Dorner, J.) ("The assumption is... that the authority must exercise
its powers while respecting the basic rights of the person, including the prohibition against dis-
criminating against women-unless it has been given express power not to do so.").
Cf Frances Raday, On Equality, 24 MISHPATIM 241, 250-51 (1994-1995) (Hebrew).
For the legislative history explaining the background for the non-incltsion of the right in
Basic Law. Human Dignity and Freedom, see RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 10, at 956;
Karp, supra note 10, at 338-40, 345-47.
One of the aspects of the right to equality-in connection with elections to the Knesset-
is expressly guaranteed constitutionally in Section 4 of Basic Law. the Knesset (cited in supra
note 108). See supra text accompanying notes 108-11.
"9 See the references to cases in which these statements appear and the references to the
leO literature on this issue in Zamir & Sobel, supra note 288, at 210.
- The judicial determination is largely dependent on the question whether the list of rights
set out in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, is a "closed" list, or whether the protected
rights concerning human dignity (Sections 2 and 4) and freedom (Section 5) include tinder
their umbrella additional rights which have not been specified in the Basic Laws, such as the
right to equality. For a discussion of this question, see Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to
a Written Constitution: the Israeli Challenge in American Perspective, 26 COLUN. HUM. RTs. L. REv.
309, 342-44 (1995);Judith Karp, Questions on Human Dignity According to the Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Freedomn, 25 MISHPATIM 129 (1995) (Hebrew); Hillel Sommer, Non-Enumerated Rights:
on the Scope of the Constitutional Revolution, 28 MISHPATIM 257 (1997) (Hebrew).
In this context, one should also note an approach which is more "moderate" than the one
which recognizes the full scope of the right to equality as a protected constitutional right, ac-
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aforesaid view is rejected, it is clear that at least wvith regard to pro-
tected rights, the prohibition against discrimination has been up-
graded to a constitutional level in the sense that it expresses the val-
ues of the State of Israel and accordingly a statute-or an
administrative decision taken under it-which discriminates between
equals, with regard to a protected right, will not meet the require-
ments of the limitation clause and may be inalidated. -  In the same
way, the courts may obligate the appropriate authority-the legisla-
ture or the administrative authority-to prevent the violation by re-
quiring them to positively guarantee the right to equality ith regard
to a protected right-namely, to grant to B the same (protected)
right which was granted to A-where there is no difference between
them in terms of the factors relevant to the right under considera-
tion.2 The constitutional upgrading of the right to equality will also
cording to which "the Basic Law protects against violation of the principle or equality when the
violation causes insult, that is a violation of the dignity of a person as a person." Miler. 494)
P.D. at 133 (DornerJ.).
29 See C.A.L Cargo Air Lines v. Prime Minister, 52(4) P.D. 193,234-35: 7-AmR, supra note 44.
at 114-15. Indeed, in referring to a regulation "which includes a discriminatory provision.
which breaches equality and infringes human dignity," Justice Mazza held, in connection %ith
the limitation clause, that "needless to say, a regulation which incorporates a provision which
adopts a blatant discriminatory standard between holders of an equal right, does not befit the
values of the State of Israel." H.C. 205/94, Nofv. Minister of Defense, 50(5) P.D. .149. 462.
The fact that the principle of equality is included in the values of the State of Israel for dte pur-
pose of the limitation clause is strengthened by the "basic principles" clauses located in the Ba-
sic Laws (Section 1 of Basic Law- Freedom of Occupation and Section 1 of Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Freedom) which provide that human rights "%ill be honoured in the spirit of the
principles set out in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel." One of the
princlples which is emphasized by the Declaration is that the State of Israel "will ensure com-
plete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or
sex." Cf BARAK, supra note 10, at 405.
Of course, the principle of equality does not operate alone and it may clash ith other
values, with the ensuing need to draw a balance between them %ithin the context of the exami-
nation whether the requirements of the limitation clause have been met by the statute and the
administrative decision made thereunder.
The principle of equality may also be anchored in the requirement of proportionality in
the limitation clause. See Mille, 49(4) P.D. at 144; H.C. 2313/95, Contact Linsen (Israel) Ld. v.
Minister of Health, 50(4) P.D. 397,409 (GoldbergJ.):
[I]n order that the discrimination be permited, it is not sufficient hlt the difference be
relevant, it must also meet the test of proportionality. In other words, a suitable propor-
tionality must exist between the factual difference between die bodies under discussion.
and the difference in attitude of the authority towards them. The factual differences
may indeedjustify a certain difference in the attitude of the authority towards each of the
bodies, however, not more than this. A situation where the difference in attitude ex-
ceeds what is necessary, will also be deemed to be unlawful discrimination ....
299 Seesupra text accompaning notes 70-71. In the area of administrative law, die courts have
indeed occasionally preferred to ensure "positive" equality (by granting a right to B. who has
been discriminated against) rather than its "negative" counterpart (negating the right of A. who
has been shown preference). See, eg., H.C. 678, 803/88, Kfar Vradim v. Minister of Fin.. 43(2)
P.D. 501; H.C. 696/89, RM.I.Jerusalem Medical Ctr. Ltd. v. Minister of Health, 44(3) P.D. 113:
see genera/y H.C. 637/89, Constitution for the State of Israel v. Minister of Finance, 46(1) P.D.
191, 205. In H.C. 721/94, El-Al Isr. Airlines Ltd. v. Daniloitz, 48(5) P.D. 7-19. die Supreme
Court applied this approach within the area of labor law in relation to collective agreements
and arrangements. Justice Barak adopted the remedy of extension or reading in. recognized in
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strenohen its status in relation to laws which preceded the Basic
Laws.
IV. CONCLUSION
Israel's general administrative law" ' is essentially ,udge-made
law3 2 It is in the nature of "common law-Israel style. Through
theirjudgments, the courts have supplemented omissions of the legis-
lature. In recent years, a number of statutes have been enacted
which contain framework arrangements within the area of adminis-
trative law,35 however, the general picture has not changed. Thus,
for example, in the area of the administrative process, no general law
has yet been enacted regarding administrative procedure, as is com-
mon, inter alia, in a number of European countries and in the United
States.' °5  This issue-despite its conceptual3 and practical impor-
tance in guiding daily administrative work-is still primarily regulated
by the rulings of the Supreme Court.
In their judgments in the area of administrative law, the courts
have given expression to the basic values of the legal system, even
though, for many years, the majority of these values did not enjoy
constitutional regulation or, indeed, even statutory regulation. Thus,
the basic values attained a normative dimension as part of the unwrit-
certain legal systems, id. at 764-67, even though the above terms, in connection with tie remn-
edy, did not meet favour with the judge. Id. at 765. This remedy may be relevant on the consti-
tutional level in the sense of the obligation placed on the legislature to enact a law which will
positively guarantee equality. See id. at 767; H.C. 7111, 8195/95, Local Gov't Ctr. v. Knesset,
50(3) P.D. 485, 510; H.C. 5503/94, Segal v. Speaker of Knesset, 51(4) P.D. 529, 548; see also
Vriend v. Alberta, 156 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (1998) (Supreme Court of Canada); Timothy Macklen,
Vriend v. Alberta: Making the Private Publi, 44 McGILL L.J. 197 (1999). with regard to the above-
mentioned remedy, see generally BARAK, supra note 10, at 759-67; HOGG, supra note 103, at 928-
33. For the possibility of obliging the legislature to legislate in order to guarantee the positive
implementation of a right protected in the Basic Laws, see supra text accompanying notes 104-
18.
3o See H.C. 5263/94, Hirshensohn v. Minister of Fin., 49(5) P.D. 837; see generally supra text
accompanying notes 141-46.
301 For the distinction between "general" and "particular" administrative law, see H.
KLINGHOFFER, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW 44-45 (1957) (Hebrew). See also BRADLEY & EWING, supra
note 103, at 697; DAvID FouLKEs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1-2 (8th ed. 1995).sc" See BRAcHA, supra note 23, at 27-30.
303 See, e.g., H.C. 531/79, Likud Faction in Petach Tikvah Municipality v. Petach Tikvah Mu-
nicipality, 34(2) P.D. 566, 573 (Barak, J.); CA. 180/71, Lavi v. Remuneration Officer, 26(2)
P.D. 501, 509 (WitkonJ.); H.C. 5734/98, Azriel v. Subcommittee of the Israel Land Council,
53(2) P.D. 8, 13.
SeeAdministrative Tribunals Law, 1992, 1991-1992 S.H. 90; Mandatory Tenders Law, 1992,
1991-1992 S.H. 114. In addition to the Basic Laws with which this article is concerned, see
Freedom of Information Law and Basic Law: The Government. See supra text accompanying
notes 31-37. These laws join a number of older statutes which also provided, in certain areas,
general arrangements in administrative law. See Interpretation Ordinance (New Version); Ad-
ministrative Procedure Amendment (Decisions and Statement of Reasons), 1958, 13 L.S.1. 7;
Basic Law: The Government (1966); Interpretation Law.
305 See Itzhak Zamir, Preparing a Law ofAdministrative Procedure-The Need and Situation in Israel
and Other Countries 12 MISHPATIM 334 (1982) (Hebrew); BRACHA, supra note 38, at 18-21.
See supra text accompanying notes 205-11.
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ten constitution of the State of Israel. °'
This jurisprudence to a large extent determined the rules of the
game in the relations betveen the governmental authority, which
possesses powers, and the individual, who enjoys basic rights.- The
rules of the game operated subject to the legislative sovereignty of the
Knesset and to a large extent they relied on its assumed intention,
while making use of interpretive presumptions which reflected the
basic values. Over the years, the rules of administrative law devel-
oped as substantive rules.s'° However, they, were alwvays subject to leg-
islative provisions which could reject them,3" for example, in the con-
text of powers under a specific law. 
3
2
The constitutional development of the administrative law did not
sprout, therefore, on barren land but rather on fertile and well-
ploughed soil, 13 which gave birth to the common law-Israel style."'
However, the crops which grew on this land in the past, needed
strengthening against the legislature. Indeed the combination of the
Basic Laws of 1992 concerning human rights and thejudgment in the
W7 See, for example, in the context of protection of human rights, supra text accompaning
notes 122-32.
ss See, eg., the references in supra note 123.
See, for example, regarding natural justice, supra note 234; and regarding equality, supra
text accompanying notes 291-94.
310 See ITZHAK ZAMIR, ADMINISTAmW PROCEDURE IN ISMAEL AND ARTiClE 46 OF THE ORDER IN
CoumCL 71 (1973).
3 See, for example, with regard to the rejection of the requirement of reasonablenes supra
text accompanying note 274; and with regard to the rejection of the principle of eqtality. supra
text accompanying note 293.
.312 See general!y BRACHA, supra note 23, at 14; and specifically regarding the delegation of
power, see BRACHA, supra note 38, at 216-17.
The specific reference to a particular rule of administrative law in a specific statute, does
not necessarily entail the denial of the general law on the matter, as held in the case law. Thus,
for example, reference to certain aspects of the rules of natural justice in a statute and disre-
gard of other aspects, does not necessarily mean rejection of the latter. S H.C. 531/79. Likud
Faction in Petach Tikvah Municipality v. Pemch Tikvah Municipality, 341(2) P.D. 566, 57.-75.
Thus, the question which must be answered is whether, in the light of the purpose of the
legislature and the background of the issue, the provisions of the statute must be interpreted as
exhaustive provisions, which deny the principles of natural justice outside tiem, or whether the
provisions of the statute must be interpreted as crystallizing the principles of natural justice
which are included in them, and which permit tie application of the rules which are not in-
cluded in them-statutory arrangements and case law arrangements, tiving in harmony, one
alongside the other.
Id. at 575 (BarakJ.). In cases of doubt with regard to the proper interpretation of ite statute.
[T]he interpretive trend should be that the rules of natural justice--in so far as they
have not been expressly modified-continue to apply alongside die statute, and a statu-
tory provision which deals with the rules of natural justice, but which does not encom-
pass them, must be regarded, in these circumstances, as a supplementary and emphasiz-
ing provision, but not as an exhaustive provision.
IM.
313 See supra text accompanying notes 122-32.
314 Regarding proportionality, see, for example, supra text accompanying notes 281-87. See
also H.C. 5936/97, Lam v. Director General of die Ministry of Education, Culture & Sport
(forthcoming) at para. 1 (BarakJ.).
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United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. case,3  created a new constitutional-
normative reality in Israeli law,16 which stamped its mark on all the
branches of the law31' and in a clear, prominent and immediate man-
ner on the game rules of administrative law which are anchored in
the basic constitutional principles of the legal system.3 8 A large por-
tion of the rules were upgraded by being accorded protection under
the umbrella of the Basic Laws-sometimes as independent rules and
other times only within the area of protected rights-and by being
subjected to the legislator's capacity to manoeuver, only within the
boundaries allotted to it by the Basic Laws themselves, and in particu-
lar by the limitation clause. ' 9 This is the case, first and foremost, with
regard to the basic rule of administrative law which reflects the prin-
ciple of the legality of the administration, 32 as well as with regard to
the derivatives of that principle in the complex of activities of the
t 1y-i.e., the power, the process, and the administrative
discretion.324
Administrative law primarily expresses the proper balance be-
tween human rights and the public interest.325 With the elevation of
some of these rights to a constitutional level, the points of balance
also change-again in the complex of activities of the authority.3 0
Generalizing, one may say, therefore, that the authority must give
greater weight to protected rights-as well as to those which are not
protected 3 --- at every stage of its daily work, including activities an-
chored in the "old" law,' which impact on the interests of the indi-
vidual. The courts, for their part, must ensure, within the framework
ofjudicial review, that the administrative authorities indeed conduct
3,5 C.A. 6821/93, United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Viii., 49(4) P.D. 221.
316 Seesupra text accompanying notes 1-18.
7 See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
317 See supra text accompanying notes 21-23, 40-52.
3 9 Section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom and Section 4 of Basic Law: Free-
dom of Occupation.
3o Seesupra text accompanying notes 53-60.
321 See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
352 See supra text accompanying notes 122-204.
323 See supra text accompanying notes 205-50.
34 See supra text accompanying notes 251-300.
:2 See supra text accompanying note 119.
26 "[W]ith the enactment of the Basic Laws concerning human rights, new reciprocal rela-
tions were established between the individual and other individuals, and between the individual
and the public. A new balance was created between the individual and the government."
MA.Cr. 537/95, Genimatv. State, 49(3) P.D. 355,412 (Barak,J.). Moreover:
[T]he novelty in the Basic Laws lies not in the fact of the existence of the balance. The
novelty lies in the location of the point of balance. Elevating the status of human lights
on one hand, and limiting the scope of the considerations which may infringe them, on
the other hand, create by their very nature new reciprocal relations and new points of
balance between human rights and the infringement thereof.
Id. at 414. See also supra text accompanying notes 139-47, 209-11, 271-72.
S7 See supra text accompanying note 147.52 See supra text accompanying notes 141-46.
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themselves accordingly. That is, that the) give practical expression to
the change in the respective strength of the relevant interests. m In so
doing, the courts should not hesitate to impose duties on the admin-
istrative authorities, which are imperative in light of the new obliga-
tions, even if in the past the courts did not show any willingness to do
so.3 Such an approach would reinforce the constitutional nature of
administrative law in Israel.
329 The question to what extent the courts in practice implement the riles %hich they them-
selves establish in connection -with a given power merits examination in a separate article. See
suta note 147.
As an example, one may mention the unwillingness of the courts to subordinate the proc-
ess of promulgating regulations to the right to a hearing. Ser supra text accompanying notes
219-20. Against the background of the Basic Laws one may expect the courts to change their
approach. Seesupratextaccompanying note 222.
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